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A Study of Plato’s Use of Myths and its Relation to Philosophy and Moral Education 
Yoshiaki Nakazawa 
 
The way in which Plato’s uses of myth relate to his theory of moral education and his 
conception of philosophy is examined. Plato’s use and conception of myth (muthos) is 
notoriously difficult to determine, however, especially because it is difficult to determine 
whether and in what way Plato wishes to contrast muthos with logos. I argue that muthos 
plays an integral role in Plato’s philosophical investigation and dialectic, and therefore it 
is best understood as a “guise” of logos. Myth is not a suspension nor transcendence of 
logos, as scholars have suggested. Plato uses myth when he is concerned with moral 
education, that is, the moral transformation of the reader and the interlocutor. According 
to this line of interpretation, Plato’s myths play a heuristic role in service of his moral 
pedagogical goals. I outline Plato’s pedagogical goals in the context of his theory of 
moral education, and conclude with some suggestions about the integration of 
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Plato, like other Greek philosophers, treats the love of learning as a philosophical 
achievement. To some extent, taking pleasure in learning is a universal attribute for 
cognitive creatures, because we naturally take pleasure in perception as such. For 
cognitive creatures perception is constitutive of experience, and there is no pleasure—or 
pain—without experience. “[T]o be learning something is the greatest of pleasures”, 
Aristotle writes, “not only to the philosopher but also to the rest of mankind, however 
small their capacity for it” (Poetics 4, 1448b15). As this capacity for learning is 
developed into an intentional, rational love of learning, whose object is ultimately the 
knowledge of reality, one is becoming more like a philosopher. This is what thinkers like 
Plato and Aristotle contend. The capacity for learning is universal; and therefore there is 
a universal capacity for developing our philosophical abilities, however little or greatly. 
But to what extent ought we to develop our philosophical capacity? And what kind or 
which part of our education develops this capacity? One encounters in Plato’s dialogues 
various attempts to address these sorts of questions, and one also finds Plato’s Socrates 
exhorting his interlocutors to pursue the development of their love for investigating, to 
conceive of the possession of knowledge as a moral achievement, and therefore to take 
seriously their methods for investigation.  
 
I am considering in a very rough and sketchy way an important Platonic idea. Namely 
that our natural desire for knowledge finds its expression in the pleasure we take in 




obviously do not conceptualize the aim of our “desire for knowledge”, nor the 
significance of the pleasure we take in learning. But there is the potential for its 
development into an intentional and rational—that is to say a self-consciously held 
motivation—desire. According to Plato the development here is a specifically 
philosophical education.  
 
I am interested in examining further Plato’s idea that a philosophical education is an 
important part of moral development. Plato sees the fruits of a philosophical education as 
an ethical or moral1 achievement. Naturally, then, in this area of Plato’s thought there are 
several important assumptions about the purposes of a philosophical education that work 
toward convincing us of its ethical significance. Plato’s ideas deserve attention in their 
own right, but what makes his thought on philosophical education more interesting is his 
incorporation of myths. I wish to examine the ways in which Plato’s mythologizing can 
further shed light on the connection he envisages between philosophical and moral 
development. It should become clear, in this study, that Plato’s myths are neither a 
stylistic idiosyncrasy nor the upshot of failing to grasp a more refined style of 
philosophical argument. Myths play an important role in Plato’s philosophical thought, a 
role for which in certain chunks of his dialogues Plato deemed other modes of thinking 
unsuitable. It is my aim to show that Plato’s use of myths rather reveal the educational 
transformation he envisaged for his readers (and Socrates’ interlocutors in the dialogues). 
 
                                                
1 I am not employing an important contrast between the ethical and the moral, nor will I 




But before introducing this topic of study in further detail and outlining its program of 
pursuit in this dissertation, I will quote an abridged passage from a fragment which, 
although it did not have a title in the condition in which it was found, is commonly called 
The Oldest Systematic Program of German Idealism, following Franz Rosenzweig. I 
quote this passage for two reasons. First, for what it is worth, the following document, 
whose author is thought to be Hegel, intimates an important connection between 
philosophy and mythology, which provided the inspiration for this topic of study. An 
interest in philosophy’s relation to mythology is anchored in the power of philosophy to 
educate. Second, as difficult as it is to take confidence in one’s interpretation of this 
admittedly strange document, it does make clear its conviction for the idea that 
philosophy is of interest for all. Again, the justification for this is to be found in 
philosophy’s contribution to educating people about important philosophical ideas like 
freedom, goodness, and beauty.  
  
Here is the passage: 
 
An Ethics. […] 
Only that which is the object of freedom is called idea. […] 
[A] Finally the idea which unites all, the idea of beauty, the word taken in 
the higher platonic sense. I am convinced that the highest act of reason, which, in 
that it comprises all ideas, is an aesthetic act, and that truth and goodness are 
united like sisters only in beauty— The philosopher must possess just as much 




philosophers of the letter. [B] The philosophy of the spirit is an aesthetic 
philosophy. One cannot be clever in anything, one cannot even reason cleverly in 
history—without aesthetic sense. It should now be revealed here what those 
people who do not understand ideas are actually lacking—and candidly enough 
admit that everything is obscure to them as soon as one goes beyond charts and 
indices. 
[C] Poetry thereby obtains a higher dignity; it becomes again in the end 
what it was in the beginning—teacher of (history) the human race because there is 
no longer any philosophy, any history; poetic art alone will outlive all the rest of 
the sciences and arts. 
[D] Until we make ideas aesthetic, i.e., mythological, they hold no interest 
for the people, and conversely, before mythology is reasonable, the philosopher 
must be ashamed of it. Thus finally the enlightened and unenlightened must shake 
hands; mythology must become philosophical, and the people reasonable, and 
philosophy must become mythological in order to make philosophy sensual. [E] 
Then external unity will reign among us. Never again the contemptuous glance, 
never the blind trembling of the people before its wise men and priests. Only then 
does equal development of all powers await us, of the individual as well of all 
individuals. No power will be suppressed any longer, then general freedom and 
equality of spirits will reign—A higher spirit sent from heaven must establish this 
religion among us, it will be the last work of the human race.2 
                                                
2 Translated by Diana I. Behler, pp. 161-163, in Philosophy of German Idealism: Fichte, 
Jacobi, and Schelling, ed. Ernst Behler; Continuum, 1987. The author of this text is 





Why must the philosopher “possess as much aesthetic power as the poet”? (A) seems to 
suggest that the poet’s power lies in the capacity to unite truth with goodness by 
representing the truth beautifully. Truth is all the more convincing when we are 
persuaded that apprehending it is itself good for us, that it benefits us in some practical 
sense. In many cases we are more inclined to believe that something is good for us if we 
find it beautiful. Socrates declares that the myth of recollection that he tells Meno is 
“both true and beautiful”, and therefore all the more persuasive (Meno 81a). For Plato, 
beauty is a direct expression of unity, and truth partakes in unity. We find beauty in 
things that are unified, and we are taken in by this unity. We find pleasure in unity. 
Hence, the cosmos is superbly beautiful and draws our attention and evokes our wonder 
because it appears supremely unified: it is organized; many of its parts behave in 
predicable ways; it makes life possible for conscious beings; and so on. In this way of 
thinking, apprehending the beauty of the cosmos is simultaneously to apprehend 
something about reality (of which the cosmos is a part) and to be benefited by that 
apprehension. Thus, “the highest act of reason” must be a unifying act, and to apprehend 
the unity of reality is at the same time an aesthetic act, for it is to apprehend its beauty 
                                                                                                                                            
the authorship and the influences on the author, see for instance D. Henrich’s 
“Aufklärung der Herkunft des Manuskripts ‘Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen 
Idealismus’”, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung (1976), pp. 510-28; Frank-Peter 
Hansen (1989), Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus: 
Rezeptionsgeschichte und Interpretation. It is thought that the document was most likely 
written in 1796, with the aim to succeed Kant’s philosophy as a “new philosophy”. I am 





also.3 In order to apprehend the unity of reality, however, (B) we must go beyond “charts 
and indices”, or, as I understand the suggestion, a crude kind of empiricism that shuns the 
investigation of freedom or beauty. (E) External unity, provided by “charts and 
indices”—such as sharing discovery of facts, unity in education across diverse 
communities, and joint inquiry into what is reasonable—is of course desirable. But there 
is a unity that reason is able to create in its apprehension: one can come to learn some 
truth about the human condition, but one can represent this truth in many different ways. 
Thus, aesthetic acts create beauty, and these acts are a deliverance of reason, because 
they are the upshot of coming to apprehend something. Thus, to mythologize is to reason 
(D). So it is that mythologizing is an aesthetic act that discloses the unity of reality 
(though it seems that no single myth can disclose the unity of reality in its totality).  
 
(C) Why will poetic art alone outlive the rest of the sciences and art? If we consider the 
remarks in (D) further, perhaps the author is suggesting that the non-poetic sciences and 
arts cannot disclose the unity behind reality (assuming it arrived at such an 
understanding) in a manner that would practically persuade the people. The people are 
taken in by myths because the myths are sensual, beautiful, and pleasant. Plato observes 
in his Symposium that we are drawn to beautiful things by nature, and that our first 
                                                
3 Cf. Fredrich Nietzsche’s remark in the Birth of Tragedy: “the existence of the world is 
justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon”, rather than as a moral phenomenon (p. 22). 
Nietzsche seems to target a “traditional” morality that is concerned with understanding 
objective truths about what is good and bad in human behavior or existence (amongst 
other things). Nietzsche thinks that this type of morality historically failed to provide us 
with a picture of a unified reality that aided us in finding “meaning” in life. For 
Nietzsche, morality in this sense is passive: we, as it were, wait or hope for the world to 
disclose its objective unity to us, so that we can feel assured of the worth of our actions. 
An aesthetic act, on the other hand, is more active: we create unity that we desire, without 




encounter with beauty is our first spiritual experience. That is, an experience that, at least 
at first, cannot be entirely apprehended by reason but is nevertheless felt, taken in. 
Eventually, however, our desire for beauty can be transformed, through a philosophical 
education, into a rational desire. According to Plato’s theory of education, we learn to 
recognize that (to put it in Platonic terms) our desire to know the beautiful itself is the 
same desire to know reality, and thereupon our desire to experience beauty becomes a 
rational desire to know the beautiful, to know reality. Plato ultimately concludes that the 
aim of eros, what is at first a non-rational, inchoate desire for beauty, is knowledge.  
 
Now to return to the passage above: “the people”, the author declares, are persuaded by 
myths because myths are beautiful and pleasant. Myths must become reasonable, the 
author asserts, and they must become philosophical, so that they might lead to knowledge 
of reality. If myths do not become reasonable and philosophical, they will not persuade 
the philosopher either, for the philosopher seeks knowledge. But the people must become 
reasonable, that is, philosophical, so that they will seek reasonable myths. I think the 
author, therefore, suggests that poetic art will outlive all the rest of the sciences and arts 
because our sensual desire for beauty, absent a philosophical education of the kind that I 
all too briefly ascribed to Plato, will ultimately hold more sway and have a deeper 
educational influence by dint of its capacity to represent something beautiful. It would be 
a mistake to conclude, from the observation that beauty has a stronger affective influence 
on our psychology, that we must become clever at exploiting and seducing that part of 
our nature that is non-rational; the conclusion that the anonymous author and, I believe, 




nature becomes rational, and that this can be accomplished through a philosophical 
education that uses reasonable myths. Only then will the highest act of reason become an 
aesthetic act, that is, mythological.  
 
I will not pretend to understand the last sentence in (E), in which the author claims that 
the work of transforming the philosophical to the mythological and the mythological to 
the philosophical will need “a higher spirit sent from heaven”, and that this is in some 
way tantamount to establishing a “religion among us”. Nor do I understand how this 
work is supposed to be “the last work of the human race”. (It should not be surprising that 
this disconcerting claim, along with rest of the document, has certainly caused some 
wonder. And so, since Plato and Aristotle say that philosophy begins with wonder [see 
below], this is perhaps not an inappropriate way to introduce this philosophical study.) 
Now, fortunately, we do not have to wait for a higher spirit sent from heaven to complete 
the last work of the human race, as the author writes, for at least the work of making 
philosophy mythological and creating myths that are reasonable is already present in 
Plato’s dialogues. I will not be concerned with speculations about why the anonymous 
author may have thought Plato’s work fell short or simply missed the mark, for it is 
possible that the author wished to revive an interest in Plato’s philosophical use of myths 
and Plato’s view of philosophy’s power to educate. While I obviously lean toward the 
latter, what I wish to show is that Plato is concerned with creating myths that are 
philosophical—reasonable—and that he seeks to make philosophy mythological—
aesthetically sensual—because he thinks that philosophical education plays an essential 




Plato seems to think that it takes myths to structure our motivation in such a way that we 
love to pursue an understanding of reality throughout our lives. The conclusion I wish to 
draw from this study is that this Platonic education, as I have briefly described it, gives us 
good reason to think that when one does learn to love learning, in a Platonic way, it is a 
moral achievement, and it is important to think of it as such. It is the sort of moral 
achievement that, as the anonymous author suggests above, leads to a sense of freedom 
and external unity, or equality, among us because it equips each individual, as far as it 






















1. The Phenomena  
 
In the colloquial sense, myths are stories that fall short of the truth. We are not in the 
habit of calling empirical theories (for example a theory about the motion of the celestial 
bodies) myths. Perhaps we might call certain empirical hypotheses myths after they had 
been proven false, because they had had some influence in culture and many people took 
them to be true at some point in history. The earth is not flat, that is just a myth our 
ancestors succumbed to, one might say. But more often myths refer to fantastical tales 
about things that are beyond our experience. There is the Genesis myth, in the Old 
Testament, about the creation of the world—the parting of day from night, sea from land, 
and of God’s rest. This myth describes an event well before humans were around. Indeed, 
in an impressive study of Ancient Greek culture and its myths, George Grote wrote that 
myths depicted “A past that was never present—a region… neither approachable by the 
critic nor measurable by the chronographer”.4 While many myths cannot be empirically 
verified, this has not of course prevented many from holding them to be true in some 
sense. So we can often recognize, then, that what we call myths now appeared to tell the 
truth for some people during certain historical periods (and evidently sometimes still do). 
And we can even admit that many myths still appear to convey something true and useful 
about things we encounter in our experience, about some aspect of the human condition, 
                                                




or provide us with a “moral”, that we should behave thus and so toward our neighbors, 
and so forth. In any event, myths are stories, every one of which originated from human 
thought and imagination.  
 
Mythologizing, the creation of myth, is born of the capacity for speech, and therefore it is 
a manifestation of the capacity for thought as such. Indeed, muthos, the Greek word from 
which the English word for “myth” derives, often meant just that: speech. While some 
mythologize from a desire to explain and understand an interesting and shared facet of 
our experience, even trying to capture the purpose or meaning of human life, others 
mythologize because they take pleasure in giving vivid expression to their imaginations 
as such. Thus, our penchant for listening to myths and telling them is a manifestation of 
our natural fondness for our faculty of imagination. Put that way, the pleasure we take in 
myths is certainly an expression of the pleasure we take in fiction. But I have already 
hinted at the peculiar relation that myth has to truth. It is of course too difficult, then, to 
isolate and lay hold of an explanation for why humans mythologize in general, and it is 
not clear what such an inquiry would entail.5 
 
But we can say this, following Aristotle: our predilection for mythologizing reflects our 
desire for knowledge, our desire to explain, and our desire to teach. Aristotle writes in the 
Metaphysics that “All men by nature desire to know” (Meta 1.980a), and this nature led 
                                                
5 Luc Brisson (1994) remarks that such an inquiry would involve understanding “the 
causes of religious phenomena in their totality” (p. 8). But it is clear that much more 
would need investigating, since, as I’ve just indicated, the pleasure we take in (hearing 
and telling) myths is the same kind of pleasure we take in fictive literature and poetry 




to mythologizing: “For it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first 
began to philosophize. … And a man who is puzzled and wonders thinks himself 
ignorant (whence even the lover of myth is in a sense a lover of wisdom, for myth is 
composed of wonders)” (Meta 982b). Aristotle remarks that myth seeks to explain the 
world and what is related to human life—what concerns us—not for any “utilitarian end” 
but for the sake of knowledge itself. Mythologizing, in this conception, can be said to 
have an “aetiological intention”, like science and philosophy, and it can be learned by 
anyone, since it is the deliverance of reason.6 Plato insists that it is the very nature of 
reason—and thereby the part of any human cognitive (or as it were logos-possessing) 
nature to desire knowledge (though of course the degree to which the desire is present 
varies).7 The point here is that it is within the natural purview of reason to mythologize, 
and this fact (of course reflective of culture, context, and so on) is a reflection of a desire 
for knowledge. Mythology for Plato—and Aristotle confirms as much—functioned as a 
mode of philosophical explanation, and we can see this vividly in early Greek philosophy 
and poetry. Philosophy seeks to investigate many things, and much of it from both the 
beginning and today aims to persuade us to adopt certain explanations and even methods 
or modes of explaining over others, by rational means. So is there an advantage to using 
mythological explanations in philosophical investigations? I think the answer is most 
                                                
6 In this vein, Aristotle says, “to be learning something is the greatest of pleasures not 
only for the philosopher but also to the rest of mankind.” Thus it is our very nature to 
desire knowledge and understanding (Metaphysics 1.980a21; see De Anima ii 3, 414b18; 
iii 3, 429a6–8). 
 
7 John Cooper (1984) does an excellent job of stressing the importance of this thesis—
that it is part of reason’s very nature to desire knowledge—in Plato’s psychology and 
theory of motivation. See also Myles Burnyeat’s (2007) “The Truth of Tripartition”, in 
which Burnyeat also asserts that the aforementioned thesis about reason’s inherent desire 




plausibly yes, if it can be shown that philosophy can make a vital contribution to 
education, or more specifically, a contribution to the development of reason. And I think 
there is such a view of philosophical education that employs myth in Plato’s thought. 
This dissertation examines a mode of rational persuasion and philosophical education that 
is finding less favor in our present philosophical milieu, but that plays an important role 
in Plato’s philosophical thought: namely, philosophical myths. My aim is to bring out the 
value of philosophical myths by focusing on the fundamental educational role that Plato 
gave to them. The argument that I will be pursuing, in its most general shape, is the 
following:  
 
1. For one’s education to go well, in general, one must learn to love learning, even though 
a desire for knowledge (or to learn) is present to some degree in every person.  
 
2. Developing one’s love of learning in general—to use Platonic terms—is to pursue an 
understanding of reality and the ways in which reality is rationally unified.  
 
3. Philosophical myths play a vital role in the program of pursuing (2).  
 
4. (2) is an ethical achievement (and this goes some conceptual distance, so to speak, to 
explaining why Plato wishes to call the pursuit of understanding reality, or what is real, 





What I wish to suggest from such an argument is that it is a worthy issue to think more 
seriously about the ways in which philosophical myths can play an important role in our 
education today, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, whether we are depriving 
ourselves of something valuable in our philosophical investigations by making little use 
of philosophical myth.8 
 
2. Issues Pertaining to the Study 
 
Myths play an important function in many of Plato’s dialogues. While scholars debate the 
ways in which myths function in this work, it is obvious that the myths have a 
philosophical purpose. Within the history of Western philosophy, Plato is peerless in his 
philosophical style in at least two respects. First, Plato wrote in the (much celebrated and 
studied) dialogue form; and secondly, he incorporates an enormous number of myths and 
                                                
8 Consider for instance Friedrich Nietzsche’s comment in the Genealogy of Morals, essay 
III, p. 137: “Our educated people of today, our ‘good people’, do not tell lies—that is 
true; but that is not to their credit! A real lie, a genuine, resolute, ‘honest’ lie (on whose 
value one should consult Plato) would…demand of them…that they should open their 
eyes to themselves, that they should know how to distinguish ‘true’ and ‘false’ in 
themselves”. See also The Birth of Tragedy, §23, pp. 135-6, where Nietzsche argues that 
the demise of tragedy in Greek culture meant the demise of myth, which led to cultural 
decadence. He indicates there his interest in “the rebirth of German myth”, and in 
mythologizing in general. In spite of the many criticisms that Nietzsche launches at Plato, 
it is worth noting that Nietzsche did not voice his suspicion over Plato’s style and 
mythologizing.  
 To be fair, to mention one example, there is a superbly interesting use of 
philosophical myths in Wilfred Sellars’ Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. There 
Sellars contrasts two competing myths, “the myth of the given” and “the myth of Jones”, 
the latter of which his preferred account. I mention this here, too, because Sellars is 
clearly treating “myth” as a type of “account” or “explanation” or “theory” that we have 
tacitly or explicitly bought into, precisely because we have found the accounts to explain 
plausibly something true (in Sellars’ case, about empirical experience, the nature of the 
mind, and language). I will be trying to show that Plato uses myth in a similar way, 




mythical figures into his philosophical thought. One might ask, then, whether Plato’s use 
of myths is (merely) evidence of an extremely idiosyncratic philosophical style of 
writing, since the extant writings of other Greek philosophers before and after Plato do 
not match the frequency of Plato’s use of myths. (I will provide some facts about this in 
the following chapter). Scholars have asked whether, for instance, Plato’s myths are 
indicative of a penchant for adding rhetorical flourish to what would otherwise be dry 
rational argument, or perhaps that Plato is seeking to dazzle the novice reader into an 
interest in philosophy.9 Scholars of Plato have also proposed that the myths sometimes 
function as a sort of heuristic device with which Plato is attempting to either 
psychologically seduce the reader into being taken in by a certain philosophical view, or 
that they act as auxiliaries to the rational arguments advanced in the dialogues, as a kind 
of “psychological reinforcement”.10 Another version of this line of thinking sees Plato’s 
myths as methods that aim to persuade the reader, or the interlocutors in the dialogue, at a 
sub-rational or emotive level. Platonic myths act as incantations for persuasion. On the 
other hand, some scholars have argued that the myths do not “tell us anything new” over 
and above the philosophical views that have already been discussed in the dialogues in 
which they appear. 11  In this reading, Plato’s myths are a different mode of expressing 
the same philosophical views whose rational, that is to say, non-mythical expression, can, 
                                                
9 Kathryn Morgan (2000), Luc Brisson (1998), Janet Smith (1985, 1986), Harold Tarrant 
(1990). 
 
10 Jonathan Lear (2003), Janet Smith (1986), Chiara Bottici (2007); “Psychological 
reinforcement” appears in David L. Hitchock’s unpublished dissertation: The Role of the 
Myth and Its Relation to the Rational Argument in Plato’s Dialogues (Claremont 
Graduate School, 1974). 
 




perhaps with care, be found in some part of the dialectical exchange within the 
dialogues.12 There are also more, as it were, exotic interpretations of Plato’s use of myths. 
Some of have thought that the myths pick up (so to speak) where rational, discursive 
arguments reach their limits, where philosophical argumentation can go no further.13 
Interpreters of this ilk have been tempted by this kind of reading because at times the 
phenomena in need of explanation appears, at least to Plato, to need a supernatural or 
non-empirical, or perhaps more suitably, divine, account. A less exotic reading attributes 
the supernatural imagery and references to Plato’s need for a means with which to test 
certain empirical hypotheses.14 Yet other scholars have thought that Plato sets up a 
contrast between philosophy and mythology for the sake of criticizing and evaluating 
each side by means of the other, while some have thought that Plato wishes to 
demonstrate philosophy’s superior status over mythology.15 One can quickly see from the 
diversity of interpretations how puzzling Plato’s use of myths can be. However, we might 
lay out, quite generally, the following ways of viewing Plato’s myths: 
 
(1) Plato’s myths transcend rational or discursive argument because philosophical 
investigation has its limits. 
 
                                                
12 Smith (1985); Julia Annas (1982) and Catalin Partenie (2009) consider this sort of 
question. 
 
13 Brisson is tempted by this kind of reading (1998); Katheryn Morgan considers a 
reading of this sort: p. 4; chapter 7. 
 
14 Smith (1986) argues for this; Myles Burnyeat (2009) expresses a similar idea in his 
landmark paper, “Eikos Muthos”. 
 




(2) Plato’s myths subscend: they appeal to our non-rational nature for the sake of 
emotively persuading us of the philosophical views that have either already been or are 
about to be advanced in the dialogues. In other words, they are psychologically 
exploitive, meant to seduce readers into accepting certain philosophical views. 
 
(3) Plato’s myths are a different mode of expressing rational arguments and thereby 
function as heuristic devices. As such, they may help us better remember the 
philosophical views that have been advanced, for example by providing a “picture” of a 
philosophical view. Myths turn “dry, technical, and forbidding material” into a “honeyed 
cup”: this might be called a Lucretian reading.16 On this reading, there is available a pure, 
analytic form of the argument that the philosopher primarily prefers. 
 
(4) Plato’s myths set up a contrast between philosophy and mythology that Plato wished 
to explore for the sake of criticizing and evaluating each by means of the other, or the 
contrast is meant to demonstrate the superiority of philosophy over myth (or the 
philosopher over the poet). 
 
(4.2) Similarly, Plato’s philosophical myths self-consciously problematize language, 
issuing from a perceived gap between language and reality, in order to evaluate the value 
and domain of philosophical language: namely, its (perhaps superior) capacity to 
represent reality.17 
                                                
16 Kathryn Morgan (2000), pp. 3-4. 
 




(5) Plato’s myths are his only means with which to test and examine certain empirical 
and normative hypotheses.18 
 
This list of course is not exhaustive. There are more positions and disagreements within 
each of the general views laid out.19 But for now I wish to mention that an interest in 
Plato’s use of myths goes as far back as Plato’s Academy. Diogenes Laertius (3.80) 
shows an interest in Plato’s use of myths, and he indicates that many of the philosophers 
of the Academy were also interested. Diogenes even posits his own explanation, 
according to which: 
 
(6) Plato’s myths are devices that are meant to deter unjust men.20  
 
It seems that Diogenes had Plato’s eschatological myths primarily in mind, however, and 
not many of the others.  
 
Aristotle famously remarks, as I quoted above, in his Metaphysics, at 981b12: “For it is 
owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize. … 
                                                
18 I shall return to this view in further detail in Chapter 2 by comparing it to a similar 
remark that Jean-Jacques Rousseau puts forward in Part I of his Discourse on the Origin 
of the Inequality. 
19 This schematic layout has been aided by many sources, but I shall mention one here 
that has been especially helpful and contains a different, interesting list: Smith (1986).  
20 Glenn W. Most (2012) cites this Diogenes passage in “Plato's Exoteric Myths”, pp. 13-
24. There is another interesting fragment by Diogenes Laertius, of a thought he attributes 
to Aristotle: “And Aristotle says that the form of [Plato’s] words is between poetry and 






And a man who is puzzled and wonders thinks himself ignorant (whence even the lover 
of myth is in a sense a lover of wisdom [i.e. a philosopher], for myth is composed of 
wonders)”. Thus, we might put to service Aristotle’s remarks about myth as an 
interpretation of Plato’s use of myths: 
 
(7) Plato’s myths induce and evoke wonder so that the reader (and interlocutors) might 
begin to philosophize and become a lover of wisdom. 
 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that there is a skeptical reading of Plato, exhibited by the 
Stoics and evaluated by Sextus Empiricus, according to which Plato’s dialogue form and 
use of myths are meant to be (as it were) a safeguard against dogmatic philosophizing. 
Thus: 
 
(8) Plato’s use of myths is in some way representative of a skeptical, that is, non-
dogmatic philosophical investigation.21  
 
Each of these readings is plausible, simply because of the many myths that Plato 
incorporates into dialogues in the variety of ways that he does. It is not clear whether all 
of these positions can be combined in a cohesive way. The sheer diversity and 
strangeness of Plato’s myths make it difficult to find a single, unified interpretation that 
could accommodate all instances of Plato’s myths in the dialogues in which they appear. 
                                                
21 Book I, xiv (trans. Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes, Outlines of Scepticism, 




There are many more comments upon Plato’s myths that are difficult to classify.22 
Indeed, some modern interpreters of Plato have argued that it is wrongheaded to try to 
find a singularly unified interpretation of Plato’s use of myths, and instead we ought 
simply to study and examine each dialogue in which myths appear on their own.23 This 
approach, too, has merit and must be appreciated by any serious scholar of Plato.  
 
Now it is not my aim to give a single, unified interpretation of Plato’s use of myths, nor 
to provide a focused study of the nature of Plato’s use of the word muthos in every 
passage it occurs. Instead, I wish to focus on the educational ends that Plato sought to 
realize through the use of philosophical myths. That is, this study aims to sketch out the 
role of Plato’s myths from an understanding of his theory of education and (if there is a 
significant difference after all) his theory of moral education. So while I agree that it is 
too difficult to find a singularly unified interpretation of all of Plato’s myths, I do think 
that, in the approach to Plato’s thought that I will pursue in this dissertation, a more 
unifying interpretation can be developed. The proposal is, to repeat, to approach the 
myths in relation to Plato’s theory of education and with his (background) assumptions 
about the purposes of philosophical investigation firmly in mind. Interpreters of Plato’s 
myths have not sufficiently foregrounded Plato’s theory of education and its relation to 
his assumptions about the purposes of philosophical investigation in their understanding 
of the role and function of those myths. Developing this approach will at best make a 
more systematic interpretation of Plato’s myths available and, at the very least, will 
                                                
22 Consider for instance Hegel’s remark in §71 of the Phenomenology of Spirit, and 
Lecture I of Heidegger’s, What is Called Thinking? 
 




further reveal how importantly his theory of education and the purposes he envisaged for 
philosophical investigation are operative throughout the dialogues (at least in the ones I 
will examine in this dissertation).  
 
I aim for this work to be a contribution to the field of philosophy of education, since I 
wish to show that a large share of Plato’s use of myths is best understood in conjunction 
with his theory of education. In the field of philosophy of education, however, there is 
little theorizing about the educational role(s) of Plato’s myths, and so I hope that this 
work will begin to fill part of that gap in philosophy of education scholarship and, 
further, to prompt further investigation into this topic. It is worth mentioning that in the 
philosophy of fiction and literature, political philosophy, and more recently in philosophy 
of education, there has been a great deal of research in the nature of narrative.24 No doubt 
there is an important relation between mythology and narrative, and the research that has 
focused on the narrative aspects of myth has been fruitful.25 For instance, it has been 
shown by various philosophers and literary theorists that one’s need to find meaning and 
significance in one’s actions and the objects with which one engages under the guise of 
[e.g.] a “vocation” takes a narrative form—and not accidentally so. Indeed, finding 
significance in one’s life is intrinsically to find a narrative that fits one’s life: that is, 
finding a narrative to explain the purpose of one’s actions and place in the world.26 
                                                
24 See Bottici (2007) for a superb overview of these areas of research, especially her 
chapters 1 and 2. 
 
25 See for instance Catherine Collobert (2012), Pierre Destrée (2012), Francisco Gonzalez 
(2012), and Kurk (2006). 
 




Nearly all myths from various historical and cultural traditions meet some need for 
significance: for some, myths provide a structure to one’s experience by portraying (e.g.) 
an ideal paradigm or picture, in narrative form, in light of which one’s experiences can be 
judged and fitted (Bottici, 2007), or even ethically improved. Indeed the focus on the 
narrative structures that our minds give to our experience has surely been fruitful in 
several domains of research, and in particular this focus has provided the resources for 
arguments that show the importance of engaging fictional literature for ethical insight 
into the human condition.27 Furthermore, the importance of myths and fictional literature 
in providing ethical insight partly consists in a narrative structure that can provide one’s 
imagination with materials to narratively structure one’s own mind accordingly. The 
structural point and its parallel with the mind are fundamental, and their importance in 
philosophy of education and teacher-education research has been explored widely.28 But 
                                                
27 See for instance Cora Diamond (1982), “Anything but Argument?”, Philosophical 
Investigations, V. 5, Issue 1, January.  
 
28 Some samples of this kind of research: Jane O’dea (1994), “Pursuing Truth in 
Narrative Research”, Journal of Philosophy of Education, V. 28, Issue 2, December; 
Klaus Peter Mortensen (2002), “The Double Call: on Bildung in a Literary and Reflective 
Perspective”, Journal of Philosophy of Education, V. 36, Issue 3, August; Naoko Saito 
(2009), “Ourselves in Translation: Stanley Cavell and Philosophy as Autobiography”, 
Journal of Philosophy of Education, V. 43, Issue 2, May; David T. Hansen (1996), 
“Finding One’s Way Home: Notes on the Texture of Moral Experience”, Studies in 
Philosophy and Education, V. 15, Number 3; Tone Kvernbekk (2003), On Identifying 
Narratives”, Studies in Philosophy and Education, V. 22, Numbers 3-4; Sven-Eric 
Liedman (2002), “Democracy, Knowledge, and Imagination”, Studies in Philosophy and 
Education, V. 21, Numbers 4-5; Moira von Wright (2002), “Narrative Imagination and 
Taking the Perspective of Others”, Studies in Philosophy and Education, V. 21, Numbers 
4-5; Aparna Mishra Tarc (2006), “In a Dimension of Height: Ethics in the Education of 
Others”, Educational Theory, V. 56, Issue 3; Carola Conle and Michael deBeyer (2009), 
“Appraising the Ethos of Experiential Narrative: Key Aspects of a Methodological 
Challenge”, Educational Theory, V. 59, Issue 1; Kristjan Kristjansson (2010), “Educating 
Emotions or Moral Selves: A False Dichotomy?”, Educational Philosophy and Theory, 




what I want to point out is that while nearly all mythological accounts are narrative in 
their structure, not all narratives are of course myths (Bottici, 2007). As I said, there is a 
good deal of research about the significance of narrative in moral education and 
philosophy of education, but there has been very little engagement with the place of 
myths as such in theories of education and moral education; and in particular, there is 
very little engagement in the scholarship of philosophy of education about the relation 
between Plato’s use of myths and his theory of education. In the field of philosophy of 
education, however, there is mention of myth in its colloquial use, as “unreality”, 
“fiction”, or “fantasy”29, in a positive or negative sense; but myth is not treated as a mode 
of investigation, argumentation, and demonstrative explanation as it is in Plato’s 
dialogues.  
 
On the other hand, there is substantial research in philosophy of education about the 
nature of Socratic dialogue, dialectical reasoning, Socratic teaching, and Socratic method, 
along with analysis of their applications in primary and secondary schools, but these 
studies do not analyze Plato’s use of myths (although they posit interpretations of 
sections of the myths).30 The focus of this dissertation, however, is not so much on the 
                                                
29 For example: Robert Nelson Reddick (2004), “History, Myth, and the Politics of 
Educational Reform”, Educational Theory, V. 54, Issue 1, Winter; James Palermo 
(2000), “Reading Mann and Cubberly on the Myth of Equal Educational Opportunity: A 
Barthesian Critique”, Philosophy of Education; Eammonn Callan (2002); “Democratic 
Patriotism and Multicultural Education”, Studies in Philosophy and Education, V. 21, 
Number 6. 
 
30 Avi Mintz, “From Grade School to Law School: Socrates’s Legacy in Education”, in A 
Companion to Socrates, ed. Sara Ahbel-Rappe and Rachana Kamtekar (Malden, MA: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2009); Daniel Pekarsky, “Socratic Teaching: A Critical Assessment”, 
Journal of Moral Education 23, no. 2 (1994): 119–134; and Anthony G. Rud Jr., “The 




nature of Socratic teaching—although an understanding of Plato’s myths would, I think, 
enhance our understanding of Socratic teaching—but, first, rather more with the ways in 
which Plato’s use of myth can better our understanding of his theory of education, and, 
second, the ways in which goals that Plato envisaged for philosophy and education 
become apparent when we juxtapose his use of myths with his theory of education. Thus, 
there is indeed a lacuna in the philosophy of education with respect to the nature of myths 
in Plato’s thought on education and moral education.  
 
To anticipate, then: while Plato assumes that everyone wishes to know what is real, 
because knowledge of this sort in general is helpful in procuring the goods that are 
necessary for sustaining a human life and indeed add pleasure to it, he observes that this 
does not lead everyone to a desire to understand the rational order behind reality as a 
whole. A philosophical education transforms what is, as it were, a mere desire for 
knowledge that is practically suitable into a kind that concerns the ultimate ends of 
human life and the true nature of reality. On this score, it becomes crucial for Plato to 
convince his readers (or interlocutors) that there is a reality, that it is rationally ordered 
and therefore unified, and that this concept of reality is supreme in some sense (and 
therefore is to be called the Good). Furthermore, Plato is keen to show that philosophical 
investigation is not so much as possible without an idea of a unified reality, which is a 
kind of whole. Nearly all of Plato’s myths confirm these assumptions, and the rest do not 
disprove them. Plato’s myths seek to educate the reader (or interlocutor) about the nature 
                                                                                                                                            
Archives 5, no. 20 (1997), http://epaa.asu.edu/ojs/article/viewFile/621/743. These 
references are taken, exactly, from Mark Jonas (2015), “Education for Epiphany: The 




and reasonableness of these assumptions, and in turn provide a source of motivation and 
establish the psychological conditions for a lifelong investigation of a unified reality. To 
this end, Plato’s myths are extraordinarily useful in the dialogues. I hope that this 
dissertation will at least make that much clear. Many agree that a range of Plato’s myths 
function as a heuristic device that could teach or convince Socrates’ (or the Stranger’s) 
interlocutors or us the reader of a philosophical idea or concept or even method of 
thinking that Plato thought important. Yet a stronger characterization than “heuristic” 
may be found by means of considering more deeply Plato’s assumptions that bear on the 
purpose of philosophical investigation and philosophy’s power to educate. As I said 
above, if Plato is right that philosophy’s contribution to one’s development is indeed 
ethically beneficial, then I should like to argue that the philosophical value that Plato 
found in his use of myths may find some application, or at least provide some insight, in 
our current educational landscape. In other words, can Plato’s assumptions and uses to 
which he put his myths find a foothold in our own educational theorizing? I will try to 
provide a substantive “yes” to this question and conclude the dissertation with a 
discussion of how these aims that Plato envisaged for philosophy and education, and how 
he sought to achieve those aims through philosophical myths, compare with our own 
assumptions about the purposes of education. At this point in the introduction, I will say 
that I suspect that our contemporary thinking about the importance of developing “critical 
thinking skills”, as they are often called in education, might not fully appreciate the 
important contribution that philosophical myths can make, on the one hand, and, on the 































Muthos and Logos 
 
A general background to Plato’s use of muthos and some of the theoretical issues 
surrounding that will be considered in this chapter. While the purpose of this dissertation 
is not to conduct an exhaustive survey of each instance in which muthos or some cognate 
of that word appears in Plato’s work, a brief overview of Plato’s concept and usage of 
muthos (and its cognates) will demonstrate the interpretive difficulties that scholars of 
Plato’s myths cannot evade, and thereby some of the challenges that the present study 
must face. Thus I will proceed through a range of the pertinent scholarly literature, 
providing a concise synopsis of the various interpretive positions scholars have taken 
with respect to Plato’s myths. Moreover, it will be helpful to have a conceptual 
background to Plato’s muthos, so that we can try to arrive at a notion of it that will further 
illuminate its role in Plato’s educational scheme. For, as I shall discuss in the following 
chapters, Plato does envisage an inherent educational task for philosophy:  to develop 
rationally the love of learning and to clarify and explicitly fix its object, namely the real, 
the good. My aim is to examine in some detail the nature of the relation between Plato’s 
theory of education and his use of myths, and for that a study of muthos will be suitable 
here. Furthermore, in the present chapter, I will introduce the issue of whether Plato 
makes use of a strong contrast between muthos and logos, since this will make clearer 






1. Conceptual Background of Muthos 
 
Kathryn Morgan (2000) shows in her excellent research that there is not really textual 
evidence—as had been thought, for example in Hesiod and Herodotos and Homer—that 
mythos had the connotation of fiction. In Homer, muthos often means “authoritative 
speech”, examples of which can be found in the speeches of Agamemnon (1.388), 
Diomedes (9.51), and Achilles (9.431).31 It is interesting to note that one cannot find a 
consistent conceptual distinction between muthos and logos in Herodotos’ Histories. For 
example, he calls stories concerning the flood of the Nile and the Egyptians’ efforts to 
sacrifice Heracles muthoi (the only two passages that he mentions the word muthos); but 
he calls a whole host of “historical” accounts, which he utterly rejects, logoi.32 Morgan 
(2000, p. 20) shows that even in Thrucydites one looks in vain to find a programmatic 
condemnation of muthoi, nor an interest in determining its semantic scope. Accordingly, 
Liddell and Scott’s entry in the English-Greek Lexicon (1889) has a wide range of 
meaning for muthos, from “anything delivered by word of mouth, word, speech”, to 
“counsel, advice”, and even “a resolve, purpose, design, plan”, as well as the familiar 
“tale, story, narrative”.33 It is noteworthy that muthos largely overlaps conceptually with 
logos, where logos diverges from muthos in English translations of Plato and Aristotle as 
“reason” and “argument”. Recently, however, Jessica Moss (2014) has shown, through a 
careful study of manypassages in which translators of Plato and Aristotle have been apt to 
                                                
31 Morgan (2000), pp. 17-18; the references in Homer are hers.  
 
32 Morgan (2000), chapter 2. 
 




translate “reason” for logos, that “an explanatory account” is a more suitable translation. 
Indeed, she points out that only a century ago “reason” was a rare translation for logos in 
Plato and Aristotle, and that translators at that time chose “rule”. Of course, there is a 
connection that Aristotle and Plato held between what we call the faculty of reason and 
logos, and that pivots around the power to reason, the power of reasoning. When Homer 
and Hesiod call dumb animals “logos-lacking”, what they mean is not reason-lacking 
(which they are) but rather animals without speech.34 Moss goes on to argue that the 
translation of “reason” in Plato and Aristotle is perhaps too liberal, since in the relevant 
passages in which “reason” is a tempting translation, “speech” or “account” or 
“argument” will suffice, and this is moreover in keeping with the usage of the writers 
who preceded them. She notes that even in Parmenides’ extant fragments, where it is 
tempting to translate “reason” for logos (for instance where he says [28 B7 DK] “judge 
by logos (krinai logōi)”), “speech”, “account”, or “argument” will do.35 Now in the case 
of Plato, Moss reminds us that when Plato is interested in demarcating the part of the soul 
that reasons, he does not use logos but rather logistikon, what is capable of calculation 
(logismos). Moss goes on to argue, through a meticulous exegesis, that logos in Plato, 
thereupon in Aristotle, is “something which, when grasped, transforms an inferior 
epistemic state into a superior one”, which of course means closer to the truth. This 
formulation is excellent because it works well for a wide range of passages in Plato and 
                                                
34 See Moss (2014), p. 185. She cites the works of Urs Dierauer (1977), Tier und Mensch 
im Denken der Antike: Studien zur Tierpsychologie, Anthropologie und Ethik, 
Amsterdam; Roman Dilcher (1995), Studies in Heraclitus, Hildesheim; and John Heath 
(2005), The Talking Greeks: Speech, Animals, and the Other in Homer, Aeschylus, and 
Plato, Cambridge.  
 




Aristotle, and it does not diverge from its traditional meaning in writings of Plato’s and 
Aristotle’s predecessors. On this way of translating, where, in passages of Plato that 
translators often use “[rational] argument” for logos, Moss argues that we ought to go 
with “explanatory account”: “an account of the aitia, cause, or explanation, that underlies 
the facts”.36 Moss further brings attention to passages in which Plato uses the 
formulation, “to give a logos”, or “to be able to give a logos” (Rep. 534b, Theat. 201c-d, 
Symp. 202a, Phaed. 76b, Tim 51d-e, Prot. 338e-9a), which is more comfortably rendered 
“account”, rather than “reason”. Similarly, in the passages that we will consider in the 
following chapters, a muthos is something that one is able to give when one needs to 
explain, demonstrate, persuade, educate, or argue a point. Now this puts us back into the 
conceptual region, as it were, into which Aristotle places muthos. As I quoted from his 
Metaphysics in the previous chapter, he explains the reasons the early philosophers and 
poets began to mythologize: namely, to explain so as to know. But obviously we have yet 
to determine whether there is an important contrast that is operative between muthos and 
logos in Plato, in spite of their undeniable conceptual kinship in classical Greek. Even if 
it could be shown that we could put “explanatory account”, keeping in mind that the 
purpose of an explanatory account is to improve our epistemic position or our grasp of 
the truth, that does not explain why there appears to be a contrast between muthos and 
logos most notably in Plato’s Protagoras and Meno, a problem which is further 
confounded by an apparent absence of a contrast in the Theaetetus and Timaeus. An 
important caveat is needed here. The present study does not aim to settle once and for all 
whether there is a critical contrast in Plato between muthos and logos, but it does aim to 
                                                




further clarify Plato’s notion of muthos, which will require an engagement with the 
question of whether there is a contrast. My hope is that a consideration of Plato’s theory 
of education, and philosophy’s role in it, will bear on this question, or at least give us a 
better sense of the concept of muthos as well as the role it plays in Plato’s thought. So 
this is a good juncture at which to turn to muthos in Plato. 
 
1.2 Conceptual Background of Muthos in Plato 
 
There are 87 occurrences of muthos, where its meanings seem to range from that of 
“speech”, a “tale”, a “story”, to an “account” or “discourse”, in 12 of the 26 dialogues 
that are unanimously considered authentic to Plato; and, if we include the six works that 
are often considered inauthentic, there are all together 101 occurrences. Of the 87 
references, over half of the occurrences of muthos (54% to be exact) are found in the 
Republic (20 times) and Laws (27), while the remaining uses of the term are strewn 
through the following dialogues: Statesman (8), Timaeus (8), Phaedo (6), Protagoras (5), 
Gorgias (5), Phaedrus (3), Theaetetus (3), Sophist (2), Cratylas (1), and Philebus (1). 
Amongst these occurrences of muthos there are two derivatives of muthos: (1) muthikos, 
at Phdr. 265c1: “what belongs to the class of myths”, or “what concerns myth”, and (2) 
muthōdēs, at Rep. 522a7:  “what resembles myth”, or “what presents the character of 
myth”. In addition, there are a number of compound forms, all of which are unique to 
Plato, that is, they are his neologisms37, and several derivatives thereof. Here is a list: 
muthopoiois (muthos + poieō: “myth-maker”); muthologos (“one who says/tells a myth”) 
                                                




and the derivatives muthologikos (“belonging to the myth-teller”, in one occurrence at 
Phdo. 61b5) and muthologia (“the activity/fact of telling myth(s)”, in 8 occurrences at: 
Phdr. 243a4; Pol. 304d1; Crit. 110a3; Laws 680d3, 752a1; Hipp. 298a4); the verb 
muthologeō (“to tell or speak in the form of a myth”), in 13 occurrences; the nominal 
compound muthologēma (“the result of the action of telling something in a myth”, or 
“what is told in a myth”, in only two occurrences at Phdr. 229c5 and Laws 663e5); and 
finally the compound constructs of mutheomai (“to say/speak/tell/recount”; or “to 
consider”) with para.38 
 
Why did Plato invent a host of words built from the noun muthos and the verb mutheomai 
in those 12 dialogues? Again it may prove fruitless to try to find a single, unified 
interpretation that can answer such a question, but, we can say at a general level, as Iris 
Murdoch points out, that Plato is inclined to call a range of theories he is either positing 
or evaluating, myths.39 Protagoras’ thesis, for example, considered throughout the 
Theaetetus with utter seriousness because of its plausibility—that perception is 
knowledge—is called a muthos (164d). And we are told in the Republic (592) that the 
description of the city is a mythological description of the soul. To give one more 
                                                
38 The information in this paragraph, along with the translations (with slight 
modifications) in quotation marks, is taken from Luc Brisson (1998), Appendixes I-II. 
Brisson draws from Leonard Brandwood’s (1976) precise and impressive survey. 
Brandwood’s work also informs us that there are 260 proper names of characters that are 
related to myths that were circulating in ancient Greece in Plato’s authentic corpus, a list 
which can be found in Brisson (1998), p. 153, and Brandwood (1976). 
 
39 Iris Murdoch (1992), p.10; Murdoch (1971), “The Sovereignty of Good over other 




example, the explanation for how it is that the earth, which is spherical,40 can sustain its 
location in space without a grounding support in the heavens among the other heavenly 
bodies (or gods) is given by a myth; that explanation, Socrates argues, ought to be 
preferred to an explanation that makes use of material causes insofar as the non-material 
explanation employs a concept of the Good in its causal explanation. Because, according 
to Plato, the Good “binds and holds things together” (99c), it can properly be called a 
cause, an aition; and a myth that shows or demonstrates this counts as a causal 
explanation or explanatory account.  
 
Thus, when Plato calls the works of poets like Homer “myths”, it does appear that they 
are called so because of their aim to explain the causes at play in history and in nature, 
and not because of the genre of writing to which they belong. While it may be tempting 
to associate myths with the activity of poets, in Plato the variety of words associated with 
myth marks the activity of those aiming to theorize and explain so as to persuade.41 
 
The issue of poetry and prose and myth and rational argument is difficult to disentangle 
in Plato’s works, and this is unsurprising when we consider Plato’s position in his own 
cultural heritage and the novel ambitions put into the form of his writing. But indeed 
Leslie Kurke (2006) argues at length that a closer look at Plato’s texts in conjunction with 
                                                
40 David Sedley (1990) argues (p. 362) that “spherical” is the natural reading for the 
passages at 97d7-e1, 108e5, 110b5ff, and 112c1-2. Gail Fine (1990) rigorously argues 
against Sedley, claiming that one does not find a teleological account of the Good as a 
causal force in the Phaedo; but that does not show that there is not a myth that is playing 
an important explanatory role in the Phaedo, whether it is supposed to be a teleological 
account in particular or not.  
 




a remark of Aristotle42 shows that Plato holds a contrast between poetry and prose-
writing, the latter for which he uses one of his ‘myth’-neologisms. Kurke goes on to show 
that it may be more appropriate to think of (Aesopic) prose, as a style or genre of writing 
or philosophizing, for muthos, rather than something opposed to logos. For example, 
Kurke finds a contrast between “storytellers and poets [µυθολὸγων ἤ ποιητῶν]”, at 
Republic 392d1-3 (p. 10)43. Kurke’s central contention is that although “[t]his literary-
historical narrative is usually constituted as the inevitable, triumphal march from 
‘muthos to logos’… the presence of the Aesopic lurking behind and within the Socratic 
dialogues of Plato necessarily complicates this narrative” (p. 8). It would take us too far 
afield to go through Kurke’s sophisticated analyses of the Aesopic elements and Plato’s 
“programmatic” remarks that suggest he is mimicking, to some degree, Aesop’s mimetic 
prose for his own Socratic dialogues.44 Yet for my purposes Kurke’s work is worth 
considering insofar as it begins to de-emphasize the assumtion that Plato treats muthos as 
something beneath logos, whereby the latter is something that he is pleased to associate 
                                                
42 A remark, that is, preserved by Diogenes Laertius: “And Aristotle says that the form of 
his [sc. Plato’s] words is between poetry and prose” (D.L. 3.37): see Kurke (2006, 2011, 
p. 264). Kurke (2006, p. 18) draws attention to Nietzsche’s “clearsighted assessment” of 
Plato’s style of writing: “Indeed, Plato has given to all posterity the model of a new art 
form, the model of the novel—which may be described as an infinitely enhanced 
Aesopian fable, in which poetry holds the same rank in relation to dialectical philosophy 
as this same philosophy held for many centuries in relation to theology: namely, the rank 
of ancilla” (The Birth of Tragedy, trans. Walter Kaufmann [New York, 1967], pp. 90-91). 
 
43 The same kind of contrast can be found at Republic 394b-c; see Kurke (2006), p. 10. 
 
44 Kurke (2006, p. 14) finds such a “programmatic passage” in Phaedo 61a-b. She writes, 
concerning that passage, “While Socrates consistently designates Aesopic fables as 
muthoi, his interlocutor Cebes … refers to them as logoi. At the level of language, these 
two designations are just what we would expect within the diachronic development of 
Greek linguistic usage: for Aristophanes and Herodotus in the fifth century mainly 
designate fable as logos, while Plato’s successor Aristotle uses the terms muthos and 




with philosophy. The interesting point here is that if Kurke is right, we ought to keep 
apart poetry and mimetic prose, that is, poetry and muthoi. On this reading, Plato’s 
writings in general, subtly and at times explicitly identified with Aesopian fable (mimetic 
prose45), fall within the genera of mythological prose writing—Sôcratikoi logoi. Myth is 
not so much ancillary to poetry, rather, in Plato’s writing, it is the shape that 
philosophical thought and writing takes.  
 
Another interesting interpretation that Kurke espouses is her agreement with Andrea 
Nightingale (2000), who says that the famous passage at Republic 10, 607b, where 
Socrates tells his interlocutors that they have, as it were, stumbled into the “ancient 
quarrel between philosophy and poetry”, is “one of Plato’s more powerful fictions”. 
Indeed, Nightingale writes:  
 
the notion that “poetry”—as a mode of discourse that promulgates a certain set of 
values—is fundamentally opposed to “philosophy” (and vice versa) was not 
articulated before Plato. It is Plato’s private quarrel, then, which is retrojected 
back onto the ancients in Republic 10 and thereby made to escape the contingency 
and specificity of Plato’s own historical moment.46 
 
Plato’s scheme—which is plausible—or, perhaps, irony, here is best put by Alexander 
Nehemas (1999), who says that Plato, driven by his goal to appropriate “the term 
                                                
45 Kurke (2011) writes: “Platonic prose is ‘mimetic’ in several senses: it is a fictive 
imitation or representation of a whole social world” (p. 251). 
 




‘philosophy’… for his own practice and educational scheme”, contrasts philosophy “not 
only with sophistry but also with rhetoric, poetry, traditional religion, and the specialized 
sciences” (p. 110), for each of which muthos and logos, without any specialized 
distinction, are put to service.47 Of course, almost all scholars agree that Plato’s Socratic 
dialogues are peerless because they incorporate and simultaneously evaluate so well 
“rhetoric, poetry, traditional religion, and the specialized sciences” of his time. On this 
reading then, Plato at times evaluates mythological accounts of various physical and 
metaphysical phenomena because it is the function of philosophy to evaluate such 
accounts. Philosophy must take an interest in mythology because from its beginning, 
mythologizing, Plato shows, had (unselfconsciously) a philosophical aim: to explain and 
get at the truth of nature, of reality. Plato, however, does not merely stop at evaluating 
myth for its philosophical success but refines the purpose of mythologizing by creating 
his own philosophical myths, so that mythologizing becomes a mode of philosophizing. 
Morgan (2000), who holds a similar line of interpretation as the one I have been 
describing with Kurke (2006), Nightingale (2000), and Nehemas (1999), summarizes 
thus: “[Plato’s] Philosophical tales are often newly invented because they have a point to 
make that does not fit into previous narrative formats, but most importantly because they 
must demonstrate how to employ myth correctly” (p. 16, emphasis added), that is, how to 
employ myth philosophically. In this way, Plato can, so to speak, have his cake and eat it 
too. He can set up philosophy as its own “autonomous domain of rational thought”, set 
apart from rhetoric, religion, poetry, and traditional myths, and yet help himself to the 
power of mythologizing: that is, perhaps paradoxically, creating philosophical accounts 
                                                




that are portrayed as if they are dialectically arrived at, as if the pursuit of truth demands 
it.48 Morgan goes on to bluntly conclude: “until the rise of philosophy, there was no 
‘mythology’, [and thus the] distinction between mythos and logos is a function of the rise 
of philosophical self-consciousness” (pp. 21-3), brought to a victorious culmination in 
Plato. 
 
2. Muthos and Logos 
 
More recently, scholars of Plato’s work have become interested in reexamining the 
overall interpretation of those dialogues in which Plato discusses or makes his own 
myths. David Sedley (2009) remarks: “It remains the case that Plato’s myths, for all the 
interest they have attracted, are far too rarely used in the interpretation of the dialogues to 
which they belong”.49 I concur with Sedley; but the aim of my dissertation is perhaps 
more ambitious: I aim to gather together a general sense of the importance that Plato saw 
in myth and myth-making as it emerges in light of considering his theory of education as 
it is developed in several of his dialogues, in conjunction with some assumptions about 
philosophy about which Plato himself is not always explicit. The rest of this section, 
however, will not make good on this ambition; rather, I shall describe several more 
important issues in the interpretation of Plato’s texts and mythological parlance, 
surveying some of the relevant, modern scholarship.  
   
                                                
48 The quoted “autonomous domain of rational thought” appears in Kurke (2006), p. 19. 
 





It is thought that the pre-Socratics begin to mark a shift in a concern for examining a 
suitable form of literary expression that represents the true nature of the world. And 
hence begins philosophical writing, although up until Plato it takes the form of poetry. 
Plato begins explicitly to question poetry’s capacity for the task of philosophizing; but, as 
discussed above, he at times does pursue a philosophically appropriate poetic expression 
of truth (or, more precisely, what resembles the truth). Yet, since linguistic convention 
always represents (to some degree) cultural conventions and practices, philosophical 
writing from the sixth to fourth centuries still largely relied on poetic language. Plato may 
be seen as the culmination of the beginning of an explicit philosophical self-
consciousness about the scope, power, purpose, and limits of philosophical writing and 
thought.  
 
Hegel thought of philosophy as tracing the history of the development of reason. What I 
wish to say here is that myths in Plato’s philosophy (as well as in that of his 
predecessors) have played an interesting and important, non-tangential part in that 
history. Therefore it is no surprise that, even if this philosophical history finally leads to 
inextricably linking logos with reason, because mythologizing is a capacity of reason, 
muthos is also linked with reason. 
 
Most philosophers, however, maintain that there is an important contrast in Plato’s 
thought between logos and muthos. The question of there being a contrast of a certain 
kind is unavoidable and important. Indeed, it can seem that for those studying muthos in 




Protagoras, Plato has Protagoras ask those present whether he should give a logos or a 
muthos (320c), which seems to suggest that they are not the same thing. His audience, 
including Socrates, agrees that they would prefer a muthos: “give us a muthos because it 
is more pleasant”, they say. Philosophers have supposed that logos, in that context, stands 
for a rational demonstration or proof, formulated in a philosophical way, as opposed to a 
mythological way. The latter, it is thought, is less rigorous and caters to the non-rational 
elements of the soul.50 We do not need to assume, however, that Plato’s myths 
themselves are non-rational or irrational. On the contrary, Protagoras’ myth is proposed 
as one of two ways that can prove to Socrates that virtue is teachable. (I do not think that 
the persuasiveness of Protagoras’ account, if it is at all persuasive, depends on its ability 
to stir up our less-than-rational desires.) The interlocutors choose Protagoras’ mythical 
version of his account over the logos not because it would be more persuasive but 
because it would be more “pleasant”. Moreover, Protagoras concludes the great 
demonstration with a logos (beginning at 324D) as a continuation of the muthos he 
began, with the exception that he does not reference any gods. But we should not assume, 
at least from the Protagoras, that myths are merely stretches of decorated and dramatic 
ways of clothing bits of rational arguments, what could otherwise be put into a more 
perspicuous (and austere) logical form.51  
                                                
50 See Christopher Rowe (1999) “Myth, History, and Dialectic in Plato’s Republic and 
Timaeus-Critias”, and Rowe (2009) “The Charioteer and his Horse: an Example of 
Platonic Myth-Making”; and Malcolm Schofield (2009) “Fraternite, inegalite, la parole 
de Dieu: Plato’s Authoritarian Myth of Political Legitimation”. 
 
51 I disagree with Brisson (2994), who does hold that Plato’s myths pick up on the work 
of persuasion where rational argument fails. Indeed, Brisson calls this an “extreme 





The question of contrast quickly becomes especially complicated when we consider the 
famous passage from the Gorgias (523a), where Socrates insists that the mythological 
account he gives is a logos even though Callicles would consider it a muthos. Socrates 
says, at Gorgias 523a: “‘Give ear, then,’ as people say, to a very fine account [καλοῦ 
λόγου]—one that you, for your part, I imagine, will consider a story [µῦθον], but that I 
consider an account [λόγον]; because the things I’m going to tell you I’ll tell as being 
true”.52 I will return to this passage and the one in the Protagoras above in the following 
chapter for a closer analysis, but for now one can easily see that logos and muthos do not 
appear conceptually equivalent. But it does seem obvious that the mythological form with 
which Socrates delivers his arguments for a different notion of justice (among other 
things) in the Gorgias is significant. Moreover, that the mythological form of the 
argument for Socrates’ conception of justice is declared to be a logos by Socrates is 
further evidence that muthos and logos are deliverances of the same faculty of thought.   
 
Plato seamlessly transitions, in the Timaeus, between calling the account of the creation 
of the cosmos an eikôs muthos (three occurrences: 29d, 59c, 68d) and an eikôs logos 
(seven occurrences: 30b, 48d, 53d, 55d, 56a, 57d, 90e).53 Luc Brisson (2012) interprets 
this difficulty thus: “Because it appears in the form of a story that describes the making of 
a god, the world, by another god, the demiurge, the Timaeus is akin to a myth (muthos) 
like the one told by Hesiod in the Theogony. Yet it also wants to be an explanation 
(logos), backed up by arguments. … The major difficulty to be faced by the interpreter of 
                                                
52 The translation here is Christopher Rowe’s (2012), p. 187. 
 




the Timaeus resides in the fact that Plato adopts both views, without really choosing 
between them” (p. 390, emphasis added). The contrast between logos and muthos, in 
Brisson’s interpretation, consists in its literary form and epistemic scope. Myths tell a 
story through narration that is grounded in belief rather than the facts, although of course 
it is trying to get at the truth of things. A logos, on the other hand, is a formal argument 
that has the potential to be grounded in empirical facts, and so has the potential to explain 
how things really are. Myles Burnyeat (2009), however, argues that an eikôs muthos 
ought to be thought as a reasonable account, because it is the best account that we can 
infer, given the important connection between the reasonable order that inheres in the 
sensible world and our reason’s capacity to perceive that reasonable order. On Burnyeat’s 
reading, Plato’s account is first called a muthos because, as Brisson says, the account has 
limits, since it is attempting to explain events that took place before (and therefore 
beyond) our experience, and because it takes a narrative form. But Burnyeat suggests that 
Plato is happy to call it a logos because it does seek to explain, through carefully 
reasoned out premises, in conjunction with the facts that we can indeed perceive. The 
eikôs muthos thus succeeds (at least for Timaeus and his interlocutors, including 
Socrates) because it “disclose[s] the reasonableness of the cosmos”; and because it does, 
it also empowers Plato to “overcome the traditional opposition between muthos and 
logos” (p. 179).54 Thus, there does seem to be a contrast, at least in literary form, between 
muthos and logos, but even that contrast is complicated if we keep passages like the 
Gorgias in mind, where the narrative story that Socrates gives is declared to be a logos.  
                                                
54 Note that Burnyeat does indicate that he thinks the opposition between muthos and 






On the other hand, it has been thought that Plato holds myths in higher regard than (mere) 
rational arguments. Chiara Bottici (2007) affirms such a view. She writes: “Platonic 
myths could be seen as ways of expressing a conceptual content which is superior to 
rational argument, because once the argument is translated into a single written form it is 
dead, whereas myths are open to a proliferation of meaning that can always generate 
further discussion”.55 It is clear that Plato was interested in, and well aware of, the power 
of images and stories to impress themselves on the psyche, and thus it makes sense that 
for those philosophical views that Plato thought most important to convey (such as the 
supremacy of justice for the individual and community) he would use mythological 
constructions. I do not think, however, that the question of superiority between myth and 
rational argument in Plato yields a very helpful approach in understanding Plato’s 
philosophical purposes for myth in the considerations and passages I have adduced so far. 
Plato does seem to show an interest in examining the limits and possibilities of 
philosophical investigation and how the philosopher might convey the meaning and truth 
that philosophy can discover. The idea that Plato’s myths aim to evoke, in his readers or 
characters, a kind of philosophical reflection that may be more difficult to accomplish by 
a more obvious and familiar style of rational argument, is plausible. As Myles Burnyeat 
puts the point: “My own view is that some truths are too important to stand or fall by 
mere argument”.56  
 
                                                
55 A Philosophy of Political Myth, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 32. 
 
56 Emphasis added. P. 1, in “The Truth of Tripartion”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian 




Does Plato rely on myths, then, to convey or even discover truths that “mere argument” 
cannot deliver? This question must be considered in light of another question, and that is 
a question about Plato’s philosophical purposes more generally. But characterizing 
Plato’s philosophical purposes and intentions is precisely what remains so difficult. 
While I cannot answer this question fully, the dissertation will try to show that the 
philosophical purposes and assumptions that motivate Plato’s use of myths are better 
understood with a firmer grasp of his educational scheme that is woven into his view of 
philosophy. It should be emphasized that this way of characterizing Plato’s philosophical 
purposes is very far from the idea that Plato saw myths as a foil for demonstrating the 
rational purity, or superiority, of philosophy over mythology.57  
 
It is worth asking, however, if Plato saw myths as either capable of conveying something 
that he thought philosophical argument—that is, rational argument—could not, or of 
persuading someone of something that rational argument could not. One line of 
                                                
57 It is tempting to think that Plato wishes to show the superiority of philosophy to myth 
(or poetry) in the Republic, but I do not think such a reading is necessary, nor attractive. 
Julius Annas (1982) seems to hold such a view, unfortunately, and I will consider it in 
Chapter 4. Cf. Monique Dixsaut’s (2012, pp. 25-46) “Myth and Interpretation” (pp. 25-
46); Dixsaut thinks that the contrast between muthos and logos is best approached by 
considering Plato’s interest (most notably in the Phaedrus and the Republic) in 
examining, and experimenting with, the different modes that are available for conveying 
meaning. Gerard Naddaf (“Translator’s Introduction” in Brisson’s Plato the Myth 
Maker), too, portrays Plato in this vain, though with a sharper focus on Plato’s 
fascination with evaluating the different forms of written communication that have 
emerged by his time and the ways in which the Greeks’ consciousness and psyches were 
being transformed thereby. Superseding the oral tradition, Naddaf notes that, “Plato was 
the first great exponent of an entirely new kind of consciousness”. Plato, then, pioneered 
a most novel way to write philosophy: a written philosophy integrating mythological 
elements, traditional and new, and serving as an exploration of this new Greek 
consciousness and psychology. Cf. G. R. F. Ferrari (2012) “The Freedom of Platonic 




interpretation is that Plato thinks there is a range of truths whose expression must be 
mythical. Franco Trabattoni (2012) pursues this thesis: “The aim of Socrates here [in the 
Phaedrus] is to show that there is a kind of truth that only the myth is entitled to 
expound” (p. 308) (for which, interestingly, Socrates claims courage is needed: Phaedrus 
68a). Trabattoni supports this thesis with the passage in which Socrates reproaches 
Phaedrus for his skepticism about the authority of the sources of various myths. Socrates 
says, in admiration, that Dodona’s priests (before their time) were willing even to listen 
to rocks or oak, “provided only they spoke the truth” (Phaedrus 275b-c). The remark is 
strange indeed. But Trabattoni then turns our attention to what we learn from the 
Phaedrus, Symposium, and the Republic. In each, Plato discusses the process and aim of 
dialectical investigation: namely, the idea that the logos (account) about some sensible 
phenomena should, if pursued, eventually lead the investigator from its various 
instantiations in the sensible world to a single, unified idea, a Form, of which it partakes. 
(My claim here is that muthos can play a function in the development of knowledge; or to 
put it another way, a muthos can improve our epistemic position.) It is entrenched in 
many readings of Plato that the realm in which the Forms exist is not fully accessible by 
our faculty of reason or perception, and therefore must be spoken about in a likely (eikôn) 
way, which is to say mythical. Thus “if philosophy seeks to advance human knowledge 
past the world of perception and beyond the unifying work that man is in a position to 
perform upon that world, then it must indeed turn to myth”.58 This line of interpretation, 
in my view, is attractive because it resists denigrating myth in the name of philosophy, 
and rather sees myth as in some sense completing or supplementing the task of 
                                                




philosophy.59 According to this way of reading Plato’s myths, myths by all means play a 
philosophical role, nothing less or more. 
 
Catherine Collobert (2012) proposes that we understand Platonic myth as Plato’s 
“synthesis of poetry and philosophy”.60 The aim of such a synthesis is to provide the 
reader with verbal imagery that can get at the truth—truths that a non-synthesized 
philosophy aims at anyway, but truths that mere poetry (i.e. non-philosophical myth) 
cannot attain. Collobert does not see in Plato’s thought a deep contrast between logos and 
muthos, but rather sees each as a species of representation, and muthoi as a category of 
logoi.61 Collobert says that the purpose of a Platonic myth, then, is to represent the 
likeness of something real. Put this way, “What is at stake in understanding the art of 
image-making is ultimately the type of reality with which the myth-maker [in this case 
the philosopher] should deal”.62 Collobert draws attention to a distinction between types 
of images found in the Sophist (267e): images grounded in knowledge and images 
grounded in doxa (opinion). The philosopher is keen to create images grounded in 
knowledge, whose representations are portions of a stable reality. On this view, the image 
of the soul that is presented in the Phaedrus, for example, is an image of the “actual 
                                                
59 Cf. Harold Tarrant (1990) “Myth as a Tool of Persuasion in Plato” (pp. 19-31), and 
Tarrant (2012), “Literal and Deeper Meanings in Platonic Myths” (pp. 47-66). 
 
60 “The Platonic Art of Myth-Making: Myth as Informative”, pp. 87-108. 
 
61 P. 91. I do not think a lot turns on categorizing things this way, and this issue seems to 
become needlessly difficult in Collobert. 
 




structure of the soul”—the image is a “copy [eikon] of the soul’s nature”.63 This line of 
investigation seems promising in that it circumvents the difficulties of postulating a 
substantive contrast between muthos and logos, but nevertheless provides a framework in 
which Plato’s philosophical purposes are illuminated in his use of muthoi. 
 
So far I have been considering some interpretations that put the contrast between muthos 
and logos as one of superiority, or one that sees myth as supplementary or auxiliary, or 
one that sees Plato as trying to supersede or synthesize any contrast. But there is another 
kind of interpretation that is suggested by the myth of Cronus as it appears in the 
Statesman and, perhaps, the so-called eikōs muthos (translated by Burnyeat as a 
“reasonable account”64) that appears in the Timaeus, as I discussed above, as well as the 
myth of Er in the Republic. In each of those passages, Plato seems to be interested in 
evaluating the dialectical investigations themselves, their epistemic value and principles. 
It might be thought that Plato needs a different mode of thinking by which to evaluate the 
progress of the investigation at hand—or at least make us see the need for such an 
evaluation. Truth must be tested and represented in different forms. Truth should remain 
the truth that it is, even when it is represented in a medium other than the one in which it 
was discovered or proved. Myths can provide a different medium through which the 
merits of the philosophical investigation at hand can be examined.65 One way in which 
                                                
63 P. 96.  
 
64 “Eikōs Muthos”, (Plato’s Myths, pp. 167-186). 
 
65 Though with considerable more detail, something like this line of interpretation is 
pursued in Kathryn Morgan’s (2000) Myth and Philosophy From the Pre-Socratics to 




myth can evaluate philosophy, or at least provide an occasion for such an evaluation, has 
been described as the “disjunctive effect of myth”, by Morgan (2000). Morgan writes that 
this “makes us aware of changes in perspective, as in Plato we move beyond the confines 
of one human lifetime and an earthbound body. It makes us look at our lives and our 
intellectual tasks differently, [producing] the vertigo necessary for converting earthly and 
prudential rationality into something more”.66 What is this “something more”? One of 
Morgan’s suggestions is that it turns into a substantial education, something that changes 
the flow of the individual’s life and is capable of drastically casting one’s beliefs and 
perspectives into another light. There is no doubt that Plato’s philosophical myths aim to 
change one’s (philosophical) perspective toward what is more real. We will have to look 
at some of Plato’s philosophical myths more closely to see how Plato seeks to educate his 
interlocutors and readers in this way, and what objectives such an education entails.  
 
Things become particularly interesting and difficult when, as I will try to show, we 
encounter Plato’s assumption that, in some cases, believing what is more real is to believe 
what makes us ethically better. Such an assumption is present, for example, in the myth 
of recollection that Socrates espouses in the Meno. I will further this assumption later, as 
well as a similarly difficult assumption of Plato: even when Plato’s myths purport to 
provide an empirical explanation—for instance, as I mentioned above, how it is that the 
                                                                                                                                            
and scientific language cannot” (p. 4). Plato’s lesson is supposed to help us “realise that 
all language is a story that interprets reality, with greater and lesser degrees of success”; 
and the idea of there being a “degrees of success” requires the comparison of different 
mediums of communication, in our case that between muthos and logos (p. 287). 
 





earth is able to maintain its location in space without a foundation to support it 
(Phaedo)—if the explanation makes, so to speak, contact with the Good, that is, reveals 
the way in which the Good is a causal factor, embracing the myth (account) is supposed 
to benefit us ethically in this case as well. One who contemplates and in some sense takes 
on the myth of recollection in the Meno will be better off because of the way in which it 
motivates us to pursue philosophical investigation; and this is in itself an improvement in 
our epistemic position. In other words, an improvement in our psychology, which, 
importantly, is something a proper philosophical myth can bring about, improves our 
disposition to know reality. On the other hand, pursuing and taking on mythological 
explanations that reference the Good make us more ethical agents as well. One way to 
capture both of these assumptions is in the idea that developing a rational love of learning 
to investigate reality is a moral achievement. For Plato, this moral achievement is the 
upshot of a philosophical education that incorporates and positively relies on myth. 
Myths are not a secondary recourse when we cannot grasp formal, and, as it were, purer 
arguments: myths just are the deliverance of reason(ing) itself. But myths do have a 
special function; in the various interpretations of Plato’s use of muthos and logos that I 
have considered so far, Plato does seem to conceive of muthos and logos differently, 










Myth and Education in Protagoras, Gorgias, and Meno 
 
1. Myth and Education 
 
The Protagoras, Gorgias, and Meno share a common concern about the nature of moral 
education. More specifically, each dialogue examines whether moral education is even 
possible. Socrates asks explicitly in the Meno and Protagoras whether human excellence 
(arête)—the kind of excellence one must possess if one is to lead a morally good and, 
therefore, happy life—is something that one can pass on to another. Now these dialogues 
also have one more thing in common, and that will be the central concern of this chapter: 
namely, in each of these dialogues Plato incorporates a myth that serves an important 
function in advancing the dialectic about moral education. But each myth plays a 
different function in each of the dialogues, although there are also similar, or overlapping, 
functions. For now, I can put it concisely as the following: the central respective myths of 
the Protagoras, Meno, and Gorgias serve as motivational myths. These myths are meant 
to motivate the interlocutor, and more importantly the reader, to pursue virtue and the 
knowledge of virtue. Plato’s motivational myths provide a framework, a way of viewing 
one’s life and the various faculties and capacities that one develops in one’s life, such that 
one is persuaded that moral improvement is indeed possible and that it is worthwhile to 
try to pursue. The Protagoras myth, however, also functions as an explanatory account of 
how it is that virtue not only is teachable but must be teachable by its nature. The central 




motivating one toward virtue but also providing a framework within which moral 
deliberation can find, as it were, a starting point. Lastly, the famous myth of recollection 
in the Meno, which primarily functions as a motivational myth, also reveals an important 
educational principle: namely, that it may behoove the educator to exercise some 
creativity in creating myths to help students overcome a variety of skeptical arguments 
against a rigorous pursuit of objective knowledge.67 We can see that while Plato intends 
for the readers to be taken in by the myths, the myths themselves also stand as examples 
of philosophical explanations that can be put to service in one’s philosophical education. 
In other words, Plato is setting forth examples of the nature of explanations and 
accounts—myths—that, by his lights, play an important role in philosophy and 
philosophical education. 
 
In Chapter 1, I said that it would be helpful to see Plato’s myths as normative explanatory 
accounts, and I still wish to treat them that way. I will try to show, in this chapter, that the 
motivational aspect of Plato’s myths is an outcome of the framework—that is, either a 
way of viewing how things are or how things ought to be—that Plato seeks to 
recommend. And within that framework, Plato aims to persuade the reader, or 
interlocutor, to be taken by a Socratic moral (and epistemic) disposition. It is my 
contention that what is especially difficult in understanding the important educational 
                                                
67 It is worth noting that in the Protagoras, the myth is delivered by Plato’s Protagoras, 
while in the Meno and Gorgias, the myths are delivered by Plato. One might wonder 
whether a myth told by Socrates, Plato’s main spokesperson, holds the same status for 
Plato as a myth told by Protagoras. It is my contention that Plato’s respect for Protagoras 
that we encounter in the Protagoras and Theaetetus, for instance, shows all the more the 
honorable and philosophically legitimate status that myth held for Plato and Protagoras, 




function that all of Plato’s myths exhibit is that Plato ultimately wishes the reader to love 
the pursuit of virtue. (Or, if it is appropriate to put it in a modern way: Plato wishes the 
reader to fall in love with a Socratic worldview, even to be dazzled by it.) For Plato seeks 
to show that adopting the Socratic worldview, or framework, leads to as it were a 
generative source of motivation for moral improvement and philosophical investigation. 
As I have said, it will also be important to see that Plato consolidates the pursuit of moral 
improvement and philosophical investigation: to find a source of motivation for ongoing 
philosophical investigation is to find the same motivation for moral improvement. 
Perhaps it is the manner in which love, or eros, is intermixed with Plato’s mythological 
argumentation that inclines some scholars to describe Plato’s use of myths as seductive.  
 
Now whether there is an important difference between seducing the reader by 
psychological exploitation or rationally wooing the reader into a worthy Socratic 
worldview—and I do contend that there is a difference, a topic to which I will turn 
shortly—the value of Plato’s myths is to be found in the ways in which they advance the 
philosophical and moral education in us the readers, and in some cases Socrates’ 
interlocutors in the dialogues. To this point, Christopher Rowe (2009) says that “Written 
dialogue (in Plato’s case) is not the same thing as, and does not follow the rules of, 
ordinary philosophical dialectic…and his focus is—I suppose—on our, the readers’ 
improvement” (p. 22). I agree with Rowe’s point about the function of Plato’s use of 
dialogue, and I wish to carry this point over to Plato’s use of myths as well. Thus, while 
myth in Plato functions as a means of persuasion, it is important to examine, first, just 




persuades. We do Plato’s myths a disservice, however, if we are inclined to see them as 
less than perfectly rigorous auxiliaries to proper philosophical argumentation, as if the 
myths are simply there to persuade those who are less than philosophically inclined 
(although they may accomplish that) or unfamiliar with proper dialectical thinking (in 
Plato’s opinion, anyway). Plato is concerned with inculcating a change in our view of 
how things are and how we stand in relation to others and to reality. Rowe continues:  
 
The truth [that Plato wishes us to see, consider, evaluate, and ultimately take on with our 
lives] cannot be given us on a plate, directly. … We have to see things for ourselves. But 
this is more than just a sound educational principle: seeing the way things are involves, as 
it may be, having to give up the way we currently see them. A long process of persuasion 
is involved, of gentle, perhaps… progressive, exposure, combined with questioning our 
own (Socrates’ interlocutors’) ideas (p. 25) 
 
In some cases, then, incidentally, the views espoused by the interlocutors may reflect 
some of our own assumptions. But in any case, the views of Socrates’ interlocutors likely 
represent the kinds of philosophical views to which Plato’s contemporaries may have 
been attracted, and they are the kind of views that Plato wishes to critically evaluate and 
replace, through his own philosophical education, with a Platonic (or Socratic) view of 
realty. Rowe concludes: “The set of ideas, truths, that Plato and his Socrates want to 
persuade us to accept is no more than a beginning; it provides us with a framework for 
thinking, and for acting, without actually telling us what we should do here and now” (p. 




educational ambitions Plato holds for his readers: namely, Plato’s myths are one of his 
most powerful and important vehicles for helping us readers ‘see’ the views and truths 
and ways of thinking of which he wishes us to be persuaded.  
 
Rowe’s way of so describing Plato’s educational aims for his readers respects the power 
of myth without portraying its power as something seductive or sub-rational or less than 
philosophical. But as I will argue more in this chapter and the following chapter, 
according to Plato’s moral psychology, becoming rationally persuaded by a myth does 
induce a change in one’s desires and motivation. No wonder, then, that Plato’s myths 
appear seductive and psychologically exploitative. Indeed, perhaps it is not unfair to 
characterize Plato’s myths as psychologically exploitive; it is just that his use of myths is 
an educationally sound way of bringing about a change in one’s psyche.  
 
Part of the reason that scholars have been inclined to describe Plato’s myths as 
psychologically exploitive in a derogatory way is because it can appear as if he intends 
for a strong contrast between logos and muthos, according to which logos, conceived as 
formal (or perhaps pure) argument, is placed above muthos, in a philosophically minded 
hierarchy. Thus, in this way of conceiving the contrast, Plato’s myths become seductive. 
Luc Brisson (2012) expresses such a view:  
 
Myth cannot produce certainty in man, and remains on the side of belief. This being the 




the human soul, which corresponds to spirit (thumos) and desire (epithumia), dealing 
respectively with fear and temerity, pleasure and pain. Hence its efficacy… (p. 375). 
 
While this kind of reading can acknowledge the educational value that myth plays in 
Plato’s educational scheme—the type of ethical education and ethical exhortation that 
Plato seeks to achieve through philosophical practice—it denigrates the role of myth to 
mere heuristic devices that are psychologically seductive, catering to the “lowest part of 
the human soul”. Brisson’s reading suggests that myths work at a sub-rational level, and 
that logos—reason, arguments, rational accounts—on the other hand, interact with the 
rational part of our soul. Not only is this reading difficult to square with the passages that 
I will examine below, in which Plato’s Socrates ties myth closely together with truth, but 
it also assumes anachronistically that Plato’s conception of philosophy is concerned with 
“certainty”. No doubt Socrates is preoccupied with truth; even in Plato’s moral 
psychology one finds a concern with the view that one ought to feel convinced by the 
truth (insofar as one recognizes something as being true), but “certainty” is a concept 
that, in our study of Ancient Greek thought, we should not purport to find (lest we 
become ensnared in interpolating modern philosophical ideas68). The more serious issue, 
however, is to see Plato’s philosophical myths as seeking to convince the interlocutors 
and readers of some view by arousing “fear and temerity, pleasure and pain”. A closer 
look at the myths that Socrates delivers in the Protagoras, Gorgias, and Meno should 
make Brisson’s reading less tenable, since Socrates does seem to think of those myths as 
                                                
68 There are good, cautionary remarks of this kind, against importing modern 
philosophical ideas into our reading of Ancient Greek philosophy, in John McDowell’s 




being rationally persuasive and, moreover, accounts that capture some important truth. 
(Moreover, Plato writes in the Laws (664a-b) that to maintain a unified communal 
conviction and commitment to living a just life the lawgiver must “charm [ἐπᾴδειν] the 
souls” of the young with “songs and stories and doctrines [or perhaps discourses]” (ᾠδαῖς 
καὶ µύθοις καὶ λόγοις). Setting up a contrast in the way that Brisson does is not so 
straightforward; for logos, too, plays the role of charming its subjects.69)  
 
Now consider an alternative reading, by Most (2012), that finds a complementary relation 
between logos and muthos:  
 
In Plato’s project of educating a new philosophical audience, his dialectic and his 
myths are closely bound together. It is not at all the case that only dialectic 
represents the true philosophy in Plato’s writings: instead, Plato’s myth and his 
dialectic are complementary and interdependent. … Without logos there would be 
in Plato’s writings no proofs, no analysis, no verifiability, no intellectual 
conviction; but without muthos there would be no models, no global vision, no 
belief, no emotional motivation (p. 23). 
 
While I agree with Most, that Plato’s myths provide emotional motivation, models, and 
global vision, I will show that Plato’s myths do serve to analyze, prove, verify, and 
provide intellectual conviction. Indeed, it is for this reason that Rowe (2012) reminds us, 
importantly, that Plato’s views and framework and assumptions are so different from our 
                                                




own that we risk misinterpreting the philosophically respectable function and status he 
gave to his myths.  
 
In this chapter, then, I will turn to those key passages in which commentators find Plato 
presenting a strong contrast between muthos and logos, and which most notably appear in 
the Protagoras, Gorgias, and Meno (which on Plato’s part is surely no accident). In this 
chapter I will consider three passages that are thought to present a contrast of some sort 
between muthos and logos. Studying these passages and the educational and 
philosophical assumptions that are revealed in them will help make clearer the 
educational aims that Plato is seeking to accomplish through his use of myths. We should 
then become less inclined to characterize Plato’s use of myths as seductive and think of 
them as operating at a level that is either above or below philosophy. For one thing at 
least becomes clear in considering the Protagoras, Gorgias, and Meno: to give a myth as 
a philosophical argument is in some sense a privilege that is earned, either by seniority or 
dialectical mastery. (Passages found in Plato’s other dialogues also serve to buttress this 
point: that the Eleatic stranger in the Statesmen begins to tell a myth early on without 
question from the young Socrates, and that Phaedrus yields to Socrates’ dialectical moves 
as well as his claim that myths do get at the truth in an important way, both support the 
reading that mythologizing is a mature way to philosophize, that it must be delivered and 
used with considerable philosophical acumen and skill.) 
 





In the Protagoras, Socrates is concerned with whether virtue is teachable, that is, whether 
someone is really able to make another more excellent in matters of choosing well and 
acting in a morally good way. Socrates’ concern with the problem of moral education is 
expressed in conversation with Hippocrates. Hippocrates believes that a sophist like 
Protagoras, who possesses the pedagogical skills and the relevant knowledge about 
human excellence, is able to make someone better than they were before simply in 
speaking cleverly (312d). When, however, Socrates presses Hippocrates to explain the 
content or knowledge about which a sophist like Protagoras is able to improve one’s 
speaking, Hippocrates fails to give a satisfactory answer: “I really don’t know what to 
say” (312e). Socrates then reprimands Hippocrates for risking the health of his soul, and 
explains the danger in which Hippocrates has unwittingly placed himself, whereby we 
come upon an important assumption in Plato’s theory of education. Plato’s Socrates says 
(313a-b):  
 
Do you see what kind of danger you are about to put your soul in? If you had to 
entrust your body to someone and risk its becoming healthy or ill, you would 
consider carefully whether you should entrust it or not, and you would confer with 
your family and friends for days on end. But when it comes to something you 
value more than your body, namely your soul, and when everything concerning 
whether you do well or ill in your life depends on whether it becomes worthy or 
worthless70, I don’t see you getting together with your father or brother or a single 
                                                
70 The part I have emphasized reads: “…ὃ δὲ περὶ πλείονος τοῦ σώµατος ἡγῇ, τὴν ψυχήν, 




one of your friends to consider whether or not to entrust your soul to this recently 
arrived foreigner [Protagoras].71 
 
Socrates then says that “a sophist is a kind of merchant who peddles provisions upon 
which the soul is nourished”, and that the soul is “nourished” (τρέφεται) on “teachings” 
(µαθήµασιν) (313c-d). And the risk with absorbing teachings into your soul is that one 
“cannot carry teachings away in a separate container” in order to examine it before one 
determines whether it will benefit one or not (314d). Plato has Socrates advance the idea 
that there is no such thing as a mere education or mere acquisition of knowledge: 
education changes the way a life goes. Indeed, Socrates is convinced that education 
affects the way a whole life goes, whether a whole life goes well or badly. Things that are 
learned either improve the soul or make it worse off, which affects how one’s life goes in 
general. So how and why does Socrates think this? Unfortunately, Socrates admits that 
they are “too young to get to the bottom of such a great matter” (314b), and, perhaps 
ironically, suggests that they go to Protagoras (anyways) to see if he can explain for them 
the ways in which his teaching can improve them.  
 
When Socrates and Hippocrates meet with Protagoras, they immediately ask what 
Protagoras teaches and how it will improve Hippocrates. “If Hippocrates studies with 
Protagoras”, Socrates asks, “exactly how will he go away a better man and in what will 
he make progress each and every day he spends with you?” (318d). Protagoras responds 
                                                
71 On issues related to this passage, see David Blank (1985), “Socratics versus Sophists 





that he teaches “sound deliberation, both in domestic matters—how best to manage one’s 
household, and in public affairs—how to realize one’s maximum potential for success in 
political debate and action”, which, absent unfortunate, contingent circumstances, will 
also lead to a good reputation. Socrates generalizes Protagoras’ education, calling it an art 
of citizenship, of making people morally better in the private and political sphere. 
Protagoras agrees that this is indeed what he teaches, and everyone present accepts this 
proposition. 72   
 
Nevertheless, Socrates adduces two cases that make it appear as if virtue is not teachable. 
Both of Socrates’ arguments proceed from his own observations in the public sphere and 
in family concerns. I will describe both briefly in order to see better that Plato sees fit to 
turn to a muthos to explain away problems of this kind.  
 
In the public sphere, Socrates reports that when, for instance, the city has decided that it 
will build something, then it consults builders; and if the city is deliberating about 
building a ship, they turn to ship-builders, and so on. Where there is a matter of expertise, 
the city turns to the relevant expert(s). But if the Athenians are deliberating about how 
best to manage the city in general, then there are no experts to turn to because there are 
no teachers of this kind of expertise, that is, of how a city should be run, or what would 
be good for a city in general. Socrates infers from the fact that everyone speaks when the 
city is deliberating about how to manage its own affairs that there are no experts nor 
teachers; for if there were experts or teachers, naturally only they would speak (except for 
                                                




fools). Therefore, Socrates says, it follows that the Athenians do not think that this type 
of knowledge is teachable, for there are no experts of this kind whom the Athenians 
consult (319a-e).  
 
In his argument concerning family management and affairs, Socrates admits that he is 
puzzled about how it is possible that someone such as Pericles—whom all Athenians and 
everyone present at the dialogue agree is virtuous—failed to make his sons virtuous. 
Socrates assumes, without problem, that anyone virtuous would be concerned and take 
every measure within his or her power to try to make his or her children virtuous. If 
virtuous people can and do fail to make their own children virtuous, it must be the case 
that virtue is something that cannot be taught. Socrates’ skepticism about whether virtue 
is teachable, in the Protagoras and Meno, reflects a question about why moral education 
does not succeed in the same way, or to the same degree, as education does, say, in 
mathematics or literacy. With the exception of the certain cognitive differences, for the 
most part many people succeed in learning to read and succeed in learning basic 
mathematical executions—even in spite of mediocre teachers. Even the slave boy in the 
Meno successfully learns how to double the area of a square. But when it comes to 
teaching the virtues—namely, the value and worthwhileness of practicing moderation, 
justice, and pursuing wisdom, and so forth—students do not end up virtuous, even with, 
in Socrates’ example, an exemplary moral teacher like Pericles (319e-320b).  
 





Socrates urges Protagoras not to withhold an “explanation” (ἐπίδειξον) for (1) why it 
appears that virtue is unteachable and, (2) if virtue is teachable, how that is so. Protagoras 
responds to Socrates, at 320c: “I wouldn’t think of begrudging you an explanation. … 
But would you rather that I explain by telling you a muthos, as an older man to a younger 
audience, or by developing a logos?”73 Socrates and the others who are present agree that 
Protagoras should proceed as he sees fit, to which Protagoras responds that it would be 
more “χαριέστερον” (agreeable or graceful or pleasant) to give a muthos instead of a 
logos (although, as the reader well knows, he later provides a logos as well). There are 
two points I wish to note here.74 First, (Plato’s) Protagoras’ suggestion, in conjunction 
with the audience’s consent, shows that with respect to dissolving Socrates’ puzzlement 
over moral education, for both (1) and (2), as mentioned above, a muthos will do just as 
well as a logos. Socrates makes a similar remark in the Gorgias, which we will examine 
below, but this should begin to show that a muthos is not being treated as something 
which goes above or below rational argument, nor does it immediately suggest that 
philosophical arguments have their limitations. Secondly, in Liddell and Scott’s Greek-
English Lexicon (1889), under the entry for “χαρίεις”, one will note that for the masculine 
plural nominative use, “οἱ χαρίεντες”, “men of education”, is an appropriate translation. 
This accords with Plato’s Protagoras describing his circumstance as an older educator 
speaking to a younger audience interested in being educated. Thus, Protagoras’ muthos 
seems to suggest that employing a muthos to answer Socrates’ puzzlement about moral 
                                                
73 The Greek text is: ἀλλ᾽, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐ φθονήσω: ἀλλὰ πότερον ὑµῖν, ὡς 
πρεσβύτερος νεωτέροις, µῦθον λέγων ἐπιδείξω ἢ λόγῳ διεξελθών; 
 
74 cf. Statesman 286d: the pleasure that might be enjoyed by his mythological discussion 




education would be not only be rationally persuasive but also more educational. Giving a 
muthos here is educationally appropriate.75  
 
Protagoras’ muthos tells a story about what capacities are necessary for social life and 
cooperation among human beings: the gods, in their own wisdom, determined that it was 
necessary for all humans to be endowed with a sensitivity to justice, that is, a capacity for 
learning about what is just. The gods agreed that humans would eventually destroy each 
other or, following a failure to band together into a community, scatter and die in nature, 
if they did not possess a sensitivity to justice, which is an actualization of their capacity 
to learn about justice. Protagoras says that the fact that there are cities and politics and 
communities and laws and, especially and significantly, punishment for lawlessness 
shows that we must, to some extent, be able to learn and, therefore, teach virtue (320d-
324d).   
 
At 324d-e, Protagoras announces that in order to dissolve Socrates’ puzzlement about 
how it is that a virtuous person such as Pericles can fail to make others (like his children) 
virtuous, he will now give a logos instead of a muthos.76 I will give a brief outline of 
Protagoras’ logos. 
                                                
75 I diverge here from Morgan (2000), pp. 138-147, who thinks that “Protagoras 
manipulates his listeners into allowing his choice of approach, and makes it seem as 
though the two approaches are equivalent and easily distinguishable”. Morgan does not 
consider the possibility that Plato aims to educate his readers through Protagoras’ use of 
myth. Neither is the lesson here “beware of sophists who give myths!”, for Socrates and 
the Eleatic Stranger in the Statesman as well as the speaker in the Laws rely on myths. 
Cf. Claude Calame (2012) and Gerd Van Riel (2012) on Plato’s use of Protagoras’ myth. 
 




Protagoras observes that there are six stages of educational development, each of which 
makes an important contribution to the development of human excellence.	  
 
Stage 1: Parents, nurses, and family members educate their children through speech and 
deed, by setting a good example. 325c-d: “Starting when they are little children and 
continuing as long as they live, they teach them and correct them. As soon as a child 
understands what is said to him, the nurse, mother, tutor, and the father himself fight for 
him to be as good as he possibly can, seizing on every action and word to teach him and 
show him that this is just, that is unjust, this is noble, that is ugly, this is pious, that is 
impious, he should do this, he should not do that (emphasis mine).  
 
Stage 2: 325d-e: “After this they [i.e. family members] send him to school and tell his 
teachers to pay more attention to his good conduct than to his grammar or music lessons”. 
The teachers continue the moral education that began at the child’s home. 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Here Protagoras explicitly leaves mythos for logos (324d6-7). The fundamental 
problem of the logos is set up at 324de-325a by a question that recapitulates the 
conclusion of the myth: is there or is there not one quality which all must have if 
there is to be a city at all? This question should properly be regarded as an 
equivalent of the myth: the myth sets down as axiomatic that there is one quality 
necessary for the survival of the city and that this is political excellence. The 
axiom is in the form of a conditional; the logos will hold only if we presuppose 
the myth (p. 141). 
 
Gábor Betegh (2009) says of Protagoras’ use of muthos and logos that “both would 
express in two different expository modes the same overall view that Protagoras holds on 
the matter”, that contrary to the appearances that Socrates has focused on, present 
circumstances and facts about social life and practice suggest that we believe that virtue 
is teachable and learnable (p. 82). Betegh further observes, importantly, that Protagoras’ 
myth, as well as other myths in the Gorgias, Symposium, Phaedrus, Phaedo, and 






Stage 3: The schoolteachers now provide the students with moral exemplars in literature 
and poetry so that the children will have outstanding descriptions of people to emulate 
and imitate. 325e-326a: “... [the students] are given the works of good poets to read at 
their desks and have to learn them by heart, works that contain numerous exhortations, 
many passages describing in glowing terms good men of old, so that the child strives77 to 
imitate (µιµῆται) them and become like them.  
 
Stage 4: Musical education makes an indispensible contribution to the moral education of 
the students. 326a: “the music teachers too foster in their young pupils a sense of moral 
decency and restraint, and when they learn to play the lyre they are taught the works of 
still more good poets, the lyric and choral poets. The teachers arrange the scores and drill 
the rhythms and scales into the children’s souls, so that they become gentler, and their 
speech and movements become more rhythmical and harmonious. For all of human life 
requires a high degree of rhythm and harmony”78 (emphasis mine).  
 
Stage 5: 326b: Physical training for courage now improves their moral education, 
providing the students with “sound bodies in the service of their now fit minds”, helping 
them to avoid cowardice and act on their moral knowledge.  
 
                                                
77 I put “strives” for “ὀρέγηται”, instead of “is inspired to”, as Stanley Lombardo and 
Karen Bell translate it in John Cooper’s (1997) Plato: Complete Works. 
 
78 The emphasized sentence in the Greek text reads: “πᾶς γὰρ ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου 




Protagoras then concludes his schematic layout of moral education with an analogy, 
according to which this view of education is like the way writing teachers teach their 
students how to write, by drawing large faint letters over which the student can trace and 
learn how to write. “In the same way”, Protagoras remarks, “the city has drawn up laws”, 
and the students are learning to internalize those laws throughout their education (326d-e). 
Therefore, Protagoras concludes, it would be even more puzzling if virtue were not 
teachable.  
 
Protagoras’ myth coheres with the educational views that Plato lays out elsewhere, 
including the educational methods and assumptions that support it. Stages 1 through 5 are 
essentially reiterated in the Republic and Laws, especially at 401d-e, 442a, 518c-d, 532, 
595c-d, 792d-e.79 It is morally good for students to learn reading and writing and poetry 
and the interpretation thereof because these impart “rhythm and harmony”, and it is 
assumed that all participants in the dialogue agree that these are necessary ingredients for 
moral development and, therefore, for living a morally good life. In the Statesman, Plato 
reaffirms the assumption that people are amenable or “susceptible” to moral 
improvement, and “in general are never completely ignorant, or totally insusceptible to 
improvement”.80 Moreover, it is passages like these in the Protagoras and elsewhere, in 
their mythological expression, that lead Aristotle to say the following: “Hence we ought 
                                                
79 I am not committing myself to a certain chronology here; perhaps Plato’s theory of 
education and his assumptions about how to best carry out a moral education and its 
indispensable role in social life were laid out in the Republic and then reiterated in the 
Protagoras. Either way, Plato places a high premium on musical and poetical education, 
within certain parameters, in inculcating virtue.  
 




to have been brought up in a particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as both 
to delight in and be pained by the things that we ought” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1104b9-
13), because we are indeed capable of being brought up that way. The myth makes clear 
that moral education makes social life possible and good. More interestingly, the logos 
that follows the myth relies on the myth’s assumption that moral education must be 
possible, and Plato goes on to show that the variety of subjects that the Athenian students 
study throughout their lives—writing, grammar, music, and gymnastics—can each be 
seen as making an important contribution to the central and fundamental task of moral 
education, of instilling virtue. Indeed, the idea seems to be, perhaps surprisingly, that the 
mere fact that we are able to train our bodies and study music, poetry, literature, grammar, 
and writing also supports the thesis that we assume that moral education is possible.  
 
Gerd Van Riel (2012) summarizes this perspective and the relation between Protagoras’ 
muthos and logos as follows:  
 
[T]he Athenians presuppose that all have a basic capacity that can be instructed 
and educated towards virtue (322d-325c), and that people like the sons of Pericles 
do not have a well-disposed capacity to learn how to become virtuous (325a-
327e). In other words, Protagoras and Socrates both take for granted what is 
explained in the myth. … [The myth] constitutes the pre-dialectic common 




origins of morality and of religion, and provides the … starting point of the 
discussion, on which both partners agree (p. 163).81  
 
Following the myth, Socrates and Protagoras disagree over the nature of virtue. But 
nowhere is the myth criticized for its mythological form or argumentation. Socrates 
agrees on the structure of the story and its premises. I think Plato agrees with Protagoras, 
that a concern with what’s good, what’s shameful, that is, a basic sensitivity toward other 
people—however it is that we are able to pass on this sensitivity—is no doubt a condition 
of society. We cannot so much as a make sense of the very idea of the necessity and 
value of education outside of the truths about our social nature. That we are the kind of 
creatures that live together and exchange our thoughts, that our survival depends on our 
ability to exchange our thoughts with one another, so as to be sensitive toward one 
another, shows that moral education is taking place. But it is one thing to identify the 
conditions of society, and it is another investigation to determine how moral education 
                                                
81 Cf. Gábor Betegh (2009), who writes:  
The [myth] of Protagoras … construct[s] generic explanations to specific 
explananda. The fundamental problem with these explanations, however, is that 
their explananda are not true. They try to construct a formally valid explanation to 
something that is not the case. … Protagoras [gets] the first step wrong: [he is] 
mistaken in establishing the fact, but [he is] then using the correct explanatory 
principles to provide an explanation for the ‘fact’ as [he] establish[es] it. Or, to 
use contemporary language, if one accepts that myths in general can provide 
explanations, these myths can be taken as potential explanations as philosophers 
of science use the term: they have all the required formal features of a genuine 
explanation without however being true (p. 90). 
 
The lesson in using mythological explanations is not to give a factual account but rather 
to give a rational explanation that explains some feature of reality, some fact about the 
human condition, and so on. A myth can demonstrate how to show, rationally, 
imaginatively, and creatively, why it—that is, some fact about our human condition—




ought to take shape in society, and, furthermore, what kinds of possibilities can be 
realized through moral education. Protagoras’ myth, without relying on facts, is 
nevertheless able to elucidate an insight about our social nature: that, at some basic level, 
however minimal, all of us must be concerned with our relations with other people. But 
identifying this condition is still a far way off from the idea that education affects 
whether a whole life goes well or badly. To reiterate, stating what must be the case—that 
it is a fact that being the social creatures we are we must all have an interest in 
education—does not tell us anything about how we ought to carry out our education. But 
we can at least begin to see that Plato’s use of Protagoras’ myth does not readily lend 
itself to the view that myths are something either more or less rational explanations. 
Protagoras’ myth, in Plato’s dialectic, spurs an important investigation into the nature of 
moral education, and it also functions as a lesson in philosophical explanations. It is also 
worth emphasizing again that Protagoras is not criticized once for delivering a myth. 
Mythological explanations, without relying on facts, can demonstrate certain conditions 
that must hold, and they can elucidate interesting assumptions that influence our thinking 
and practices. 
 
It is interesting to note that Jean Jacques Rousseau pursues a similar program of 
explanation in his Discourse on the Origin of Inequality. There, Rousseau sets out to 
prove that social inequality is not a necessary or intrinsic feature of the human condition, 
and he draws a distinction between natural and social inequality through his mythological 
description of the primordial conditions of human beings. Likewise, Plato is not 




improving our thinking in the area of evaluating explanatory accounts. Rousseau 
introduces his investigation with the following remarks:  
 
Let us begin then by laying facts aside, as they do not affect the question. The 
investigations we may enter into, in treating this subject, must not be considered as 
historical truths, but only as mere conditional and hypothetical reasonings, rather 
calculated to explain the nature of things, than to ascertain their actual origin; just like the 
hypotheses which our physicists daily form respecting the formation of the world.82 
 
Rousseau’s programmatic remarks about the nature of his argument capture well, I think, 
the purposes of Protagoras’ mythological argument: to show that such-and-such 
conditions are necessary, and to reveal that such-and-such assumptions are operative in 
our thinking and practice. But the form of mythological argumentation in Plato also 
works toward educating the reader philosophically, testing the reader’s assumptions, as 
well as inviting the reader to consider a framework within which to think about certain 
philosophically important issues such as moral education. It is clear that Plato thinks that 
moral education and the nature of virtue is a philosophical topic of the utmost importance 
                                                
82 Translated by G. D. H. Cole (2005), p. 15. 
Most (2012) states that all of Plato’s myths say something that concerns human 
beings but that nevertheless cannot be empirically verified, and concludes that they “must 
be taken on faith” (p. 17). But given the purposes of Protagoras’ mythological 
demonstration, in conjunction with the programmatic remarks about mythological 
argumentation made by Rousseau, Most’s conclusion misses the mark. Plato is not asking 
the reader to take the myths on faith, to suppose them literally true for the sake of the 
argument. Plato signals, through Socrates in the Protagoras, Gorgias, and Meno, that the 
myths are to be treated as relaying some philosophical truth. They are not to be “taken on 
faith”; Plato is rather asking us to consider and evaluate them philosophically, and 





and deserves serious philosophical engagement. Mythologizing, then, as Plato’s 
Protagoras says, has the further advantage of being educationally stimulating 
(χαριέστερον), and thereby motivating us to consider the issue in a new light. 
 
3. Muthos and Logos and Moral Education in the Gorgias  
 
The Gorgias is concerned with the issue of moral education and the nature of moral 
improvement. In particular, Socrates challenges Gorgias to show how the art of rhetoric 
(or the rhetorician) brings about moral improvement in students, after Gorgias admits that 
the rhetorician knows what justice is and (therefore) tries to persuade his or her student’s 
to act justly (460b-c). Yet, Gorgias also had admitted earlier (456a-457c) that the student 
who learns rhetoric may nevertheless use his rhetorical skills and knowledge to commit 
wrongdoing and act unjustly. There, Gorgias argues that if the student who learns rhetoric 
from a good teacher does go on to commit wrongdoing, his or her teacher ought not to be 
blamed or punished; instead, the student alone should take responsibility and be 
punished.83 Socrates goes on to show how Gorgias has entrapped himself in a 
contradiction of sorts: even though the rhetorician (teacher) knows what justice is and 
tries to persuade his or her students to act justly, the student who becomes a rhetorician 
may employ his rhetorical knowledge or skills to act unjustly. The issue that Plato brings 
out here, as he does in the Protagoras, is, again, the difficulty of moral education: moral 
education is not successful unless knowledge of virtue, in conjunction with a genuine 
concern and desire for acting justly, is passed on to another; importantly, only someone 
                                                




who possess the knowledge of virtue and the desire that constitutes that knowledge can 
truly teach someone to be virtuous. The conclusion that Plato arrives at in the Gorgias is 
that it is the philosopher, and not the rhetorician, who primarily seeks and comes to 
possess moral knowledge and who seeks to pass on this moral knowledge. It will be 
helpful to see Socrates’ grand myth against this background. For unless we do, we will be 
inclined to see Socrates’ myth about virtue in this life and the afterlife as simply an 
argument—admittedly, however strange and, as we shall see, incompetent we may be 
inclined to think it—for choosing a life of virtue and (again, perhaps strangely) for virtue 
as its own reward.  
 
Given Socrates’ claim that virtue is its own reward in this life, scholars have found 
Socrates’ myth strange, since the myth seems to show that virtue is rewarded in the 
afterlife as well. If one is convinced by the thought that acting virtuously is its own 
reward, would one be all the more motivated by learning that virtue is also rewarded in 
the afterlife? If Socrates’ myth is to figure in an interpretation of the arguments that 
appear in the dialogue, in particular, that justice is intrinsically good, then it may appear 
as though the myth threatens to undermine that claim, because it seems to threaten an 
punishment in the afterlife—i.e., the “threat of hell”—for acting unjustly, thereby 
motivating one to act justly (David Sedley, 2009). Daniel C. Russell (2001), too, notices 
that even though Socrates claims that virtue is its own reward, Socrates’ myth seems to 
posit a reward for virtue in the afterlife. He writes, “How could one show that virtue 
benefits us already, on the grounds that it will benefit us later?” (p. 558).84  
                                                




Yet the confusion over the myth that Plato gives to Socrates in the Gorgias does not need 
to be so disconcerting if, as David Sedley (2009) aptly points out, we remind ourselves 
that, at 492a-493d, “Socrates has explicitly advertised the idea that myths of afterlife 
punishment serve as allegories for moral truths about this life” (p. 53). It should be said, 
however, that Socrates’ myth is not merely an allegorical reiteration of his philosophical 
arguments for the virtuous life—in particular, that it is better to be a victim of injustice 
than to perpetrate it—but the myth plays a philosophically educational role for the reader 
(and for Socrates’ opponents, although it appears unsuccessful), a task that Plato did not 
think was accomplished, or, better, finished, in the dialectical exchange up to the point 
where Socrates delivers his myth. David Sedley’s subtle and fruitful reading leads to the 
idea that the program that Plato’s Socrates envisions for the reader (and interlocutor) is to 
transform people into their own moral evaluators, that is, to train them into becoming 
“dialectical witness[es]” (p. 57). The “dialectical witness” possesses the same Socratic art 
of examining whether one has acted justly, or whether one is leading a life based on true 
beliefs or false ones. The argument in the myth is that the kind of moral improvement 
that can be made through a dialectical exchange with Socrates is more educationally 
effective than judicial punishment, or the threat thereof. Part of the education of Socrates’ 
myth consists in “making each person their own character witness”, a point that is more 
vividly made in a myth that describes that the consequences of acting justly and unjustly 
carry all the way through one’s life and thereafter.85  
                                                
85 See 471e-472c for a contrast between the “law courts” and dialectical examination. 
David Sedley takes the effect of Socrates’ myth on Gorgias and Callicles as Plato’s 
preferred counterpart to judicial punishment: “just as dialectical interrogation is the 
superior counterpart to judicial trial, so too are the respective outcomes related: 





But why does Socrates call his mythological account a logos? Is Plato setting up a strong 
contrast here? To further reinforce the educational role that Plato gives to Socrates’ myth, 
and for the sake of maintaining my argument that Plato does not intend to denigrate myth 
and praise logos (or some “pure” philosophy), it will be helpful to examine Socrates’ 
introductory remarks to his myth, as well has his closing remarks after it.  
 
Socrates introduces his myth, at 523a, as follows: “Give ear then—as they put it—to a 
very fine account [µάλα καλοῦ λόγου]. You’ll [Callicles] think that it’s a story86 [ἡγήσῃ 
µῦθον], although I think it’s an account [ἐγὼ οἶµαι, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον], for what I’m about to 
say [λέγειν] I will tell you as true [ἀληθῆ].87 
 
Socrates is not insisting on the literal truth of his account (Rowe 2012, Sedley 2009), but 
the philosophical truth of it. Given what we have seen in the Protagoras—namely that it 
is appropriate for philosophical demonstrations and explanations to take a mythological 
                                                                                                                                            
false or “worthless” (527e) beliefs (p. 60). I think this view is compatible with viewing 
the myth as a tool for philosophical education, since Plato’s Socrates clearly thinks that 
dialectical interrogation and refutation are morally (and epistemically) beneficial. Indeed, 
Sedley characterizes Socrates’ dialectical interrogation and refutation as “therapeutic” for 
the soul, leading to “moral improvement”: pp. 63-65. 
 
86 Donald J. Zeyl, in Cooper’s (1997) Complete Works, translate “µῦθον” as “mere tale”, 
which gives the impression of a stronger contrast. I am not saying that adding “mere” is 
translational blunder, especially because if one looks ahead to 527a, where Socrates says 
that Callicles will probably look down upon his account as if it were a myth told by an 
old woman, one will be inclined to find the same sentiment expressed here at 523a. But, 
for 523a, adding “mere” may nevertheless beg the question concerning whether Plato is 
setting up a hierarchical contrast for his readers. Thus, I have put “story” instead.  
87 The Greek reads: “ἄκουε δή, φασί, µάλα καλοῦ λόγου, ὃν σὺ µὲν ἡγήσῃ µῦθον, ὡς ἐγὼ 




form when they can serve to be more educative and establish assumptions that may be 
shared in the dialectic—Socrates’ announcement at Gorgias 523a, that his account may 
seem like a myth to Callicles but that it will be told as a true logos, can be interpreted as a 
signal to Callicles and the reader that the following myth will do more than educate and 
establish (however successfully or unsuccessfully) certain philosophical assumptions that 
might be shared. Socrates is saying to Callicles, “you might think that this myth is only 
functioning as a mythological account that reinforces the (potential) eternal reward of 
virtue and vividly describes the (potential) eternal punishment and misery of living a 
vicious and unjust life—but that would miss the mark”. If a god’s divine logos can 
distinguish between a virtuous soul and a vicious one, and if we are the sort of people to 
be motivated by the thought that we have all the more reason to make our souls amenable 
to perfect (divine) judgment, and we have obvious reason to try to avoid divine 
punishment, the account might only succeed as a motivationally efficacious account, and 
lack in argumentative force. But Socrates also claims that the account is a very fine, 
beautiful, or noble account (µάλα καλοῦ λόγου), an account that, absent a better and finer 
one, also captures the truth about the nature of virtue and the virtuous life. Socrates’ 
declaration that his myth is a logos is Plato’s more overt signal that the myth is to be 
treated as a vital part of the whole dialectical exchange that has taken place so far 
between Socrates and his opponents.88 Thus we might see the dialectical exchange as a 
whole as amounting to the dialogue Gorgias, which itself is a philosophical account that 
investigates the nature of rhetoric, language, and ethics, and seeks to persuade us of 
                                                
88 Cf. Morgan (2000), chapter 7. At p. 191, Morgan says that Socrates views his myth “as 
an extension of his philosophical logos …because doing so dramatises the incompatibility 




certain positions and views with respect to those subjects. Mythologizing, in Plato’s 
context, is a way of philosophizing. And Callicles and the readers are told not to treat 
Socrates’ account as only a myth, something that serves to educate, persuade, and 
motivate—although it does that, too. We are being told to treat myths, in these contexts, 
as manifestations or guises of logos. Socrates’ myth, in the Gorgias, is being treated as an 
account that (as strange as this sounds to our modern ears) is by all means a philosophical 
account, a logos, of the supremacy of the virtuous life.   
 
After Socrates tells the myth, he says, at 524a: “This, Callicles, is what I’ve heard, and I 
think that it’s true [ταῦτ᾽ ἔστιν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἃ ἐγὼ ἀκηκοὼς πιστεύω ἀληθῆ εἶναι]”. 
The myth captures the truth about virtue. Later again, from 526d-527e, he says:  
 
For my part Callicles, I’m convinced by these accounts, and I think about how I’ll 
reveal to the judge a soul that’s as healthy as it can be. [A] So [οὖν] I disregard 
the things held in honor by the majority of people, and by practicing truth I really 
try, to the best of my ability, to be and to live as a very good man, and when I die, 
to die like that. And I call on all other people as well, as far as I can … to this way 
of life, this contest [i.e. to strive for virtue], that I hold to be worth all the other 
contests in this life. … [B] Maybe you think this account is told as an old wives’ 
tale, and you feel contempt for it [τάχα δ᾽ οὖν ταῦτα µῦθός σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι 
ὥσπερ γραὸς καὶ καταφρονεῖς αὐτῶν]. And it certainly wouldn’t be a surprising 
thing to feel contempt for it if we could look for and somehow find one better and 




[ἀποδεῖξαι] that there’s any other life one should live than the one which will 
clearly turn out to be advantageous in that world, too. But among so many 
arguments this one alone survives refutation and remains steady: that doing 
what’s unjust is more to be guarded against than suffering it, and that it’s not 
seeming to be good but being good that a man should take care of more than 
anything. … So listen to me and follow me to where I am, and when you’ve come 
here you’ll be happy both during life and at its end, as the account indicates [ὡς ὁ 
λόγος σηµαίνει]. … [C] So let us use the account [τῷ λόγῳ] that has now been 
disclosed to us as our guide, one that indicates to us that this way of life is the 
best, to practice justice and the rest of excellence both in life and in death. Let us 
follow it, then, and call on others to do so, too, and let’s not follow the one that 
you believe in and call on me to follow. For that one is worthless, Callicles [ἔστι 
γὰρ οὐδενὸς ἄξιος ὦ Καλλίκλεις] (526d-527e; emphasis mine). 
 
(A): “So” (οὖν), Socrates concludes, the myth compels him to live a virtuous life; that 
“by practicing truth I really try, to the best of my ability, to be and to live as a very good 
man, and when I die, to die like that”. The myth is motivational and rationally persuasive, 
such that because of it Socrates chooses to live a life of virtue.  
 
(B): Because Callicles is not persuaded, he may have contempt for Socrates’ 
mythological logos as if it were told by some old woman who is trying to fear monger 
someone into a life of virtue; but that would be missing the mark. The myth may be all 




own reward in this life—is also the more advantageous and healthy life in the afterlife as 
well, if there were an afterlife. But I think the real reason that Socrates finds his account a 
fine and true one is because it (at least by Plato’s standards) has begun to show that an 
account of the supremacy of virtue ought to show that virtue is to be chosen over 
anything in any circumstance. The virtuous life is not a contingent and accidental good. If 
the life of virtue is truly the healthiest and best life here and now, intrinsically, then it 
must be the case that it will benefit in any potential circumstance, even in something as 
remote as the afterlife. The virtuous life is so supremely and non-accidentally good that if 
there were an infallible divine logos that could morally judge lives perfectly, it too would 
deem the virtuous life supreme and best. Socrates also claims that a better account has not 
been offered. Socrates reminds Callicles that he has failed to prove [ἀποδεῖξαι] his own 
account—that might makes right, or that virtue is a relative and contingent good that is 
entirely dependent on, and vulnerable to, the circumstances in which one finds oneself—
with or without a myth.89 Socrates says that his account captures the important thought 
that “it’s not seeming to be good but being good” that we ought to seek, for otherwise we 
might believe in the false and “worthless” account that the good we are seeking in life is 
merely contingent and circumstantially advantageous. Socrates’ claim is that virtue 
brings about the unified health of one’s soul such that one’s soul, in any kind of 
circumstance, is well off. Insofar as the myth succeeds in showing the non-contingent 
good of virtue, it is a philosophically fine (kalon) and true account.  
 
                                                
89 Cf. Charles B. Daniels (1992): “the view [Socrates] has argued for all along is 
unrefuted … because… the myth, as expressing reasoned and unrefuted truth, is no more 
than a closing summary in exemplary fable form of that very view [that was argued by 




(C):  Another conclusion that Socrates draws from his mythological logos is that it can 
lead or guide (ἡγεµόνι) one toward living a virtuous life: “So let us use the account [τῷ 
λόγῳ] that has now been disclosed to us as our guide, one that indicates to us that this 
way of life is the best, to practice justice and the rest of excellence both in life and in 
death. Let us follow it, then, and call on others to do so, too”.90 Socrates also thinks that 
his account should motivate them to call on others to live a just and virtuous life, using 
this myth if the philosophical, dialectical, or educational opportunity calls for it. 
 
(D): Socrates calls Callicles’ account worthless (οὐδενὸς ἄξιος). Notice that Socrates 
does not deplore Callicles’ account by dint of being false; Callicles’ account is rather 
worthless because it not only fails to capture the intrinsic goodness of the virtuous life, 
but it also miseducates us into pursuing the wrong things—contingent and circumstantial 
goods that may falsely appear advantageous. Callicles’ account miseducates us by failing 
to motivate us to morally improve ourselves, and it fails to motivate us to continue 
pursuing virtue and philosophical investigation about virtue. 
 
Lastly, at 527d, Socrates makes clear that espousing his mythological account will not 
only motivate one to pursue virtue—a non-contingent, or non-accidental good—but that 
it will lead to an improvement in one’s deliberations. Socrates reprimands his opponents, 
saying that they must all be uneducated (“… εἰς τοσοῦτον ἥκοµεν ἀπαιδευσίας …”), 
because they have hitherto failed to seize upon an account of the kind that Socrates has 
                                                
90 “οὖν ἡγεµόνι τῷ λόγῳ χρησώµεθα τῷ νῦν παραφανέντι, ὃς ἡµῖν σηµαίνει ὅτι οὗτος ὁ 




given. Socrates’ dialectical interrogation has revealed that they have failed to agree about 
the most important matters: namely, the worthwhileness of pursuing a life of virtue.  
Perhaps part of the negative aspect of Plato’s educational program in Socrates’ myth is 
that one begins to learn how to feel contempt for the kind of “worthless” views that 
presume that there is no non-relative, intrinsic good that can be pursued in a human life. 
Perhaps we are even to learn to feel contempt at their philosophical obstinacy as well. 
 
4. The Motivational Myth in the Meno: Philosophical Investigation is a Moral 
Achievement  
 
Here again the central concern of the dialogue is with moral education. Interestingly, it is 
Meno who asks the same question that Socrates posed to Hippocrates and Protagoras in 
the Protogoras. Meno asks: “Can you tell me, Socrates, can virtue be taught? Or is it not 
teachable but the result of practice, or is it neither of these, but men possess it by nature 
or in some other way?” (71a).91 Familiarly, Socrates states that the first question that 
ought to be asked is about virtue itself; but one gathers from Plato’s engagement with the 
question of its teachability here and in other dialogues that it is not a misguided question 
to ask but indeed an important one to consider. Now it is well known that Meno gives 
four answers that fail Socratic examination, but Socrates insists that they carry on the 
investigation into the nature of virtue. Socrates’ persistence, along with Meno’s failed 
attempts to answer the question, leads to the dramatic scene in which Meno poses his 
                                                
91 The Greek text reads: “ἔχεις µοι εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἆρα διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετή; ἢ οὐ 
διδακτὸν ἀλλ᾽ ἀσκητόν; ἢ οὔτε ἀσκητὸν οὔτε µαθητόν, ἀλλὰ φύσει παραγίγνεται τοῖς 




infamous sophistic argument, at 80d-e: “How will you look for it [i.e. the knowledge of 
what virtue is], Socrates, when you do not know at all what it is? How will you aim to 
search for something you do not know at all? If you should meet with it, how will you 
know that this is the thing that you did not know?”92 
 
Socrates acknowledges that he understands (“µανθάνω”) what Meno wishes to say. But 
when Meno asks whether Socrates finds the argument “καλῶς”, Socrates emphatically 
says that he does not. Now “καλῶς” is usually translated as “sound” or “fair” but I am 
inclined to think that Socrates’ response to Meno, at 81a, suggests that “fine” may do. In 
any case, it does not appear that Meno is asking Socrates about whether his argument is 
logically sound in the sense in which we speak of sound arguments in logic.  
 
To dissolve Meno’s skeptical paradox about finding knowledge one does not have, 
Socrates delivers a myth, an account he flags as “both true and beautiful” (“ἀληθῆ, ἔµοιγε 
δοκεῖν, καὶ καλόν”). According to Socrates’ myth, which most scholars call the “myth of 
recollection”, the soul is immortal and, because of its immortality, it has had time to 
experience and take in all that is knowable by it. And since the soul has taken in 
everything that is knowable, it has the capacity and potential to recollect all knowledge. It 
becomes a difficult task to recollect all knowledge, or even difficult to recollect this or 
that piece of knowledge, because, according to the myth, the soul eventually forgets 
                                                
92 The Greek text reads as follows: “καὶ τίνα τρόπον ζητήσεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο ὃ µὴ 
οἶσθα τὸ παράπαν ὅτι ἐστίν; ποῖον γὰρ ὧν οὐκ οἶσθα προθέµενος ζητήσεις; ἢ εἰ καὶ ὅτι 




much of what it has learned when it becomes embodied. This myth, then, also asserts that 
the (phenomenological) experience of discovery is really an instance of recollection.  
Now in this “true and beautiful account”, Plato enfolds (at least) two important 
philosophical and educational assumptions.  
 
The first assumption is that reality is unified, what I earlier in this work called the unity 
of reality. Socrates says, at 81d: “As the whole of nature is akin [ἅτε γὰρ τῆς φύσεως 
ἁπάσης συγγενοῦς οὔσης], and the soul has learned everything, nothing prevents a man, 
after recalling one thing only—a process men call learning—[from] discovering 
everything else for himself, if he is brave and does not tire of the search” [καὶ 
µεµαθηκυίας τῆς ψυχῆς ἅπαντα, οὐδὲν κωλύει ἓν µόνον ἀναµνησθέντα—ὃ δὴ µάθησιν 
καλοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι—τἆλλα πάντα αὐτὸν ἀνευρεῖν, ἐάν τις ἀνδρεῖος ᾖ καὶ µὴ ἀποκάµνῃ 
ζητῶν]”. The unity of reality is the assumption that reality is a kind of whole, a whole 
whose parts are integrally and meaningfully connected. Reality is unified in such a way 
that learning or coming to know a part of it gives one the potential and means by which to 
come to know the rest of it. From our modern scientific perspective, this may appear to 
beg several questions about the nature of reality, whether it is unified, and, if it is, in what 
way. But we will not be able to appreciate the educational value of the myth if we focus 
on whether this assumption about the unity of reality can be verified (if it can be verified 
at all) against the facts. Indeed, Socrates admits, at 86b-c: “I do not insist that my 
argument (λόγου) is right in all other respects”, but that it is nevertheless an account 
worth believing. Socrates does make clear that his mythological account ought to be 




all the more motivated to investigate it. If we did not assume reality was unified in the 
way that Socrates describes, Plato seems to think that we might fall into a skeptical 
position like Meno, worrying whether we can successfully and fruitfully investigate 
reality at all, whether we can in fact acquire knowledge (of reality). Indeed, as I will 
discuss in the following chapter, the assumption about the unity of reality, as well as the 
educational principle that complements it (namely, that we ought to assume that “the 
capacity for learning is in everyone”), is repeated in the Republic. I mention this here 
because Plato seems to think that the assumption about the unity of reality can also reveal 
important insights about the nature of our minds and our reason. It is a fine and important 
educational principle, then, to assume that the student has the capacity to learn many 
things he or she might think he or she cannot learn, and to tell the student that it is 
worthwhile and important to try to learn, even if it is difficult. As the student pursues 
learning one thing, so too will the student learn many other things in turn (about the 
world and his- or herself). This is not a trivially true platitude. Socrates’ myth here does 
raise an important and difficult question about whether there is occasion—and whether it 
would in fact be efficacious—to give a mythological argument about the unity of reality 
and the recollection of knowledge. I think this is a difficult question, and I will return to it 
in the concluding chapter of this work. For now, it does seem clear where Plato stands, 
which leads me to his second assumption.  
 
The second assumption is that acquiring a love for learning is a moral achievement in 
itself, for a commitment to investigating reality (as if it were unified) leads, eventually, to 




with knowledge (see 87d). From a philosophical and educational perspective, myths of 
this kind are important for motivating students, or whomever, to pursue learning and 
investigating,  because they try to persuade the student that he or she has the capacity to 
learn, and that there really is something (out there) that can be learned. The consequences 
of not believing that there is a reality that can be investigated, or believing that there may 
be a reality but that it is not one that is knowable, is dire and, eventually, leads to moral 
dissipation. That idleness and skepticism about knowledge and the unity of reality leads 
to moral dissipation can be inferred from, again, Socrates’ identification of virtue with 
knowledge. If we are not motivated to pursue knowledge in general, for whatever 
reason—although Socrates seems to think that the main culprits for a feeble and 
irresolute motivation are, to repeat, (1) not assuming that reality is unified and (2) 
thinking that one may not have the capacity to acquire knowledge, or thinking that one 
would not recognize that one did learn something—we, like Meno, may fail to pursue 
virtue. For how would one be motivated to pursue virtue if one did not think it was 
something real and something that could be known? Socrates declares that his 
mythological account is a truer and finer account than Meno’s. He says, first, at 81d: “We 
must not believe that debater’s argument, for it would make us idle, and fainthearted men 
like to hear it, whereas my arguments makes them energetic and keen on the search”.93 
Later, after the geometrical demonstration with Meno’s slave, he repeats the point again, 
at 86b-c: “I would contend at all costs both in word and deed as far as I could that we will 
be better men, braver and less idle, if we believe that one must search for things one does 
                                                
93 The Greek text reads: “οὔκουν δεῖ πείθεσθαι τούτῳ τῷ ἐριστικῷ λόγῳ: οὗτος µὲν γὰρ 
ἂν ἡµᾶς ἀργοὺς ποιήσειεν καὶ ἔστιν τοῖς µαλακοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἡδὺς ἀκοῦσαι, ὅδε δὲ 




not know, rather than if we believe that it is not possible to find out what we do not know 
and that we must not look for it” (emphasis added).94  
 
Given these two assumptions, Plato seems to think that if a mythological account that 
argues for a certain position or view of things motivates one to do the right thing, for 
instance, pursue a life of virtue, then the account is a fine, noble, beautiful (kalon), and 
even true one. In this line of thinking, therefore, it is no accident, nor a sign of a 
psychologically seductive maneuver, that the fineness of the account is motivationally 
efficacious. The myth is effective because it gets at something true and fine. The fineness 
and educational value of a myth is buttressed by the integral connection between its 
content, that is, its worldview and the behavior and the actions that worldview endorses 
and motivates.  
 
From this philosophical and educational view of Plato’s use of philosophical myths, it is 
not surprising that Protagoras’ myth is never called a worthless or false account, which 
we can assume is not an accident of omission on Plato’s part; Protagoras’ account aims to 
show us that moral education and improvement must be possible and that we must 
continue to pursue moral education because the good of society depends on it. Protagoras’ 
myth can motivate us to further consider the nature of moral education and its 
                                                
94 The Greek text reads as follows: “ὅτι δ᾽ οἰόµενοι δεῖν ζητεῖν ἃ µή τις οἶδεν βελτίους ἂν 
εἶµεν καὶ ἀνδρικώτεροι καὶ ἧττον ἀργοὶ ἢ εἰ οἰοίµεθα ἃ µὴ ἐπιστάµεθα µηδὲ δυνατὸν 
εἶναι εὑρεῖν µηδὲ δεῖν ζητεῖν, περὶ τούτου πάνυ ἂν διαµαχοίµην, εἰ οἷός τε εἴην, καὶ λόγῳ 
καὶ ἔργῳ”. Socrates makes a similar remark at Phaedo 114d, about the myth of the 
immortality of the soul: that it is “a belief worth risking, for the risk is a noble one. We 
should use such accounts as if we were charming ourselves, and that is why I have 




possibilities. Socrates’ myth in the Gorgias also motivates us to take the life of virtue 
seriously, while also providing an argument for the intrinsic goodness of virtue and a 
framework for thinking about the educational and moral value of dialectical interrogation, 
refutation, and investigation.  
 
There is a sort of unity to the Protagoras, Gorgias, and Meno in that they are all 
explicitly concerned with moral education and that in each Plato creates a myth (drawing 
on some familiar mythological materials from other sources) that plays an important 
philosophical and educational role in the respective dialectical investigations.95 We have 
seen in the myths of the Protagoras, Gorgias, and Meno that Plato seeks to lead the 
reader to engage with questions about the nature of moral education and its possibilities. 
Through these myths, Plato is rationally arguing for the importance of living a virtuous 
life and, therefore, the importance of actively pursuing moral education. Toward these 
ends, Plato’s myths also present us with frameworks in which to consider a certain set of 
philosophical and educational ideas. While the mythological presentation of these ideas 
makes the ideas more vivid and more memorable—which is surely an educational 
advantage—we have seen that it makes little sense to suppose that Plato intends to set up 
a strong contrast between muthos and logos, either because he seeks to denigrate the 
former and set apart the latter, or because he simply wants the convenience of 
hypothesizing without the burden of proving the facts. Plato’s myths do not go beyond 
where philosophical argument can follow. It is rather that philosophy must become 
                                                
95 Cf. Morgan (2000), who broadly divides Plato’s myths into three categories, although 





mythological when it seeks to teach and educate someone of important philosophical 
ideas and frameworks within which, and from which, to think about moral deliberation. 
Philosophy must also become mythological when it can provide a source of motivation 
for further philosophical investigation and, what I wish to argue amounts to the same 



























In the previous chapter we saw that Plato uses myths to educate his readers and 
interlocutors in philosophy. In the myths we have considered, Plato lays out certain 
philosophical and educational ideas for critical evaluation; advances particular conceptual 
frameworks or perspectives; and seeks to motivate the reader and interlocutors to pursue 
virtue and other values. While Plato’s myths, in the hands of Socrates or his interlocutors, 
are cast as accounts, demonstrations, and explanations, their cogency does not rely on 
verifiable facts. For the purposes of advancing philosophical and educational views, 
however, choosing not to rely on facts does not need to be seen as problematic or 
philosophically irresponsible. Plenty of important philosophical insights can be found 
through mythologizing, because, as we have begun to see, mythologizing in Plato’s hands 
is a form of philosophical investigation and normative argumentation.96 I also began to 
argue that an education in philosophy, in Plato’s view, is a form of moral education. This 
is because Plato sees moral education—and education in general—as a movement toward 
                                                
96 Indeed there are plenty of philosophical myths, images, frameworks, and fictive 
narratives in modern philosophy that play a role in philosophical investigation as well. As 
I already mentioned, there is Rousseau’s myth of primordial human beings. Nietzsche 
mythologizes his Zarathustra and has his own myth of the so-called eternal recurrence. 
John McDowell (1996) has written a parable about wolves (in “Two Sorts of 
Naturalism”). Wilfred Sellars wrote his famous “myth of Jones”, which clearly functions 
as a philosophical investigation into the nature of language in the hands of cognitive 
creatures like us. And, as I will mention again in the following chapter, Iris Murdoch 




a better understanding of reality. As Plato argued in the myth of recollection in the Meno, 
it is better to assume that reality is unified because that will make one more inclined to 
seek knowledge and (therefore) philosophical investigation. The purpose of this chapter 
is to continue to examine the philosophical and educational views that Plato advances in 
the Republic. The Republic, like the three dialogues I discussed in the previous chapter, 
provides a sustained inquiry into moral education, since Plato’s strategy for discovering 
the nature of justice and injustice is to look into the way in which one can be raised to be 
just, including the social conditions that would make such an upbringing possible. One of 
the important conditions for a good moral education, about which there is very little 
discussion in the Republic, is kinship (οἰκειότης). Plato’s idea is that moral education 
establishes a kinship between (mythological) accounts of virtue and one’s psyche, or 
motivational makeup. For example, we might say that Meno’s skeptical argument about 
the possibility of acquiring knowledge has no kinship with Socrates’ motivational 
structure and beliefs. Socrates claims to “understand” the argument, but the argument 
does not accord with him. It is not simply that Socrates disagrees with Meno’s argument, 
as argument; it is that Socrates finds Meno’s argument—and the larger ethical (and 
epistemic) lifestyle that it implies, or to which it may belong—misaligned with his 
character. Socrates finds Meno’s argument, as we saw in the passage I cited in the 
previous paragraph, not kallon. The myth of recollection and the myth of the afterlife in 
the Gorgias, on the other hand, are accounts that, given the remarks we will examine in 
the Republic, can be said to share a sort of kinship with Socrates: they harmonize with his 
character, and in turn he recognizes the truth of the accounts. I wish to lay out Plato’s 




are able to shape one’s psyche in a way that one’s reason learns to recognize, or is readily 
responsive to, “fine” (kalon) and “true” (agathon) accounts. For the establishment of this 
kinship between reason and, essentially, external manifestations of reason, Plato argues 
that the idea of reality can be identified with the idea of the Good. I will return to this 
topic below, in section 3. First I want to continue to argue against a reading of Plato’s 
myths that denigrates myth and privileges argument.  
 
Denigrating Plato’s myths can be the result of misapprehending the roles that Plato’s 
myths play as a method of philosophical argument and as a mode of conveying his 
educational schemes and ideas. I have been pursuing a reading of Plato according to 
which Plato’s philosophical arguments and his pedagogical goals cannot be sharply 
separated. Indeed, my claim is that it is intrinsic to Plato’s philosophizing to educate his 
readers: in particular, to try to motivate his readers to pursue ethically good lives, often 
by morally exhorting Socrates’ interlocutors through philosophical interrogation and 
(mythological) investigation. Plato seeks to educate the reader, that is, to philosophically 
and therefore morally benefit the reader, through the dialogues (and that is one important 
reason he wrote dialogues). Plato lays out his philosophical investigation in the form of 
dialogues, nearly half of which incorporate myths, because it is educationally effective to 
do so. Indeed, one might say that Plato is a pedagogical philosopher par excellence.97 
Plato holds that the purpose of philosophical investigation really is to improve one’s life, 
and this is because he assumes that a better understanding of reality and improving our 
                                                
97 Rousseau claims in the Emile, or On Education that the Republic “is not at all a 
political work, as think those who judge books only by their titles. It is the most beautiful 




natural capacity to perceive and represent the unity of reality is a moral improvement. 
This way of reading Plato is wonderfully advocated by Iris Murdoch, which I will discuss 
further in the following chapter. As I mentioned above, for the sake of continuing to 
dismantle the strong contrast between muthos and logos (or philosophy)—a reading that 
prevents us from appreciating the important roles that Plato’s myths play in his 
philosophy and education—I will now turn to another instance of such a reading.  
 
2. Myth and Argument 
 
The myth of the ring of Gyges, in the Republic, does an excellent job of helping the 
reader think about the idea of something having intrinsic value. In particular, the myth of 
Gyges directs the reader to consider whether justice is an intrinsic good. There is of 
course no ring of Gyges. Like many hypothetical thought experiments, the ideas and 
theses that are at stake, in philosophy, can sometimes be made clear(er) without facts. 
The ring of Gyges asks the reader to imagine someone possessing a magical device, a 
ring that has the power to free the individual from all external consequences that may 
likely accompany acts of injustice. With the ring, one can get away with theft and 
manipulation, escape judicial punishment, and much else. The myth of Gyges makes 
vivid the fact that one might be inclined to act unjustly if one knew one could get away 
with it in every case. The upshot of the myth, in the Republic, is to raise the important 
question about the value of justice: could we find any reason to act justly even if there 
were no negative consequences to acting unjustly? “Why, then, should we still choose 




advantages (366b). Is there an argument for the intrinsic goodness of justice98 that can 
overwrite or nullify any perceived benefit from acting unjustly? The myth of Gyges plays 
an important role in the Republic because it sets an additional goal to the inquiry into the 
nature of justice and injustice, and their respective effects, fundamentally, on the 
individual and society: namely, that not only do Socrates, Glaucon, and Adeimantus hope 
to inquire into the nature of justice so as to learn what justice is, but, in so doing, that they 
become convinced that justice is intrinsically good and superior to injustice. The ring of 
Gyges is just one of several myths in the Republic that play an important philosophical 
and educational role in the dialectical inquiry and dialectical exchange between Socrates, 
Glaucon, Adeimantus, and Thrasymachus. The myths in the Republic are not mere 
auxiliaries to a finer and purer style of argumentation, nor, again, are they a means by 
which to seduce the readers—by appealing to the non-rational parts of their souls—into 
adopting Plato’s views. The ring of Gyges is a clear instance of Plato using a myth to 
sharpen the focus of his philosophical inquiry into justice, and, importantly, to demolish 
the dangerous assumption that in moral education the goal is to learn how to appear good 
(363a). The myth of Gyges can still bring that view into focus for modern readers 
today.99 There are of course several more myths and images in the Republic that have 
struck a stranger and more critical note with modern readers—the myth of metals, the 
                                                
98 At 367c ff., Socrates, Glaucon, and Adeimantus concur on an analogy for the kind of 
intrinsic goodness that they wish to see in justice, according to which “seeing, hearing, 
knowing, being healthy” are “worth getting for their own sake” and are “goods that are 
fruitful by their own nature”.  
 
99 See Myles Burnyeat (1998, 1997) for an insightful discussion of the educational ideas 
and principles in Plato’s Republic, as well as a superb appraisal of Plato’s influence on 
modern educational thought. See also Jonathan Lear (2004) for an in-depth analysis of 




cave, and the myth of Er. Of course, criticism of Plato’s myths should not be 
discouraged. The point I wish to make is that a critical evaluation of Plato’s myths can be 
philosophically productive precisely because in those myths there are philosophical views 
and ideas with which one can either agree or disagree. Consider, on the other hand, a 
much different and unfortunate reading of Plato’s myths. Julia Annas (1982) writes: 
 
[Plato] uses the myth form to express truths that are profound and important; yet 
for him myth or any form of storytelling has low epistemological status, the 
preferred philosophical method being argument. … It is, clearly, a mistake to 
make Plato’s myths or imagery central to interpreting his thought, at the expense 
of the arguments; to make this use of the more accessible passages would be 
unplatonically lazy and unphilosophical. But it is also a mistake to ignore the 
myths (or images) as being clearly dispensable. For Plato, his use of 
philosophically low-grade forms to present important philosophical content 
produces a problem, a problem which he never explicitly solves, but which is 
inescapably obvious to an author who has chosen to do philosophy in a literary 
medium (pp. 121-122). 
 
To her credit, Annas acknowledges that the myths, at least by Plato’s lights, are not 
dispensable, since they supposedly “express truths that are profound and important”. But 
Annas is wrong to treat the myths as some “low-grade” vehicle for conveying 
philosophical content. This is the sort of reading that I have been targeting and arguing 




does not think he can convey through some pure philosophy or argumentation. Nor is it 
the case that he could put some profound “truth” into rigorous philosophical argument 
but chooses not to because he does not think it will be as persuasive. On the contrary, it is 
clearly not a mistake, as I have tried to show, “to make Plato’s myths or imagery central 
to interpreting his thought, at the expense of the arguments” (emphasis added). While 
Annas urges the reader not to lose sight of the arguments by focusing too much on 
Plato’s myths, I have been insisting that we will lose sight of Plato’s arguments if we do 
not appreciate the central role that the myths play in Plato’s arguments, as a form of 
argumentation, and as part of a larger argument in his dialectic.100 Plato wishes to argue 
for a certain philosophical position or “outlook”.101 And in the dialectical exchange 
between Socrates (or the Eleatic stranger) and the interlocutors, various positions are 
considered and evaluated. Upon close analysis one can gather that a Socratic or Platonic 
position that Plato thinks is philosophically important and—according to Plato’s way of 
thinking—therefore morally important is being advanced in his myths. I do not think 
Plato thought he had created a “problem” for himself, as Annas says, because his myths 
are not philosophically “low-grade” vehicles; rather, they are philosophically effective 
and interesting vehicles to change our philosophical outlook. As we saw, Socrates calls 
his myths good, fine, and true accounts. Matters are not any different in Platos’ Republic, 
                                                
100 It is not clear to me that Plato saw himself as consciously pursuing philosophy in a 
“literary medium” as opposed to a conventional, “philosophical” medium. In light of 
Annas’ (1982) observation that, at Rep 501e, “the Republic’s account of the growth of 
the state is called a mythos” (p. 121), I do not see why she fails to see that the myths are a 
form of philosophical argumentation that Plato does not denigrate. The mythological 
growth of the state itself is a philosophical account of and argument for the intrinsic value 
of justice.  
 
101 A philosophical and epistemological “outlook” is the upshot of being taken in by 




arguably Plato’s most mythologically layered work. Indeed, the vast majority of the 
Republic is occupied by myth-making. The mythological building of an ideal state, which 
is a launched in Book II, begins the explicit philosophical investigation into the nature of 
justice and injustice. The mythological building of the cities functions for Plato as (1) a 
philosophical investigation into justice and injustice; (2) a philosophical argument for the 
intrinsic goodness of justice; (3) a philosophical education for Glaucon, Adeimantus, 
Thrasymachus, and the reader, which culminates with the myth of Er102, aiming to 
motivate them and the reader to become just; and (4) a philosophical evaluation of the 
conventional myths familiar to Plato’s milieu. This list highlights the central roles that the 
mythological building of the cities plays103, and as I mentioned, there are further myths 
Plato embeds therein. I will not, however, give an analysis of each occurrence of myth in 
the Republic, for there is sufficient scholarship in this area.104 Instead, as I mentioned, I 
will examine Plato’s notion of kinship, in the context of his theory of (moral) education, 
and its relation to Plato’s myths.  
 
3. Myth, Kinship, and Moral Education 
 
                                                
102 Socrates even claims, at 621b, that the myth of Er would “save us, if we were 
persuaded by it … practicing justice with reason in every way” [καὶ οὕτως, ὦ Γλαύκων, 
µῦθος ἐσώθη καὶ οὐκ ἀπώλετο, καὶ ἡµᾶς ἂν σώσειεν, ἂν πειθώµεθα αὐτῷ… δικαιοσύνην 
µετὰ φρονήσεως παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐπιτηδεύσοµεν]. 
 
103 For an in- depth discussion of the role of the mythological building of the cities, 
especially for its educational role, see Jonas, Nakazawa, and Braun (2012).  
 
104 Again, see especially Jonathan Lear (2004). Also see Janet E. Smith (1985), Burnyeat 
(1997), Morgan (2000), G. R. F. Ferrari (2009), Catherine Collobert (2012), Annie 




From the outset, then, I agree with Rousseau in taking the Republic to be primarily an 
educational text rather than a political one.105 In Book II, when Socrates sets out to 
investigate the nature of justice and injustice, he proposes that he and his companions 
investigate the conditions under which justice and injustice might arise in a city and 
thereafter investigate how it might arise in an individual, “observing the ways in which 
the smaller is similar to the larger” (368e-369a). The method Socrates proposes for the 
investigation into the nature of justice is one by which they undertake the mythological 
building of a city. Now, what I wish to emphasize here is Socrates’ response to the First 
City that they construct, which sharply differs from Glaucon’s. Socrates says of the First 
city that, for him, it is the “true” (ἀληθινὴ πόλις) and “healthy” (ὑγιής) city (373d). 
Glaucon, on the other hand, calls the city a “city of pigs”. Socrates remarks that Glaucon 
appears to be after the construction of a “luxurious city” (τρυφῶσαν πόλιν), following 
which, as the reader well knows, Socrates then goes on to construct the “luxurious city”, 
then purges the luxurious city with a program of education, and then finally goes on to 
convert the luxurious city into the Kallipolis. Along the way, Glaucon is changed. The 
mythological construction of the cities in the order and manner in which they are 
constructed assists Glaucon and Socrates in their investigation into justice and eventually 
persuades Glaucon of the superiority of the just life to the unjust life.106 Why did the First 
City, however, appear as “true” and “healthy” to Socrates and not to Glaucon and 
Adeimantus? One answer is that Glaucon’s preference in Book II for a luxurious city 
                                                
105 Again, see Jonas, Nakazawa, and Braun (2012) for a detailed argument and exegesis 
for a “pedagogical” reading of the Republic. See also William H. F. Altman (2012), Plato 
the Teacher: the Crisis of the Republic, for a pedagogical reading of the Republic. I am 






prevented him from appreciating the health and justice of the First City; whereas, for 
Socrates, the health of the First City was apparent. I want to add a notion to this answer, 
to explain Socrates’ espousal of the First City and Glaucon’s initial rejection of it. The 
notion is that of “kinship”, or “οἰκειότης” (in its nominal form), and “οἰκείωσις” in its 
abstract form, a concept that Plato (and later Aristotle and the Stoics107) makes use of in 
describing the upshot of the educational program outlined for the guardians and 
philosopher-rulers in the later books of the Republic.  
 
Liddell and Scott’s (1889) entry for “οἰκειότης” lists “kinship”, “relationship”, 
“intimacy’, “friendship”, “connection”, and even “conformity to nature or 
environment”.108 The word also captures the idea of something that belongs to one’s 
home, a household item, or a family member. What belongs to one’s household is 
something that is familiar and intimate. One’s familiarity with one’s household items can 
make one immediately notice when there is a new item in the house (e.g., new furniture, a 
guest, etc.), or one often notices when things have been rearranged in one’s house.109 So, 
                                                
107 “οἰκείωσις”, “familiarization”, is an important concept in Stoicism. See The Stoic 
Theory of Oikeiosis: Moral Development and Social Interaction in Early Stoic 
Philosophy (Studies in Hellenistic Civilization, Vol. 2), by Troels Engberg-Pedersen 
(1990). 
 
108 Liddell and Scott also reference Plato’s Symposium 197d, where the sense is 
“intimacy”, in Agathon’s speech about love. Cf. also 463c: where G. M. A. Grube’s 
translation of “kinship names” (τὰ ὀνόµατα … οἰκεῖα) is straightforwardly about family 
names (i.e., brother, sister, father, and mother). Timaeus 33a-34b “proper”: the motion 
that is “proper” to a spherical object is to revolve.  
 
109 Sometimes one fails to notice that the furniture has been rearranged, which is 
sometimes captured by a remark such as “something seems different, but I can’t tell what 




in laying out the education of the guardians and philosopher rulers, Socrates posits (what 
might be called) a theory of kinship, according to which a relation of (what might be 
called) belonging or familiarity is established between one’s psyche and the external 
manifestations of it.110 Plato’s idea is that moral education seeks to render, as it were, a 
class of reasons—reasons for acting virtuously, for instance—as familiar, welcome, and, 
importantly, as what belongs to one’s self.111 
 
It appears that the kinship is established most effectively, in the early stages of education, 
by an education in music and poetry, since both are able to inculcate a sensitivity to 
“grace”, “rhythm”, and “harmony”. Socrates claims that “gracelessness, bad rhythm, and 
disharmony are akin to bad words and bad character, while their opposites are akin to and 
are imitations of the opposite, a moderate and good character” (400e; 400d). “Akin” is G. 
M. A. Grube’s translation for “ἀδελφή”, which means sister or kinswoman. Thus Plato is 
saying that gracefulness, rhythm, and harmony are the sisters of moderate and good 
character, and forms of imitation. The image that Plato is pursuing here is one of a 
familial bond or intimacy. Plato’s moral education leads students to find reasons for 
                                                                                                                                            
the same, familiar ones, and so their special rearrangement might initially escape one’s 
notice. I do not think anything turns on this observation.  
 
110 An inculcation of a kinship toward nature, a sort of filial love toward the nature, is 
also part of Rousseau’s educational program (or curriculum) for Emile. Rousseau says 
that Emile will instinctively know what is naturally fit for him; e.g., finding foreign and 
distasteful food that is cooked too fancifully. Plato’s notion of inculcating a kinship in 
early childhood, such that a certain range of reasons, or certain kind of reasoning, will 
appear natural, seems to be a notion that influenced Rousseau’s thought on education. 
 
111 A modern idiom that might capture this idea is in the way one says, “No, not that, but 
yes, this is me”, in making choices about interior décor. One speaks as if some decorative 




acting virtuously (amongst other things) as something akin to themselves, something that 
belongs to them. Socrates’ theory is as follows (401d-402a):  
 
… because rhythm and harmony permeate the inner part of the soul more than 
anything else, affecting it most strongly and bringing it grace, so that if someone 
is properly educated in music and poetry, it makes him graceful, but if not, then 
the opposite. Second, because anyone who has been properly educated in music 
and poetry will sense it acutely when something has been omitted from a thing 
and when it hasn’t been finely crafted or finely made by nature. And since he has 
the right tastes, he’ll praise fine things, be pleased by them, receive them into his 
soul, and, being nurtured by them, become fine and good. He’ll rightly object to 
what is shameful, hating it while he’s still young and unable to grasp the reason, 
but, having been educated in this way, he will welcome the reason when it comes 
and recognize it easily because of its kinship with himself (emphasis added).112  
 
(The emphasized phrase reads: “ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου ἀσπάζοιτ᾽ ἂν αὐτὸν γνωρίζων δι᾽ 
οἰκειότητα µάλιστα ὁ οὕτω τραφείς”.) Establishing a kinship between one’s psyche, 
one’s internal motivational structure, and external objects and manifestations of reason, 
                                                
112 The Greek text reads as follows:  
… ὅτι µάλιστα καταδύεται εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ὅ τε ῥυθµὸς καὶ ἁρµονία, καὶ 
ἐρρωµενέστατα ἅπτεται αὐτῆς φέροντα τὴν εὐσχηµοσύνην, καὶ ποιεῖ εὐσχήµονα, 
ἐάν τις ὀρθῶς τραφῇ, εἰ δὲ µή, τοὐναντίον; καὶ ὅτι αὖ τῶν παραλειποµένων καὶ µὴ 
καλῶς δηµιουργηθέντων ἢ µὴ καλῶς φύντων ὀξύτατ᾽ ἂν αἰσθάνοιτο ὁ ἐκεῖ 
τραφεὶς ὡς ἔδει, καὶ ὀρθῶς δὴ δυσχεραίνων τὰ µὲν καλὰ ἐπαινοῖ καὶ χαίρων καὶ 
καταδεχόµενος εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν τρέφοιτ᾽ ἂν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν καὶ γίγνοιτο καλός τε 
κἀγαθός, τὰ δ᾽ αἰσχρὰ ψέγοι τ᾽ ἂν ὀρθῶς καὶ µισοῖ ἔτι νέος ὤν, πρὶν λόγον 
δυνατὸς εἶναι λαβεῖν, ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου ἀσπάζοιτ᾽ ἂν αὐτὸν γνωρίζων δι᾽ 




equips the students to take pleasure in “fine things” and hate “shameful” things before he 
is able to grasp the reason for doing so. Then, when (and if) the students are presented 
with an account of the relation between their character and reality, of why they are 
inclined to act justly and why their emotions and reasons and spirits shun injustice, they 
will “recognize it easily because of its kinship with himself”.113 Later, in the Laws, there 
is a passage that recapitulates this theory, which anticipates Aristotle very well (see 
below). Plato writes:  
 
I call “education” the initial acquisition of virtue by the child, when the feelings 
of pleasure and affection, pain and hatred, that well up in his soul are channeled in 
the right courses before he can understand the reason why. Then when he does 
understand, his reason and his emotions agree in telling him that he has been 
properly trained by inculcation of appropriate habits. Virtue is the general concord 
of reason and emotion. But there is one element you could isolate in any account 
you give, and this is the correct formation of our feelings of pleasure and pain, 
which makes us hate what we ought to hate from first to last, and love what we 
ought to love. Call this “education”… (653b-c). 
 
                                                
113 See Burnyeat (1980), and John McDowell (1998). Burnyeat emphasizes the 
significant way in which Aristotle draws a distinction between the content of moral 
education, that is, the habits that are put in place, and the explanation for that reveals the 
good of such a moral education. Aristotle’s locutions for the distinction is “the that” and 
“the because (or why)”. John McDowell (1998), in “Some Issues in Aristotle’s Moral 
Psychology”, helpfully warns the reader against taking “the because” as an explanation 




It is worth noting that Aristotle says: “Hence we ought to have been brought up in a 
particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as both to delight in and be pained 
by the things that we ought” (1104b9-13). Later again, in Book 10, at NE 1179b20 ff., 
Aristotle paraphrases Plato and summarizes his own lecture:  
 
… the soul of the student must first have been cultivated by means of habits for 
noble joy and noble hatred, like each which is to nourish the seed. For he who 
lives as passion directs will not hear argument that dissuades him, nor understand 
it if he does. … The character, then, must somehow be there already with a 
kinship to excellence, loving what is noble and hating what is base [δεῖ δὴ τὸ ἦθος 
προϋπάρχειν πως οἰκεῖον τῆς ἀρετῆς, στέργον τὸ καλὸν καὶ δυσχεραῖνον τὸ 
αἰσχρόν].  
 
Aristotle uses the verbal form, οἰκειόω, which can mean either to “make a person a 
kinsman”, or “make a person one’s friend”, “to appropriate”, “to adopt, make fit or 
suitable”, or “to become familiar with”, or, in its passive forms, “to be related”, or “be 
familiarized to”.114 Aristotle’s thought is that if one’s moral education goes badly, one of 
the disadvantages will be an insensitivity—or insusceptibility—to good moral reasoning 
and arguments for acting virtuously and justly. Aristotle is appropriating this part of 
Plato’s theory of moral education into his own.  
 
                                                




Recall from the previous chapter that Protagoras asserted that good teachers “compel 
[ἀναγκάζουσιν] the souls of the children to appropriate [i.e. become familiar with: 
οἰκειοῦσθαι] rhythms and harmonies,115 so that they become gentler, and their speech and 
movements become more rhythmical and harmonious. For all of human life requires a 
high degree of rhythm and harmony” (326b).116 Whether the Protagoras was written 
before or after the Republic, Plato thinks that inculcating rhythm, harmony, and grace 
into one’s character through music, poetry, and myth is an effective way to establish a 
kinship between one’s character and morally worthy reasons and actions. 
 
To return to the Republic, as the student develops, Socrates says that other objects, or 
subjects, besides music and poetry can accomplish the establishment of a kinship, a 
specific shaping of character. As one learns to perceive grace, harmony and rhythm, one 
begins to see that they are present in painting, crafts, weaving, embroidery, architecture, 
and in natural objects and beings (400d-e). But much later, in a discussion about the 
education of the philosopher-rulers, at 522a, Socrates speaks of the “musical” education 
they had discussed earlier in Book III, as a habituation in (again) rhythm and harmony 
that, at an important stage in the educational program, is inculcated by myths, either ones 
that are intentionally fictional or ones “nearer the truth”. For the educational myths for 
the young inchoately function as explanations of reality, and they also function as models 
                                                
115 Translation of this clause is mine. 
 
116 The Greek text reads: “… καὶ τοὺς ῥυθµούς τε καὶ τὰς ἁρµονίας ἀναγκάζουσιν 
οἰκειοῦσθαι ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν παίδων, ἵνα ἡµερώτεροί τε ὦσιν, καὶ εὐρυθµότεροι καὶ 
εὐαρµοστότεροι γιγνόµενοι χρήσιµοι ὦσιν εἰς τὸ λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν: πᾶς γὰρ ὁ βίος 




of justice, which, eventually, the students recognize later on as “accounts”, as models or 
images of justice.117  
 
Thus, according to Plato (and Aristotle), without a kinship between one’s psyche, or 
character, and a certain class of moral reasons, in some cases, one will not perceive a 
certain class of reasons altogether, or, in other cases, one will not understand why those 
reasons should have any bearing on oneself.118 Recall Socrates’ remark to Callicles, in 
the Gorgias: there is perhaps something more than disagreement between Callicles and 
Socrates. Callicles does not even seem to recognize Socrates’ reasons or accounts as 
reasons or accounts, while to Socrates, Callicles’ account of justice is “worthless” (527e). 
Callicles’ account has no kinship to anything in Socrates, and Socrates’ account does not 
seem to register as an account to Callicles. Socrates seems aware of this (527a). Socrates 
says (and I am paraphrasing here): “the mythological account I am about to give is truly a 
logos for me, a genuine account because of which I live in such and such way, whereas 
for you, Callicles, it will even fail to seem like an account”. Recall, too, Socrates’ claim 
about the myth of recollection in the Meno. The account, to Socrates, registers as a true 
and fine (or beautiful) account. There is a kinship between the account of recollection and 
                                                
117 Jonathan Lear (2007) argues that it is a mistake to think that the kind of myths that are 
told in the early stages of education, such as the “noble lie”, work like propaganda or 
function as “legitimating myths”. He says: “in contrast to other myths and ideologies that 
are meant to legitimate the status quo, [Plato’s educational myths in the Republic] teaches 
us to be dissatisfied with all of our experience up until now insofar as we have taken it to 
be experience of reality. This is not how legitimating myths normally work”. Lear thinks 
that Plato is trying to ensure that the myths will inculcate a desire to investigate reality by 
the time the student is old enough to begin to reflect on the idea of “reality”.  
 
118 See John McDowell’s (1998) fascinating parable (or myth) of the wolf, in his Two 





Socrates’ character. Socrates welcomes the account as a good account, whereas for Meno 
it does not present itself as a true and fine account, but rather an unfamiliar and confusing 
one.  
 
To return again to the Republic, the last significant passage in which Plato uses 
“οἰκειότης” appears in 537b toward the culmination of the philosopher-ruler’s education. 
In describing the education of the philosopher-rulers, Socrates says: “the subjects they 
learned in no particular order as children they must now bring together to form a unified 
vision of their kinship both with one another and with the nature of that which is” (537b). 
The Greek reads: “… τά τε χύδην µαθήµατα παισὶν ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ γενόµενα τούτοις 
συνακτέον εἰς σύνοψιν οἰκειότητός τε ἀλλήλων τῶν µαθηµάτων καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὄντος 
φύσεως”. It is important to keep in mind that the city in which there are three classes of 
citizens, the philosopher-rulers, the guardians, and the merchants, is a philosophical-
mythological model of the soul. On this reading, the kinship that the students would 
establish “with one another” represents a coherence in the knowledge Reason has 
acquired in the variety of subjects it has learned and studied. In one sense, Reason (or the 
“student”) has learned disparate subjects, each with its own questions and methods of 
investigation; yet, at the culmination of one’s development, all pieces of knowledge, so to 
speak, must be brought together under the concept of (a single and unified) reality. Thus, 
Plato says that everything the philosopher-ruler (Reason) has learned must be brought 
together to form a “unified vision [σύνοψιν] of their kinship with … the nature of that 




“Unified vision” is G. M. A. Grube’s translation for “σύνοψιν119” (which is also 
preserved by C. D. C. Reeve). Interestingly, a few lines later, Socrates claims that having 
a “unified vision”, “σύνοψιν”, is the necessary skill of a dialectician, for, without it, 
dialectical investigation cannot be undertaken. 537c: “for anyone who can achieve a 
unified vision is dialectical, and anyone who can’t isn’t”: “…ὁ µὲν γὰρ συνοπτικὸς 
διαλεκτικός, ὁ δὲ µὴ οὔ”120. The dialectician is one who is able, eventually, to “relinquish 
his eyes and other senses, going on with the help of truth to that which by itself is” 
(537d).121 In short, the goal of education is a unified vision of reality.122 Dialectical 
investigation seeks to unify all knowledge claims into one (big) account of reality. But it 
is important to add that Plato thinks a unified vision of reality is also what is necessary 
for living virtuously. Or better: living virtuously is having a unified vision of reality. One 
                                                
119 There is a fascinating commentary note on this word, by Paul Shorey (1969), that is 
worth quoting here:  
 
cf. 531 D. This thought is endlessly repeated by modern writers on education. Cf. 
Mill, Diss. and Disc. iv. 336; Bagley, The Educative Process, p. 180: “The theory 
of concentration proposed by Ziller . . . seeks to organize all the subject matter of 
instruction into a unified system, the various units of which shall be consciously 
related to one another in the minds of the pupils”; Haldane, The Philosophy of 
Humanism, p. 94: “There was a conference attended by representatives of various 
German Universities . . . which took place at Hanstein, not far from Göttingen in 
May 1921. . . . The purpose of the movement is nominally the establishment of a 
Humanistic Faculty. But in this connection ‘faculty’ does not mean a separate 
faculty of humanistic studies. . . . The real object is to bring these subjects into 
organic relation to one another.” 
 
120 Iris Murdoch remarks (1990), from Phaedrus 249b, that Plato thinks “It is 
characteristic of human reason to seek unity in multiplicity”: it is an aim that is natural or 
intrinsic to reason. For a further and deeper discussion of Plato’s theory of reason having 
its own ends, see Burnyeat (1997, 2007). 
 
121 The Greek text reads: “… τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαιδυνάµει βασανίζοντα τίς ὀµµάτων καὶ 
τῆς ἄλλης αἰσθήσεως δυνατὸς µεθιέµενος ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ ὂν µετ᾽ ἀληθείας ἰέναι”. 
 




of the interesting claims, then, in the Republic that is often not mentioned, or at least not 
put in this way, is this: becoming a good citizen, and thereby contributing to a better 
society, is no doubt the upshot of a good education, but the aim of (moral) education, for 
Plato, is not directly aimed at good citizenship, or undertaken for its sake: rather, the aim 
of education is primarily to develop one’s psyche in such a way that one is motivated to 
pursue a unified understanding of reality. Plato then finds it easy to show that an 
education that brings about the psychological conditions for an indefatigable motivation 
to investigate reality is what is truly necessary for a conception of good citizenry and a 
healthy political order. But I have tried to show that myths play an important role in 
Plato’s theory of education, for they make an important contribution to the establishment 
of a kinship between one’s psyche and external manifestations of reason in reality (or the 
rational order that Reason can perceive or apprehend in reality).  
 
The upshot of an education in which a kinship between one’s psyche—reason, spirit, and 
appetite—and external manifestations of reason (e.g. in art, literature, philosophical and 
mythological accounts, and nature) ultimately leads to a sensitivity to what is just and 
unjust in one’s psyche and in external circumstances, such as just and unjust people, just 
and unjust political communities, and so forth. At 443e-444a, Socrates summarizes one 
of the advantages of a musical and mythical education, yet again making use of the 
notion of kinship:  
  
He regulates well what is really his own [τῷ ὄντι τὰ οἰκεῖα εὖ θέµενον] and rules 




parts of himself like three limiting notes in a musical scale, high, low, and middle. 
He binds together those parts and any others there may be in between, and from 
having been many things he becomes entirely one, moderate and harmonious. 
Only then does he act.123 And when he does anything, whether acquiring wealth, 
taking care of his body, engaging in politics, or in private contracts—in all of 
these, he believes that the action is just and fine that preserves this inner harmony 
and helps achieve it, and calls it so, and regards as wisdom the knowledge that 
oversees such actions. And he believes that the action that destroys this harmony 
is unjust, and calls it so, and regards the belief that oversees it ignorance.   
 
The things that are “really his own”, as it were, his soul’s household items, what is most 
intimately familiar to the soul—these are his reasons, his reasons for being virtuous and 
just, since those reasons are the ones that cohere best psychically and accord best with 
reality. Having a just constitution of one’s soul is a condition for perceiving reality aright. 
That is to say, if one fails to perceive the occasions for which just action is required, in 
Plato’s view, one has failed to perceive reality in an important sense. This inference is 
ultimately licensed by conceptually merging the idea of reality (of that which is) and the 
Good. This is the topic of the next chapter. But lastly, I wish to return to the issue I 
mentioned about Socrates’ praise of the First City and Glaucon’s rejection of it. We can 
now say that Socrates’ praise of the first city as “true” and “healthy” is a reflection of the 
                                                
123 Emphasis added. Christine Korsgaard (1999) makes much of this sentence in 
particular, and much of this passage in general, in her “Self-Constitution in the Ethics of 
Plato and Kant”. Korsgaard explains that Plato’s point is that only with an internal, 
psychic unity can it be said that one acts as an autonomous agent. When one lacks an 
internal, psychic unity, one is not acting as one self. Cf. also Paul Katsafanas (2011), 




kinship he shares with that mythological portrayal of justice, whereas Glaucon does not 
have a kinship with the First City, but rather, a kinship with the luxurious city. (What we 
might even say, within the confines of the concept of “οἰκειότης”, is that Socrates feels at 
home in the First city, whereas Glaucon does not feel at home. to Glaucon, the First City 
does not feel familiar; it does not describe a city to which he belongs.) And again, the 
answer, I contend, is that Glaucon is not internally just in the way Socrates is, and 
therefore, in one sense, Glaucon does not perceive justice in the First city.124 In the next 
chapter, I will discuss the kind of perception that Plato’s theory of education makes 























                                                
124 I agree with Catherine Collobert (2012), who writes: “It [Platonic myth] is meant to be 







Plato’s Mythological Education: Learning to Love the Investigation of Reality is 
Learning to Love the Good (Life) 
 
1. The Good 
At Republic 505d-e, Socrates says of the Good: 
 
Nobody is satisfied to acquire things that are merely believed to be good, 
however, but everyone wants the things that really are good and disdains mere 
belief here. […] Every soul pursues the good and does its utmost for its sake, 
intuiting that the good is something, but it is perplexed and cannot adequately 
grasp what it is or acquire the sort of stable beliefs it has about other things, and 
so it misses the benefit, if any, that even those other things may give.125 
 
2. Murdoch on Plato, Philosophy and Moral Education 
 
So far I have been examining the educational purposes for which Plato weaves myths into 
his philosophical dialogues and the philosophical assumptions and hypotheses that bear 
on them. In these works myths are important for the reader and Plato’s characters, 
because through them Plato is able to provide a twofold education: on the one hand, one 
                                                
125 I have put “intuiting” for ἀποµαντευοµένη, following Iris Murdoch (1970) 





learns about philosophical investigation—its methods and its aims—and on the other 
hand, one receives an education in the worthwhileness of philosophizing—that is, one 
develops a rational love for knowledge whose fullest practical expression is a love for 
living virtuously. Moreover, Plato shows that the virtuous life is the philosophical life. So 
with a concern for this twofold education, Plato uses myths to create persuasive pictures: 
some of which portray the (developing) internal psychological conditions of a 
philosophical life, of a unified soul, while others portray the kind of methods and types of 
explanation that the philosopher ought to pursue in explaining the nature and importance 
of virtue and moral education toward it. While the philosopher aims to know reality, in 
Plato’s view, the way in which she can recognize her progress is the degree to which she 
understands the Good, an understanding that paradigmatically takes the form of 
representing a unified picture of reality, along the lines described in the allegory of the 
cave. Plato thinks that this normative picture can take a mythological form, which is not, 
as I have argued, a philosophically or rationally second-rate way to philosophize. Human 
reason not only relies on images, models, metaphors and myths to grasp various aspects 
of reality and the human condition, and to impress these models of understanding upon 
memory,126 but it relies on these modes of thought to build rational frameworks with 
which to question whether what is presented to reason as morally good is indeed really 
good.  
 
Apprehending the Good in Plato’s conception is the ultimate aim of philosophical 
investigation and, paradoxically, the condition for understanding and explaining why 
                                                




other, relative goods are merely relative goods. I have tried to show that this pair of ideas 
is expressed mythologically by Plato so that we might develop a rational desire (an eros) 
for knowledge of reality. Plato’s view here importantly relies on the thesis that with 
further philosophical investigation, of a Platonic kind, we will come to discover that 
reality is unified. It follows for Plato that for whatever aspect of reality we seek an 
explanation, at some level we will ultimately explain it by referring to the Form of the 
Good.  
 
I set out to study Plato’s use of myths in order to understand better his theory of 
education and his philosophical assumptions behind it. While this study has tried to show 
that there is a logically consistent and heuristically sound connection between his 
method—in particular, his use of myths—and his thought, one might be inclined to object 
to the latter. In particular, one might very well object to Plato’s central thought, that the 
(Form of the) Good is the Real. In the previous chapters I examined Plato’s mythological 
formulation of this thought, and now I wish to ask whether this thought can find a 
respectable position in our modern moral philosophizing and educational thinking. I wish 
to argue that we can do so for both domains of investigation, and that is because I do not 
see a relevant difference in kind between the two. Iris Murdoch admirably and 
substantially argued that modern moral philosophy ought to abandon its attempt to pursue 
a “discussion of morality which does not take sides”, that is, to remain neutral about 
moral questions, and instead it should focus its efforts on answering the difficult 
question: “how can we make ourselves better?” If this is one of the tasks of moral and 




the form of explanatory and persuasive metaphors”.127 What she is thinking of here is 
Plato’s use of myths. A central question for Plato is indeed how we can make ourselves 
better: how we can live a good life. Plato thinks that philosophical investigation itself 
makes us better off. Plato does not suggest, then, that we would have to have a moral 
theory in place first so that we could then derive and justify educational content and 
methods that could be shown to make us better off. However, if one were to insist on 
remaining neutral with respect to moral questions, then there is parasitic pressure (though 
obviously not only from philosophers) upon educational theorizing to remain morally 
neutral in its normative recommendations. This order of theorizing presumes a certain 
demarcation between what it takes to be different domains of inquiries (or perhaps even 
different domains of knowledge), a view that, Murdoch shows, operates on assumptions 
about morality and education and moral psychology, and that is not as cogent as it 
appears. Although I will not be able to analyze sufficiently Murdoch’s complex ideas and 
difficult arguments about these thorny issues, the purpose of this chapter is to push for a 
Platonic view of education by looking at Murdoch’s push for Platonism in moral 
philosophy. I then wish to suggest, by way of returning to the source of inspiration with 
which I began this project—“that reason must become mythological and mythology must 
become reasonable”, so that we might all educate our philosophical natures—that if we 
can give the idea of the Form of the Good a reasonable foothold in our conception of 
education amongst students and teachers, that will be (so to speak) to take a step toward 
re-enchanting education. It will be a re-enchantment in the sense that we might free our 
educational thinking from the fetters of neutrality regarding values and moral questions in 
                                                




primary and secondary education. The argument against neutrality will follow Plato’s 
thought that all instances of education, of being changed, either lead to one’s 
improvement—that is, to a better understanding of reality—or leave one worse off in 
some way. There is no middle here. Education must proceed with an idea of reality, and it 
must also assume that we can learn to see and understand reality better.  
 
Plato’s consistent concern with education is not so much the upshot of philosophical 
discovery or argument, say, in showing that it is within the purview of philosophy to 
determine educational content that is fit for a truly just and good political order (although 
it appears that Plato might have thought so, anyway); it is rather straightforwardly 
philosophy’s concern to educate and to give shape to our philosophical nature, that in us 
which naturally loves knowledge (our eros), so that we might know the Good, know what 
is real. Philosophical investigation seeks to disclose an external unity in reality that, 
according to Plato, is made possible by an internal unity in our psyches. This requires an 
education that may be described as opening our eyes to the layout of logos, that is, the 
layout of reason, and its place in reality.128 And I have tried to show why Plato thinks that 
this sort of education benefits from and positively relies on myth.  
 
                                                
128 Or to put it in a modern turn of phrase by Wilfred Sellars: to open our eyes to the 
layout of the “logical space of reason”. I am persuaded by John McDowell’s elaboration 
of Sellarsian thought in the context of Plato’s view of logos: namely, that a natural 
upbringing equips us to understand reason’s sui generis character, and there is nothing 
supernatural about a rational creature’s ability to apprehend the rational structure of 
reality, nor is the rational structure that it perceives in reality merely a projection of itself. 
See McDowell’s (1994, 1998) Mind and World, “Two Sorts of Naturalism”, and “Virtue 




Plato seeks to impress upon the reader the relation between thought and reality. In the 
beginning of our education, we begin to acquire a logos, a capacity for speech and 
thought; with the development of this acquisition, our desire for knowledge of reality, for 
what is truly good, is only inchoate. Beauty arouses us, but our sensual arousal is not 
fully rational at first because we do not recognize the true object of our desire, often 
mistaking it for mere possession of beautiful things or certain pleasurable experiences. 
Plato goes to various lengths to show through his philosophical myths the importance of 
developing, motivating, and shaping one’s inchoate love for knowledge into a full-blown 
consciously rational love for it. It is not a given that one’s logos will perceive or 
apprehend that reality is a kind of whole, but for Plato it is important to do so: one’s 
motivation and psychological unity depends on it. An education in acquiring the idea of a 
unified reality, along with the motivation and methodological tools for investigating it, 
requires a philosophical education that, in very interesting ways, as I just said, positively 
relies on myth.  
 
I have also tried to show that a philosophical education for Plato is essentially a moral 
education—the two cannot be separated. Once there is an idea of reality that can be 
known truly or falsely (or somewhat vaguely129), our eyes are opened to values the proper 
perception of which is a capacity that merits the name of virtue. Virtue is knowledge 
because its possession ensures that we are seeing things aright.130 The good person must 
                                                
129 Someone might possess a true opinion without knowing that it is true. 
 
130 Cf. Aristotle, NE, 1144a: “virtue makes the goal right”. For an in-depth discussion of 
this passage, and the controversies it has evoked, see Jessica Moss’s (2011) “‘Virtue 




be understood as knowing reality, while the bad person must be understood as being in a 
state of illusion.131 This moral characterization between perception and reality is couched 
in terms of an education in vision and love of the Good in Iris Murdoch’s bold elaboration 
of Plato. This is the topic of this chapter. Like Murdoch, who gave a central role to moral 
philosophy amongst other philosophical branches of inquiry, I wish to place moral 
education at the center of our conception of education. Doing so, I shall argue, will allow 
Plato’s thought about the Good and the Real to find a foothold in education, and will 
thereby make philosophical myth more attractive.132  
 
3. Philosophy and Moral Education 
 
Murdoch argues for the centrality and autonomy of moral philosophy amongst other 
philosophical branches of inquiry. According to her argument, the assumption that moral 
philosophy must be dictated from other philosophical findings that are considered prior 
to it is unnecessary, and this is because it can be shown that there are moral assumptions 
that are constitutive of that kind of view itself. In other words, the kind of commonplace 
                                                                                                                                            
meant to side with John McDowell’s; see “virtue and reason”. As it may become 
apparent in this chapter, some of McDowell’s views about the perception of value seem 
to have been influence by Iris Murdoch. Justin Broacks makes this case, with convincing 
textual detail, in his “Introduction”, in Iris Murdoch, Philosopher.  
 
131 Iris Murdoch (1990), The Fire and the Sun, p. 46. 
 
132 In the following section, I will be working with a moral realism (of a kind) about 
values and moral development, although I will not be providing an argument that defends 
the moral realism and the metaphysics that Plato and, in a similar way, Murdoch hold. 
My aim below is rather to intimate the sort of moral transformation that might be made 
possible by the use of story, metaphor, and myth in education, with the assumption that 




view that demarcates the domains of knowledge and subject matter in philosophy is itself, 
upon closer examination, indicative of “a particular kind of moral vision”, or position.  
 
Murdoch finds that it has become challenging to invent concepts that might improve our 
moral vision—which she sees as the primary task for moral philosophers, that is, to find 
concepts that shift our gaze toward a just and loving vision of the individual and of 
reality.133 This is so because we have become accustomed to the view that empirical 
studies can dictate the appropriateness of such a task. On the other hand, some 
philosophers have come to think that a sound philosophy of language, from a morally 
neutral vantage point, can illuminate better the nature of evaluative concepts (and 
thereby, e.g., the social utility of inventing them) than moral philosophy (since an 
interested moral philosophy may helplessly beg all kinds of questions).134 Murdoch also 
attacks philosophers of a Kantian persuasion who focus upon the priority of investigating 
the metaphysics of the will and freedom: what we first need to know, it is thought in this 
view, in order to determine the correct moral principle toward which and by which moral 
action and development ought to proceed. Murdoch ultimately argues, though I will not 
say anything more about this issue, that the Kantian conception of will and freedom is too 
thin in its moral psychology to provide a persuasive picture of the ways in which our 
imagination and emotions, as well art, all significantly impact our moral vision. She 
                                                
133 Sovereignty of the Good, p. 27. The shifting of one’s gaze, or the turning of the soul, is 
a Platonic locution (Republic 518c), and in Murdoch’s (1970) thought, one’s gaze can be 
shifted by acquiring new moral concepts or improving the concepts that one already has. 
When one’s gaze is shifted, one realizes at the very least that what one took to be real is 
not real. Cf. Murdoch’s parable of M and D.  
 





writes, “I can only choose within the world I can see, in the moral sense of ‘see’ which 
implies that clear vision is a result of moral imagination and moral effort”.135  
 
As I mentioned, what these kinds of movements have in common, Murdoch shows, is 
that they see a certain branch of philosophy, or empirical science, as being prior to moral 
philosophy, and therefore able to dictate, from the outside, the limits of moral 
philosophy.136 Murdoch argues against moral philosophy being dictated from the outside, 
however. She writes, “Moral concepts do not move about within a hard world set up by 
science and logic”.137 She claims instead that moral philosophy seeks to see a world in 
which the Good is the Real, as Plato thought. Reality transcends us—not all of it can be 
known at once—but nevertheless calls on us, as it were, to “make discoveries” about it. 
These discoveries are instances of moral progress.138 Moral philosophy’s task is to 
                                                
135 Sovereignty of the Good, pp. 34-35. 
 
136 See Cora Diamond (2010), “Murdoch the Explorer”, in particular pp. 59-61. At p. 61 
Diamond calls Murdoch’s argument the “anti-dictation argument”. Diamond writes that 
Murdoch questions the assumption that our understanding of the “divisions” of branches 
of philosophy, for instance, is morally neutral. On Murdoch’s view such divisions do 
reflect (however subtly) a commitment to using moral concepts in a certain way, and that 
is, Diamond writes, “a particular kind of moral vision”. And again: “Murdoch’s objection 
would be to the idea that ‘the metaphysics of the modern world’ could hand over to ethics 
the appropriate understanding for us of the nature of the world”. I have benefited greatly 
from Diamond’s superb analysis of Murdoch’s difficult ideas.  
 
137 Sovereignty of the Good, p. 28. See also Megan Laverty (2007, p. 49), Diamond 
(2010), and Justin Broackes (2012) for an elaboration of this idea in Murdoch. 
 
138 See Iris Murdoch (1956), “Vision and Choice in Morality”, p. 56. Murdoch goes so far 
as to claim that her position is one of a “true naturalist”. Traditional versions of 
naturalism that find values “queer” have (1) an impoverished moral psychology and (2) 
place the rational will and the values that it creates, following Kant, outside of the natural 
world. See Justin Broackes’s (2012) excellent summary of this issue in Murdoch’s works, 




discover real moral improvement and the ways in which to achieve it. Moral philosophy, 
in this view, is not secondary to other investigations, in the sense that it must proceed 
from their discoveries or at least be compatible with their theses, because moral intuitions 
are pervasive in all thought. That our thoughts are permeated or colored with moral ideas 
and beliefs is a core argument that runs throughout Murdoch’s Sovereignty of Good. 
Murdoch’s argument surely has a Platonic ring to it, and thus she is just as concerned 
with moral education. 
 
Now I wish to argue, with a similar structure to Murdoch’s argument, for the centrality of 
moral development within our conception of education. The way in which I wish to state 
this thesis is not with the (familiar) formulation that every aspect of education has, or 
may have, a moral dimension or influence; but rather the other way around: that since 
human development is a moral endeavor as such, there is just moral education, from 
beginning to end, and it is multifarious in its educational manifestations. Moral education 
is a single whole, and it has many parts.139 The suggestion is that placing moral education 
at the center of our theory of education brings about the following. First, we re-establish a 
Platonic (and Murdochean) form of realism in education, the contemplation of which 
                                                                                                                                            
Naturalism” for setting out an understanding of Naturalism that seeks to prevent value 
from being subsumed into a supernatural realm. 
 
139 Myles Burnyeat’s (2000) admirable exposition of the way in which Plato values 
mathematics, in the Republic, for its place within a whole moral education, I think, fits 
my suggestion here: “Why Mathematics is Good for the Soul”. 






provides a source of energy (to use Murdoch’s terminology140) to learn to love the Good, 
because that is to tie the idea of moral improvement (learning to see and love reality) with 
every aspect of one’s education. Second, this form of realism would, I think, change the 
nature of justification that is typically envisaged for implementing this or that educational 
content and this or that method of transmission. The consequence, I think, is that 
educators could rid themselves of the impossible and theoretically confused task of 
maintaining a neutral (or agnostic) stance of the kind that is admired in scientific inquiry, 
an attitude that officially sees moral education as something private, special, and 
extraneous to the ordinary subjects of learning.  
 
What would be the possible dangers of this conception of education? I think the intuition 
behind the admiration of a neutral, disinterested inquirer or teacher is a desire to avoid 
dogmatism. This intuition in education is surely important, and dogmatism by all means 
ought to be avoided. But as I mentioned briefly above, Murdoch persuasively shows that 
it is a mistake to think that we can remain morally neutral in the organization of our 
concepts and the ways in which we are initiated into conceptual schemes during the 
course of our upbringing.141 The question, then, is whether we can countenance Plato’s 
central thought. 
 
                                                
140 Sovereignty of Good, passim.  
 
141 For even empirical concepts fit within a scheme that ineluctably has a moral character 
insofar as it is a conceptual scheme employed by rational creatures to navigate social life. 
Cf. Charles Taylor (1989), who shows, with an impressively sustained argument, which 
is partially inspired by Murdoch, that moral ideas (inter alia) pervade our language 
because the learning of a language, in a historical community, is our primary exposure to 




Can the Good be the first non-hypothetical principle of explanation (see quote in §1 
above) and, as Murdoch says, the “magnetic centre” of all our activities and endeavors in 
the way in which Plato envisaged? And would this be enough to underwrite the value of 
philosophical myths in education? These are difficult questions. What I have argued so 
far is for a convergence in the task of moral philosophy and educational theory: namely, 
to engage with the question, how can we really make ourselves better? I have posited a 
conception of education, following Plato, that is, as a whole, moral, within which there 
are many different parts. And Murdoch urges that moral philosophy follow Plato’s lead, 
once again, in trying to invent new moral pictures (muthoi) and concepts that can 
improve our moral psychology such that we will keep our gaze focused outwardly, away 
from the ego, toward an objective reality.142 
 
4.2 Philosophical Myths in Moral Education 
 
As I have said, Murdoch (1970, 1990) gives a bold and, admittedly, abstruse defense of 
Plato’s philosophical assumptions and educational aspirations with a view to showing the 
reader that philosophy cannot go on without myths, images, and metaphors, because 
these are constitutive of linguistic consciousness as such.143 Plato appears to recognize 
                                                
142 The Fire and the Sun, p. 45: “Plato’s connection of the good with the real […] is the 
centre of his thought and one of the most fruitful ideas in philosophy”. 
 
143 “The Sovereignty of Good over other Concepts”. She writes, at p. 75: “The 





this.144 As Murdoch (1970) puts it, the philosopher’s task is to try to “invent” concepts 
that can bring about moral improvement, and this task depends for its cogency on the idea 
that we can come to know an objective reality that is constituted with value. The 
language of virtue and values are naturally metaphorical, but this in no way means that 
they describe anything less real. In this way, Murdoch (1970) characterizes herself as 
fighting under Plato’s “banner” and trying to effect a “movement of return” toward 
Plato’s conception of moral philosophy.145 There may be worry that such a “movement of 
return” is a token of moral nostalgia for a bygone metaphysics, a hankering for that old 
metaphysical consolation—an external telos that could potentially provide a blueprint for 
living a good life.  
 
What remains, then, is to show that coming to see reality more clearly and in a more 
unified way is the basic sense of moral development, and, importantly, whether we can 
understand this view in its Platonic formulation: namely, to identify the idea of the Real 
with the Good. But it will be said that this is difficult to envisage in the way in which 
Plato seems to have, since the dawn of modern science portrays a “hard world” of facts 
bereft of moral value.146 That is, as some philosophers have noted, we no longer conceive 
                                                
144 Cf. Gerard Naddaf’s “Introduction” to Luc Brisson’s Plato the Myth Maker. See 
Chapter 1 above. 
 
145 The Sovereignty of Good (1971). For “banner” see p. 76. For “movement of return” 
see p. 1. Megan Laverty (2007) and Justin Broackes (2012) both affirm that it is clearly 
Plato Murdoch has in mind. See Laverty, Iris Murdoch’s Ethics: A Consideration of her 
Romantic Vision, p. 112. Broackes writes that Murdoch has “Platonic roots”, p. 11, p. 73. 
 
146 See Christine Korsgaard (1996), The Sources of Normativity. Diamond (2010) 




of reality as unified in the way that many thinkers did historically, which is to see reality 
with a “permanent background” underwritten and held together by a divine being, for 
instance, or under the single guise of Reason.147 Science does not discover (because it 
cannot) meaning in reality, as if reality were a (single) story book.148 So in the end, the 
objection continues, we had better treat Plato’s myths as mere myths: there is not a 
metaphysically respectable sense in which we can countenance a thought that the Real is 
the Good. It is fine to consider that thought in philosophical discussion, but it goes 
against the spirit of an empirical education to assume that thought. It is also a fine thing 
to acknowledge that Plato’s “metaphysics” did not prevent him from shedding light on 
empirical psychology, and providing insight into different forms and degrees of 
psychological unity, and describing well the manner in which psychological breakdown 
can occur, for instance.149 In this vein, we might admit under suitable conditions that 
philosophical myths may have some pragmatic and heuristic value. Above I called 
Murdoch’s position “bold”, because she says explicitly that her suggestions are not “a 
                                                                                                                                            
good. For us, reality is something hard, something which resists reason and value, 
something which is recalcitrant to form”, p. 59. 
 
147 Sovereignty of Good. At p. 78, Murdoch writes, “Values which were previously in 
some sense inscribed in the heavens and guaranteed by God collapse into the human 
will”. 
 
148 See John McDowell (1994), Mind and World, pp. 70-71; Cf. Laverty chapter 3: she 
quotes Andrew Bowie (Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From Kant to Nietzsche, 1993, p. 3), 
at p. 64: “There is nothing in science that provides the individual with ‘a sense of the 
meaning of nature’. A conception of experience modeled on science impoverishes ‘our 
world’ by depleting it of feeling, meaning and significance’”.  
 




sort of pragmatism or a philosophy ‘as if’”.150 What sense is left, then? Murdoch (1970) 
rejects the kind of empiricism that is found in (her understanding of) pragmatism.151 
There is nothing empirically discoverable in the nature of reason that dictates against the 
expression of truth through metaphor or myth.  
 
The resistance toward Plato is in the idea that it is not clear in what sense the concepts or 
myths that describe the supersensible are aiding us in our quest for truth, even if we 
acknowledge that it appears that such heuristics really can and do affect our psychology 
positively.152 Murdoch (1970) puts the point vividly: “Is there, however, any true 
transcendence, or is this idea always a consoling dream projected by human need on to an 
empty sky?”153 Murdoch argues for a conception of transcendence according to which 
one sets aside personal fantasy and ego as much as one can, and instead one proceeds 
                                                
150 Sovereignty of Good, p. 61, pp. 72-73. She also places this pragmatist attitude in the 
voice of an interlocutor, at p. 61: “are these [claims] not simply empirical generalizations 
about the psychology of effort or improvement, or what status do you wish them to have? 
Is it just a matter of ‘this works’ or ‘it is as if this were so’?” She responds flatly: “This is 
not a sort of pragmatism or a philosophy ‘as if’”. 
 
151 I am not prepared to assault empiricism in all of its pragmatist guises, for that would 
require a work of its own; I only wish to align myself in questioning, as Murdoch, does 
the kind of empiricism that insists on being able to provide “a non-moral moral 
psychology” and takes value to be projected upon a world by minds.  
 
152 Cf. Lear’s (2011) A Case for Irony. Lear speaks of a “transcendence-inducing quality” 
that philosophers complain Plato builds into his moral psychology to “get the morality he 
wants out of it”. Cf. the formulation of Platonism in mathematics, in McDowell (1998), 
“Mathematical Platonism and Dummetian Anti-realism”, pp. 344-365, in Meaning, 
Knowledge, and Reality. 
Cf. Broackes (2012), who points out that when Murdoch talks “of the Good as 
transcendent, this means something like beyond the veil of selfish consciousness, and 
infinitely beyond our own limited conceptions […] we are not talking of it as an object in 
a heavenly realm of ‘transcendent’ items’”, p. 70. 
 




with the thought that there is an objective reality. The interesting aspect of Murdoch’s 
argument is that because the world is ineluctably known morally, the reality is embedded 
with values that can come to be known. This idea would lead, I think, to a reasonable re-
enchantment of education, since we develop in a world with moral values to which our 
reason can become susceptible.154 We do not have to determine what counts as a fact, 
first, in order to be able to go on in our philosophical investigations in other areas of 
inquiry. As Plato’s Socrates remarks (§1), we do intuit that some activities and responses 
and choices are better than others, but we are often perplexed; therefore, we must 
investigate what is really good for us. Myths and metaphors that provide new 
descriptions of reality and ethical concepts with which to assess our position in logical 
space, that is, assess our grasp on reality, are not our last resort when we have difficulty 
discovering the “facts” and “truth” about ethical reality. Rather, myths and metaphors 
are, as Murdoch argues, the fundamental mode by which we can seek to understand our 
human condition and the reality into which we are born.  
 
John McDowell’s (1998) remarks are pertinent here: “But ethical reality is immensely 
difficult to see clearly. If we are aware of how, for instance, selfish fantasy distorts our 
                                                
154 See John McDowell (1998) “Projection and Truth in Ethics”, in Mind, Value, and 
Reality. There McDowell discusses the notion of becoming susceptible to reasons. And at 
p. 164, he poses a question that captures Murdoch’s resistance toward a dubious 
scientism and its metaphysical assumptions, nicely: “But how good are the credentials of 
a ‘metaphysical understanding that blankly excludes values … from the world in advance 
of any philosophical inquiry into truth?” McDowell goes on: “Surely if the history of 
philosophical reflection on the correspondence theory of truth has taught us anything, it is 
that there is ground for suspicion of the idea that we have some way of telling what can 
count as a fact, prior to and independent of asking what forms of words might count as 
expressing truths, so that a conception of facts could exert some leverage in the 




vision, we shall not be inclined to be confident that we have got things right”.155 But it 
does not follow that we ought to give up on the possibility that there might be cases of 
getting it right; the difficulty arises when we hanker after certainty, a certainty that can 
vindicate from outside the ethical, conceptual scheme and life in which it looks like one 
has gotten it right. It is a fact about our subjectivity that we must investigate truth from 
within the conceptual scheme and life in which we find ourselves. Where does this leave 
us, then? The mythological and metaphorical language that philosophers like Plato 
employ may tempt us into thinking that we can give up on the idea of acquiring a 
capacity or code—what is described as “other philosophical responses” in the passage 
from McDowell below—for verifying whether we have made real moral progress. But 
that is simply an assumption about the role of metaphor and myth in the nature of 
cognition. McDowell (1998) writes: 
 
But though Plato’s Forms are a myth, they are not a consolation; vision of them is 
portrayed as too difficult an attainment for that to be so. The remoteness of the 
Form of the Good is a metaphorical version of the thesis that value is not in the 
world, utterly distinct from the dreary literal version that has obsessed recent 
moral philosophy. The point of the metaphor is the colossal difficulty of attaining 
a capacity to cope clear-sightedly with the ethical reality that is part of the world. 
Unlike other philosophical responses, this one may actually work towards moral 
                                                




improvement; negatively, by inducing humility, and positively, by an inspiring 
effect akin to that of a religious conversion.156  
 
“An inspiring effect akin to that of a religious conversion” is the experience of 
transcendence, of realizing that one has not been seeing things aright, that one has been 
blind to the demands of reasons that appear to have been there all along.157 The nature of 
our consciousness needs ethical paradigms to make more visible the values that we 
otherwise would not see. The move that Murdoch wishes to eschew is a pragmatic one: 
act as if such and such an ethical paradigm is real and you’ll get “real” (“good”) practical 
results, and accomplish this with the fallacious assumption that we are not making any 
metaphysical commitments with respect to the epistemological status of these ethical 
paradigms.  
                                                
156 “Virtue and Reason”, pp. 72-73. At the end of this passage, McDowell cites Iris 
Murdoch’s Sovereignty of the Good as an influence in his thinking. Compare Murdoch’s 
interpretation, in The Fire and Sun, p. 25:  
 
One does not have to read far in Plato to see that the Aristotelian explanation of 
the origin of the Theory of Forms in terms of “logic” is only part of the picture. 
Form the start the need for the Forms in Plato's mind is a moral need. The theory 
expresses a certainty that goodness is not fully expressed in the sensible world, 
therefore living elsewhere”. 
 
I think McDowell’s interpretation of Plato’s myth of the Forms places the emphasis on 
the difficulty of perceiving and evaluating values in our world, which I think is 
preferable, here, rather than emphasizing, as Murdoch does, the phenomenal experience 
that value appears to transcend the material world. 
 
157 Jonathan Lear (2011) discusses the idea of transcendence in Plato’s moral psychology 
astutely: “so the main question for his psychology is why it is that we are creatures who, 
for the most part, do not grasp the real situation we are in; and how it is that on occasion 
an individual can break free of appearances and engage in genuine acts of pretense-
transcendent aspiring. On occasion he attributes this to our erotic natures—our capacity 
to be stunned by beauty and overcome by pretense-transcendent longing” for what is 





Murdoch (1970) writes:  
 
If a scientifically minded empiricism is not to swallow up the study of ethics 
completely, philosophers must try to invent a terminology which shows how our 
natural psychology can be altered by conceptions which lie beyond its range. It 
seems to me that the Platonic metaphor of the idea of Good provides a suitable 
picture here.158 
 
Speaking of conceptions which lie beyond the range of our capacities for understanding 
and their reality as something that does not depend on human minds is a familiar way of 
capturing an aspect of Platonism that philosophers typically deplore. But is this a fair 
portrayal of Platonism? Platonism accepts the premises that “The development of 
consciousness in human beings is inseparably connected with the use of metaphor. 
Metaphors are not merely peripheral decorations or even useful models, they are 
fundamental forms of our awareness of our condition”.159 Some of Plato’s myths, as I 
                                                
158 Sovereignty of Good, p. 69. 
 
159 Ibid, p. 75. Cf. David Robjant (2012): “The Good is not a ‘concept’ but is (in our 
experience of the better and of our distance from perfection) a fact of life. Plato’s Good is 
[quoting Murdoch] ‘… not something obscure. We experience both the reality of 
perfection and its distance away. … If we read [Plato’s] images aright they are not only 
enlightening and profound but amount to a statement of a belief which most people 
unreflectively hold’”, p. 66; Robjant’s quote of Murdoch is from Metaphysics as a Guide 
to Morals, p. 508. Cf. also Murdoch’s remark from Metaphysics as a Guide, p. 182: 
“Plato … ‘saves’ metaphysics by showing how the noumenal and the phenomenal exist 
inside each human life. There is nowhere else, it is all here”. Robjant applauds 





have tried to show, turn to mythological language to capture the attitude we ought to 
bring to our efforts in trying to see reality better. Plato’s myths induce humility in making 
vivid the thought that reality and our condition in it are tremendously difficult to grasp 
clear-sightedly. The point is that Plato’s interest in metaphysical thinking is best 
understood as an attempt to understand better our condition in sensible reality. And it is 
within sensible reality that, Murdoch (1970) flatly declares, “A deep understanding of 
any field of human activity […] involves an increasing revelation of degrees of 
excellence”, such that we eventually intuit the idea of there being a perfect good.160  
 
The Form of the Good is the idea of perfection, and Plato declares that it is most real 
because to see it, to understand it, would be for a human mind to understand her own 
condition in nature and the relation in which her neighbor stands to her. The Form of the 
Good is transcendent because the totality of reality is a whole, the knowledge of which 
exceeds our human capacities at any given moment in time, and therefore moral 
improvement is a “never ending task”, as Murdoch (1970) says. Plato is critical of the 
kind of skepticism that precludes or eschews unified ethical reality, for that attitude is 
demonstrably lazy (Meno), or miserably elitist (Thrasymachus), or leads to a relativism 
that eschews the idea of a truly good man simplicata (Protagoras), or leads to a sophistic 
intensity without philosophical substance (Gorgias). Understanding our human condition 
and our relation to reality as Socrates did, philosophically, is stated in the Apology with 
the saturnine thought that “human wisdom” is worth very little: for the starting point is 
with the realization that one knows that one knows nothing—everything is in vain, as 
                                                




Murdoch (1970) writes. There is a paradoxical attitude in Socrates in that his pondering 
of the worthlessness of human wisdom in no way detracts from his motivation for 
philosophical investigation, and this must be because this says nothing against his belief 
that there is a reality to be investigated, the world and oneself. Investigating ourselves 
reveals that metaphor and images and models are fundamental to our understanding, 
which is to say that they are constitutive of our logos. One need not resort to myth in 
philosophy, for it is fundamental to philosophical investigation. And it is not peripheral to 
education—and there is, as I have argued, only moral education: when we direct our 
thinking toward understanding (some bit of) reality, always from our contingent, 
historical position, we mythologize. To put it in a Murdochean way, muthos is a persona 
of logos.161 In a way, my aim has been to come to this conclusion so that we might say, 
painlessly: when we investigate and seek to explain reality, we mythologize because we 
cannot do otherwise.  
 
The idea that the Form of the Good is necessary in our efforts to become morally better, 
and that it must guide our efforts in investigating reality is indeed, after all, a myth. 
Educational theorists and moral philosophers would do well to (re)mythologize 
education, like Plato and Rousseau did; and educators would do well to teach students 
how to mythologize philosophically, that is, investigate reality and themselves. My 
argument is that leading students to think that investigating the world and seeking 
                                                
161 I think this line of thought explains better how Plato can so easily slip between eikos 
muthos and eikos logos in the Timaeus (pace Brisson, 2012) without feeling any need to 
































In this dissertation, a study of Plato’s use of myths showed that for Plato moral education 
is the central goal of education for a human life. From this point of view, other subjects 
of study are seen as integral parts of moral education that aim to further moral 
development. For Plato, the study of mathematics, for instance, or physical exercise, or 
the study of history, or cosmology are all seen as playing a part in the overall education 
of the person, which is a moral education aimed at living a good and flourishing life. I 
have argued that a philosophical education—or an education in philosophical and 
mythological thinking—for Plato, is fundamentally a conception of moral education 
because, unlike the other disciplines of study, a philosophical education (eventually) 
unifies all of the domains of study and inquiry into a unified picture of moral education. 
A philosophical education reveals that each particular aim of each study can be unified 
with one another under a larger moral or ethical end: to know and live a good life. To 
recall, I discussed the passage from Plato’s Republic in which Socrates says that the study 
of philosophy begins with the cultivation of a love of learning, which then leads to the 
study of philosophical, mythological, and dialectical investigation, and culminates with a 
“unified vision” (“σύνοψιν”) of the end of the whole of education.162 Thus, an education 
in philosophy plays the important role of synthesizing each part of education into a 
unified moral education. I have tried to show, with the myths I have examined in this 
study, that Plato uses myth, in philosophical dialogue, to educate the reader—directly and 
                                                
162 Recall again Iris Murdoch’s (1990) reading of Phaedrus 249b, that Plato thinks “It is 





sometimes dramatically through a portrayal of the educational transformation of 
Socrates’ interlocutors (think of Glaucon of the Republic). The philosophical education 
that Plato brings about by his use of myths in the dialogues is multifarious. The myths 
can educate the reader in philosophical explanation, argumentation or demonstration, and 
methods of investigation. At another level, Plato’s philosophical myth, drawing as it were 
from the power of the whole dialogue in which it is dialectically situated, seeks to 
persuade the reader to consider or adopt an orientation, framework, or outlook that, by 
Plato’s lights, are ethically or morally beneficial or superior to some other view (Gorgias 
527e: that to practice justice and the rest of virtue is the best life). Plato’s myths, whether 
they are about scientific phenomenon or philosophical quandaries, aim to persuade us of 
a certain ethical outlook. Hence Socrates is able to say (for instance at Phaedo 114d and 
Meno 86b-c) that practically espousing certain philosophical myths, even if they are not 
true in every sense, can nevertheless motivate us to pursue a life of virtue, and render us 
better off.  
 
Plato’s ideas about pursuing a better life lead to the question of the role of the teacher. If 
all education is moral education, and moral education is dependent on philosophical 
education, then teachers must, in an important sense, become philosophers. One might 
balk at this claim if one is inclined to think that being a moral educator is not the proper 
role of the teacher. One might think that teachers should remain neutral so as not to 
detract from the student’s moral autonomy.163 On first glance, moral neutrality—or 
                                                
163 See Kristjan Kristjansson (2006), “Habituated Reason: Aristotle and the ‘Paradox of 




abstaining from influencing one’s students morally—may seem attractive for education. 
But looking back to Murdoch, as I discussed in the previous chapter, we saw that there is 
no such morally neutral position for the teacher.  
 
In the last chapter, following Iris Murdoch and her reading of Plato, I tried to argue that 
we could not separate moral education out from the rest of what goes on in education, 
since Murdoch shows that there is no such morally neutral position. Murdoch explains 
that it was tempting, for some at least, to think that a morally neutral inquiry into the 
nature of morality or moral concepts could take place because it appeared that scientific 
inquiry had provided a paradigmatic model of such an inquiry. Thus, one might think that 
a teacher can educate from a morally neutral position, without imposing any particular 
moral outlook on her students. However, Murdoch shows that there is no morally neutral 
position that the human mind can occupy. It follows that in any moment of education the 
student is moving toward some moral position or other, that is, developing moral 
capacities and inclinations in some way or other; and the teacher inevitably plays a role in 
that. The main point I wished to advance from this discussion was that if Murdoch’s 
argument is cogent—there is no morally neutral position—then it applies just as well to 
education. There is no morally neutral education, even if one takes oneself only to be 
teaching mathematics, science, or literacy. And if this is the case, I think it follows that 
philosophy should play an important and unique role in education, since philosophy is 
well equipped to inquire into morality. In other words, since every life is in some way 
moral, and social life is permeated with a multiplicity of moral views, it would be 
                                                                                                                                            





practically beneficial to incorporate a philosophical education into teacher education and 
education for students at the appropriate age.164 I have interpreted Plato to hold a view of 
this kind, namely that a philosophical education is in its nature essentially moral 
education, and I have tried to show that an education in philosophy that incorporates 
myths can provide the tools with which to evaluate moral concepts, paradigms, and 
lifestyles, as well as develop our own capacity to posit new moral pictures, metaphors, 
and images. Now, since I have argued that for Plato myths play a central role in a robust 
philosophical education and I have interpreted Plato to hold a view according to which a 
philosophical education is in its nature essentially moral education, it follows that a 
philosophical education would be important for teacher educators and students. But the 
question comes up: what would constitute such an educational program, for teachers and 
for students? This is a difficult question and would require a treatise all by itself. From 
this study, however, we can follow Plato and draw some provisional ideas about a part of 
that education, namely how educators might select materials that would function a 
philosophical myths in a classroom, myths that would help students develop 
philosophically and morally. I will therefore conclude this study by saying a little more 
about integrating myths into a philosophical education for teachers and students, although 
my thoughts here are necessarily adumbrated and in need of further research. In other 
words, I hope to point to the following areas in need of further research.  
 
                                                
164 It is not my purpose to determine exactly when, as it were, an overt or robust 
philosophical education should begin, although I do think it could very well begin before 
higher education. I only wish to emphasize what I take to be Plato’s position that moral 




If teachers are going to be moral educators, and if, as Plato says, philosophical myths 
play an essential role in moral education, then educators would benefit from training and 
instruction in how to choose and teach myths so that they can have the impact Plato 
believes myths can have on the transformation of the individual. There are two criteria 
that are essential to effective use and selection of myths for the classroom, which I wish 
to discuss briefly. 
 
The first criterion may seem obvious, and perhaps even a truism, but the application of 
the criteria does not appear straightforward. If we refer back to The Oldest Systematic 
Program of German Idealism” document, which I discussed in the Prologue to this study, 
the myths that a teacher uses must be reasonable and logical: they must, as the 
anonymous author declares, “stand in the service of ideas”. That is to say, the myths must 
aim, in some way, at conveying an explanation, demonstration, or argument that can be 
assessed and analyzed (to some degree, though not exhaustively). For if the myth were 
incoherent or unanalyzable it could not figure into a philosophical education. Yet, on the 
other hand, if the myth were so conspicuous in its logical form, such that it could easily 
be rendered into syllogistic form toward a proof, for instance, then the student or teacher 
may wonder why it was written in its mythological form in the first instance. Indeed, the 
student may see the myth, or the author of the myth, as trying to seduce the student, at 
some sub-rational or emotive level—a maneuver that some readers have mistakenly 
attributed to Plato—and feel manipulated. Philosophical arguments, whether they take a 
mythological or syllogistic form, ought to be innocent of an intention to manipulate, 




not seek to seduce the reader into certain philosophical views or ethical orientations, 
through vivacious language, powerful narrative, or the threat of a painful afterlife—or 
whatever—but they rather seek to lead the reader into further philosophical investigation, 
and motivate the reader to consider the intrinsic value of pursuing virtue, among other 
things. Thus if we reject, as I have argued we should, that the use of philosophical myths 
is a sign that the philosopher has reached the limits of argument, or seeks to transcend 
argument, the philosophical myths must serve a philosophical end: either to argue a point, 
demonstrate the truth or falsehood of a proposition, or set of propositions, answer a 
philosophical question, raise a philosophical question, or seek to persuade someone of a 
philosophical position, and spur further philosophical investigation. That the myths 
should serve a philosophical purpose is beneficial for students, since it will make it all the 
more difficult for any one student or teacher to claim an exclusive insight, like Ion of 
Homer, into the myth. Thus, to some degree, the myth must be amenable to philosophical 
analysis. Again, this may seem to be a truism: that a philosophical myth should be 
philosophically analyzable.  
 
Setting criteria for the myth to be reasonable, logical to some degree—although there 
may be details and descriptions, without detriment, in a philosophical myth that may not 
be suitable for logical analysis—, not incoherent, and philosophically analyzable entails 
another, related criterion. For instance, that the myth should not abandon altogether (if 
this is even conceptually possible) the relation of cause and effect, and other relations 
students and teachers would be familiar with from experience, such that the myth 




grammatically, conceptually, and stylistically that the student can engage with it 
fruitfully. One of the claims of the myth of recollection in the Meno, that our souls have 
been around eternally and possess memories of all the facts, are strange indeed; but they 
are not incoherent in the context of the dialogue. The reader can see that the soul’s 
memories and the process of recollection, or investigation, has a causal relation of some 
kind, even if it may be difficult to conceive of idea of the soul having existed from 
eternity and having perceived all facts. The main question, here, is that there still remains 
the difficulty of how conspicuous the logical form of the myth should be in order for it to 
be most effective in a philosophical and moral education.  
 
Second, following an asseveration from The Oldest Systematic Program of German 
Idealism, some or perhaps all of the myths that figure into a philosophical ought to have 
an aesthetic quality such that the student will be drawn into it and learn to find the 
manifestations of reason in its mythological guise pleasing and beautiful. Again, I do not 
think that the aesthetic quality of a philosophical myth should be directed at an effort to 
seduce the student into a certain philosophical view without argument and instead by 
invoking passion for a position. Much more needs to be said here, but the aesthetic 
quality of a philosophical myth can play an important role in invoking, instead, 
(philosophical) wonder and desire for philosophical investigation. It is worth researching 
more precisely how the aesthetic quality of a philosophical myth might invoke wonder 
and a desire for philosophical investigation, two qualities Plato and Aristotle avow. The 
aim of invoking (philosophical) wonder in the student is to inspire and motivate the 




classical understanding, is tantamount to cultivating a philosophical disposition—or a 
predilection for philosophy. Again, I cannot spell out, precisely, under what 
circumstances philosophical wonder is invoked, nor the nature of the aesthetic qualities 
of a philosophical myth that spur further philosophical investigation, but for Plato 
philosophical investigation is beautiful. The love of learning is connected with a love of 
what is beautiful. Iris Murdoch (1990) writes:  
 
Love of beauty and desire to create inspire us to activities which increase our 
grasp of the real… Plato does not analyse in detail how selfish love changes into 
unselfish love, but the asides in the early dialogues do not suggest that this should 
simply be thought of as a transference of affection to philosophy.165 
 
I read Murdoch to be saying that Plato’s aim is more than making philosophy look 
aesthetically pleasing and attractive so that one might acquire an affection for philosophy. 
The aim is not to make philosophical discourse or inquiry itself more aesthetic in form so 
as to make philosophical activity more attractive and pleasing (although it may do that 
too); but the goal is rather to show that it is intrinsic to moral development to learn to find 
the morally good life beautiful. And this change in view is effected by a philosophical 
education that helps itself to art and myth. The anonymous author of the The Oldest 
Systematic Program for German Idealism says, with confidence:  
 
                                                




Finally the idea which unites all, the idea of beauty, the word take in the higher 
platonic sense. I am convinced that highest act of reason, which, in that it 
comprises all ideas, is an aesthetic act, and that truth and goodness are united like 
sisters only in beauty— The philosopher must possess just as much aesthetic 
power as the poet. 
 
One can surmise that the “platonic sense” which the author attaches to the idea of beauty 
is significant, in the role that beauty is to play in the project of promulgating 
philosophical ideas through the use of reasonable (i.e., philosophical) myths for all 
people, not just trained philosophers. While it is not clear what the “highest act of reason” 
would amount to, it does seem that the author is suggesting that the highest act of reason 
would be reason’s highest achievement, an actualization of its highest potential, and that 
this would have to be aesthetic as well, since reason is able to appreciate beauty and 
conceive of beautiful things. If we place the emphasis on the fact that since all creatures 
endowed with reason are able to appreciate beauty, the aesthetic quality of philosophical 
arguments, in mythological form, can play an important role in assessing its cogency. The 
idea is that the educational value and, even cogency, of a philosophical myth turns on its 
aesthetic quality, because aesthetic qualities are something that can be perceived and 
evaluated by students with their faculty of reason. The aesthetic quality of a philosophical 
myth might function as something which draws a student’s interest, but its nature would 
also be something which could be philosophically assessed in tandem with the 
philosophical ideas found in the myth. Just how the appreciation of the aesthetic qualities 




area that would require more research. Philosophical myths would be a fruitful area of 
study with respect to the role of aesthetics in a philosophical education. I hope that the 
questions, in this area of research, will be further clarified and improved. 
 
Lastly, what remains to consider is the ways in which the application of these criteria 
might assist the teacher in his or her selection of philosophical myths, and which sort of 
medium might be a suitable vehicle for bringing philosophical myths to the classroom. 
For instance, would it be most advantageous for students to interact with a philosophical 
myth that came from literature, works of fiction? Or would it be helpful for students to 
interact with a philosophical myth that was delivered through a digital platform, like a 
video game or an animated television series? Or some other medium like staged drama? 
Would incorporating visual media be most helpful to students? Can a philosophical 
education motivate students to purse philosophy if were delivered through movies or 
comic books? There are many questions here, and I hope that research in this area will 
prove interesting and fruitful.  
 
It seems that the crux of the matter here is whether the medium that is chosen to deliver 
the philosophical myths spurs further, active philosophical investigation in the students. 
Thus, a medium that delivers philosophical myths to the students whereby the students 
are more passive participants in the learning may be less effective for a philosophical 
education. One way to capture the contrast between active and passive participation is to 
think of what medium will require the student to exercise her reason and imagination as 




instantiated in a television series may not require as much active participation by the 
student. Since the medium is primarily visual, the student does not have to exercise her 
imagination as much as she would if the medium were written word. In the case of 
reading a philosophical myth, whether it is embedded in a dialogue or in a work of 
fiction, the student must exercise her imagination in creating the images that are 
described in words. Perhaps that is one reason that Plato chose to embed his myths in a 
dialogue, since the reader must be actively following the dialectical exchange, which is 
not visually but verbally represented to her. Nevertheless, the question is: what about 
some medium will help the student actively engage with the philosophical myth? Comic 
books, for instance, are an interesting medium in that they are comprised of visual images 
and written words. The visual images, however, are schematic, capturing only some of 
the scenes of the story. In this medium, students would exercise their imagination, filling 
in on their own the scenes that are not depicted. The question, then, is how the images 
would foster philosophical engagement along with the written part of the medium? For 
instance, would adding some schematic scenes to one of Plato’s dialogues make the 
philosophical engagement with the dialogue more active, salient, and conducive for 
learning philosophy and in turn morally beneficial? It seems that a lot turns on whether a 
philosophical education that used philosophical myths employed visual material and 
content. There are two questions here. First, would an education in philosophy—and 
therefore moral education—in general, benefit from the use of visual material and 
content? Second, would philosophical myths in particular benefit from employing visual 




question, but I hope that it might provide a starting point for teachers who are interested 
in providing a philosophical and moral education.  
 
Indeed, the questions I have raised above and the criteria I have sketched reinforce the 
point that there are many more difficult and interesting questions pertaining to the 
curriculum of a philosophical education. There is more research to be done with respect 
to finding works and media that would be suitable for a philosophical education, 
according to the criteria I have discussed, as well as other pertinent criteria yet to be 
researched. 
 
 I have tried to show in this dissertation that a philosophical education is fundamentally a 
moral education, and that educators must take on the task of moral education directly, 
since it cannot be evaded. And in addition to whatever else might be an important 
element in a philosophical education, philosophical myths do play a vital role, a role that 
















	  	  	  
Altman, William H. F. Plato the Teacher: The Crisis of the Republic. Lanham: Lexington 
 Books, 2012. Annas, Julia. "Plato's Myth of Judgment." Phronesis 27, no. 1 (1982): 
 119-143.  
Anscombe, G. E. M. "Modern Moral Philosophy." Philosophy 33, no. 124 (1958): 1-19. 
Betegh, Ga'bor. "Tale, Teology and Teleology in the Phaedo." In Plato's Myths, edited by 
Catalin Partenie, 77-100. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
Behler, Diana I. 161-163. In Philosophy of German Idealism: Fichte, Jacobi, and 
 Schelling, edited by Ernst Behler. Continuum, 1987. 
Bishop, Paul. "Disenchantment in Education, or: 'Whither art thou gone, fair world?'  
 Has the Magic gone from the Ivory Tower?" International Journal of Jungian 
 Studies, March 2012: 55-59.  
Bottici, Chiara. A Philosophy of Political Myth. Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
Bowie, Andrew. Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From Kant to Nietzsche. New York: 
 Manchester University Press, 1993. 
Brandwood, Leonard. A Word Index to Plato. Leeds: Maney & Son, 1976.  
Brisson, Luc. Plato the Myth Maker. Edited by Gerard Naddaf. Translated by Gerard 
Naddaf. University of Chicago, 1998.  
—. "Why is the Timaeus Called an Eikos Muthos and an Eikos Logos?" In Myths, Plato 




 Pierre Destrée and Francisco Gonzalez, 369-392. Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2012.  
Broackes, Justin, ed. Iris Murdoch, Philosopher. Oxford University Press, 2012. 
Burnyeat, Myles. "Culture and Society in Plato's Republic." The Tanner Lectures on 
 Human Values, December 1997. 
—. "Aristotle on Learning to be Good." In Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, edited by Amelie 
 Oksenberg Rorty. Berkley and Losangeles, CA: University of California Press, 
 1980.  
—. "Eikos Muthos." In Plato's Myths, edited by Catalin Partenie. Cambridge University 
 Press, 2008. 
—. "The Past in the Present: Plato as Educator of Nineteenth Century Britain." In 
 Philosophers on Education: New Historical Perspectives, edited by Amélie 
 Oksenberg Rorty, 352-372. London: Routledge, 1998.  
—. "The Truth of Tripartion." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106, no. 1 (2006): 
 1-23. Buxton, R., ed. From Myth to Reason? Studies in the Development of Greek 
 Thought. Oxford University Press, 1999.  
Carmola, Kateri. "Noble Lying: Justice and Intergeneratinoal Tension in Plato's 
 Republic." Political Theory 31, no. 1 (2003): 39-62. 
Carr, David. "Moralized Psychology or Psychologized Morality? Ethics and Psychology 
 in Recent Theorizing about Moral and Character Education." Educational Theory 
57, no. 4 (2007): 389-402.  
Collobert, Catherine. "The Platonic Art of Myth-Making: Myth as Informative." In Plato 
 and Myth: Studies on the Use and Status of Platonic Myths, edited by Catherine 




 2012.  
Conle, Carola, and Michale DeBeyer. "Appraising the Ethos of Experiential Narrative: 
 Key Aspects of a Methodological Challenge." Educational Theory 59, no. 1 (2009). 
Daniels, Charles B. "The Afterlife Myth in Plato's Gorgias." The Journal of Value 
 Inquiry, no. 26 (1992): 271-279. 
Dent, Nicholas. "Virtue, Eudaimonia and Teleological Ethics." In Virtue Ethics and 
Moral Education, edited by David Carr and Jan Steutel, 21-34. London, New York: 
Routledge, 1999.  
Diamond, Cora. "Having a Rough Story about what Moral Philosophy Is." 15, no. 1 
 (1983): 155-169. 
—. "Murdoch the Explorer." Philosophical topics 38, no. 1 (2010): 51-80. —. "The 
 Importance of Being Human." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 29 (March 
1991): 35-62.  
Dixsaut, Monique. "Myth and Interpretation." In Plato and Myth: Studies on the Use and 
 Status of Platonic Myths, edited by Catherine Collobert, Pierre Destreé and 
 Francisco J. Gonzalez, 25-46. Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2012. 
Empiricus, Sextus. Outlines of Scepticism. Edited by Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes. 
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.  
Ferrari, G. R. F. "Glaucon's Reward, Philosophy's Debt: the Myth of Er." In Plato's 
 Myths, edited by Catalin Partenie, 116-133. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
 Press, 2009. 
—. "The Freedom of Platonic Myth." In Plato and Myth: Studies on the Use and Status of 




 Gonzalez, 67-86. Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2012.  
Grasso, Elsa. "Myth, Image and Likeness in Plato's Timaeus." In Plato and Myth: 
 Studies on the Use and Status of Platonic Myths, edited by Catherine Collobert, 
 Pierre Destree and Francisco J. Gonzalez, 343-368. Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2012. 
Griswold, Charles L. "Plato on Rhetoric and Poetry". 2014. 
 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-rhetoric/.  
Hansen, David T. "Finding One's Way Home: Notes on the Texture of Moral 
 Experience." Studies in Philosophy and Education 15, no. 3 (1996).  
Herman, Barbara. "Making Room for Character." In Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: 
 Rethinking Happiness and Duty, edited by Stephen Engstrom and Jennifer Whiting, 
 21- 34. Cambridge: Cambrige University Press, 1996.  
Hinchliffe, Georffrey. "Plato and the Love of Learning." Ethics and Education 1, no. 2 
 (October 2006): 117-131.  
Irwin, Terrance. Plato's Moral Theory: the Early and Middle Dialogues. Oxford 
 University Press, 1979.  
Jonas, Mark. "Education for Epiphany: The Case of Plato's Lysis." Educational Theory 
 65, no. 1 (2015): 39-51.  
Jr., Anthony G. Rud. "The Use and Abuse of Socrates in Present Day Teaching." 
 Education Policy Analysis Archives 5, no. 20 (1997).  
Kahn, Charles H. "The Myth of the Statesman." In Plato's Myths, edited by Catalin 
 Partenie, 148-166. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.  
Katsafanas, Paul. "The Concept of Unified Agency in Nietzsche, Plato, and Schiller." 




Kent, Bonnie. "Moral Growth and the Unity of the Virtues." In Virtue Ethics and Moral 
 Education, edited by David Carr and Jan Steutel, 109-128. London, New York: 
 Routledge, 1999. 
Kerr, Jeannie. "Habituation: A Method for Cultivating Starting Points in the Ethical 
 Life." Journal of Philosophy of Education 45 (2011): 643-655.  
Korsgaard, Christine M. "Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant." The Journal 
 of Ethics 3, no. 1 (1999): 1-29. 
Kristjansson, Kristjan. "Educating Emotions or Moral Selves: A False Dichotomy? ." 
 Educational Philosophy and Theory 42, no. 7 (2010).  
—. "Educating Moral Emotions or Moral Selves: A False Dichotomy?" Educational 
 Philosophy and Theory 42, no. 4 (2010): 397-409. 
—. "Habituated Reason: Aristotle and the 'Paradox of Moral Education'." Theory and 
 Research in Education 4, no. 1 (2006): 101-122.  
Kurke, Leslie. "Plato, Aesop, and the Beginnings of Mimetic Prose." Representations 94, 
 no. 1 (Spring 2006): 6-52. 
Kvernbekk, Tone. "On Identifying Narratives." Studies in Philosophy and Education 22, 
 no. 3 (2003).  
Lear, Jonathan. A Case for Irony. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011.  
—. "Inside and Outside the Republic." Phronesis 2, no. 37 (1992): 184-215. 
—. The Efficacy of Myth in Plato's Republic. Vol. XIX, in Proceedings of the Boston 
 Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, 35-56. Brill Academic Publishers, Inc., 
2004.  




 Education 21, no. 4 (2002). 
LoShan, Zhang. "Plato's Counsel on Education." In Philosphers on Education: New 
 Historical Perspectives, edited by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, 30-48. London: 
Routledge, 1998. 
Lovibond, Sabina. Realism and Imagination in Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell, 1980. 
MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory. Edited by 3rd. Notre Dame, 
 IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007.  
Mark Jonas, Yoshiaki Nakazawa, James Braun. "Appetite, Reason, and Education in 
 Socrates' 'City of Pigs'." Phronesis 57, no. 4 (2012): 332-357.  
McDowell, John. Deliberation and Moral Development in Aristotle's Ethics. Cambridge: 
 Harvard University Press, 2009.  
—. "Might there be External Reasons?" In Mind, Value, and Reality, 95-111. Cambridge: 
 Harvard University Press, 1998.  
—. Mind and World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996. 
—. "Two Sorts of Naturalism." In Mind, Value, and Reality, 167-197. Cambridge: 
 Harvard University Press, 1998.  
—. "Virtue and Reason." In Mind, Value, and Reality, 50-73. Cambridge: Harvard 
 University Press, 1998. 
McGrath, Elizabeth. "Platonic Myth in Renaissance Iconography." In Plato's Myths, 
 edited by Catlin Paternie, 206-238. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
Mintz, Avie. "From Grade School to Law School: Socrates' Legacy in Education." In A 
 Companion to Socrates, edited by Rachana Kamtekar Sara Ahbel-Rappe. Malden , 




Morgan, Kathryn. Myth and Philosophy from the Pre-Socratics to Plato. Cambridge: 
 Cambridge University Press, 2000.  
Mortensen, Klaus Peter. "The Double Call: on Bildung in a Literary and Reflective 
 Perspective." Journal of Philosophy of Education 36, no. 3 (Austust 2002). 
Moss, Jessica. "Right Reason in Plato and Aristotle: On the Meaning of Logos." 
 Phronesis 59, no. 3 (2014): 181-230.  
Most, Glenn W. "From Logos to Mythos." In From Myth to Reason? Studies in the 
 Development of Greek Thought, edited by Richard Buxton, 25-50. Oxford 
 University Press, 1999. 
—. "Plato's Exoteric Myths." In Plato and Myth: Studies on the Use and Status of 
 Platonic Myths, edited by Catherine Collobert, Pierre Destrée and Francisco J. 
 Gonzalez, 13-24. Boston: Brill, 2012.  
Murdoch, Iris. Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals. Penguin, 1993. 
—. The Fire and the Sun: Why Plato Banished the Artists. Viking Penguin, 1977.  
—. The Sovereignty of Good. New York: Routledge, 1971.  
—. "Vision and Choice in Morality." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
 Supplementary 30 (1956): 32-58. 
Murray, Penelope. "Platonic Myths." In A Companion to Greek Mythology, edited by 
 Ken Dowden and Niall Livingstone, 179-193. Blackwell, 2011.  
—. "What is a Muthos for Plato?" In From Myth to Reason? Studies in the Development 
 of Greek Thought, edited by Richard Buxton, 251-263. Oxford University Press, 
 1999. 




 Philosophy from Sophistry." In Virtues of Authenticity. Princeston University Press, 
 1999. 
Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Birth of Tragedy. Translated by Walter Kaufmann. Random 
 House, 1967 
—. Genealogy of Morals. Translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books, 
 1989 
—. Untimely Meditations. Edited by Daniel Breazeale. Translated by R. J. Hollingdale. 
 Cambridge: Cambridge Univerity Press, 1997. 
Nightingale, Andrea Wilson. Genres in Dialogue: Plato and the Construct of Philosophy. 
 Cambridge University Press, 1995.  
O'dea, Jane. "Pursuing Truth in Narrative Research." Journal of Philosophy of Education 
 28, no. 2 (1994).  
Palermo, James. "Reading Mann and Cubberly on the Myth of Equal Educational 
 Opportunity: A Barthesian Critique." Philosophy of Education 21, no. 6 (2000): 
 192-200.  
Partenie, Catalin, ed. Plato's Myths. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.  
Paul Standish, David Bakhurst, Jan Derry. "The Disenchantment in Education and the 
 Re-Enchantment of the World." (Philosophy of Education Society, Great Britain) 
 2008.  
Pekarsky, Daniel. "Socratic Teaching: A Critical Assessment." Journal of Moral 
 Education 23, no. 2 (1994): 119-134. Plato. Plato: Complete Works. Edited by John 
 Cooper. Hackett, 1997.  




 Educational Theory 54, no. 1 (2004): 1-.  
Rowe, Christopher. "Myth, History, and Dialectic in Plato's Republic and Timaeus- 
Critias." In From Myth to Reason? Studies in the Development of Greek Thought, edited 
 by Richard Buxton, 263-278. Oxford University Press, 1999.  
—. Plato and the Art of Philosophical Writing. Cambridge University Press, 2007.  
—. "The Charioteer and his Horses: an Example of Platonic Myth-making." In Plato's 
 Myths, edited by Catalin Partenie, 134-147. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
 Press, 2009.  
Russell, Daniel C. "Misunderstanding the Myth in the Gorgias." The Southern Journal of 
 Philosophy 39 (2001): 557-573. 
Saito, Naoko. "Ourselves in Translation: Stanley Cavell and Philosophy as 
 Autobiography." Journal of Philosophy of Education 43, no. 2 (May 2009).  
Schofield, Malcolm. "Fraternit'e, In'egalite', la parole de Dieu: Plato's Authoritarian Myth 
 of Political Legitimation." In Plato's Myths, 101-115. Cambridge: Cambridge 
 University Press, 2009.  
—. "Fraternité, Inégalité, la Parole de Dieu: PLato's Authoritarian Myth of Political 
 Legitimation." In Plato's Myths, edited by Catlain Paternie, 101-115. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009.  
Sedley, David. "Teleology and Myth in the Phaedo." Proceedings of the Boston 
 Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, 1990: 359-83.  
—. "Myth, Punishment and Politics in the Gorgias." In Plato's Myths, edited by Catalin 
 Partenie, 51-76. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.  




 Sensibility." Journal of Moral Education 41, no. 1 (March 2012): 117-142.  
Smith, Janet. "Plato's Use of Myth in the Education of Philosophic Man." Phoenix 40, no. 
 1 (1986): 20-34.  
Tarrant, Harold A. S. "Myth as a Tool of Persuasion in Plato." Antichthon 24 (1990): 19- 
 31.  
—"Literal and Deeper Meaning in Platonic Myths." By Plato and Myth: Studies on the 
 Use and Status of Platonic Myths, edited by Catherine Collobert, Pierre Destrée and 
 Francisco J. Gonzalez, 47-66. Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2012.  
Taylor, Charles. "Ethics and Ontology." Journal of Philosophy, no. 6 (2003): 305-320. 
—. Souces of the Self: the Making of Modern Identity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
 University Press, 1989. —. Sources of the Self. Cambridge: Harvard University 
 Press, 1989.  
Trabatonni, Franco. "Myth and Truth in Plato's Phaedrus." In Plato and Myth: Studies on 
 the Use and Status of Platonic Myths, edited by Catherine Collobert, Pierre Destrée 
 and Francisco J. Gonzalez, 305-322. Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2012. 
Vasiliou, Iakovos. "The Role of Good Upbringing in Aristotle's Ethics." Philosophy and 
 Phenomenological Research LVI (December 1996): 4.  
Vogler, Candace. "The Moral of the Story." Critical Inquiry 34, no. 1 (Autumn 2007): 5- 
 35. 
Williams, Bernard. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University 
 Press, 1985.  
—"Internal and External Reasons." In Rational Action, edited by Ross Harrison, 17-28. 




Wright, Moira von. "Narrative Imagination and Taking the Perspective of Others." 
 Studies in Philosophy and Education 21, no. 4 (2002). 
